Subject: HAB: Help wanted on "ideal speech situation"
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2000 21:39:03 +0300




Dear Habermas reader,

I like to ask help on the subject of "ideal speech situation". Below is part of one article which I am working. Please read it and send me comments. This subject is very difficult and Habermas is even more obscure in this point. Let me know, am I totally in wrong track. The references are missing, sorry about that.

Rauno Huttunen
University of Jyväskylä

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2. Habermas on ideal and real communication

2.1 The concept of ideal speech situation

With the concept of ideal speech situation Habermas meant idealized conditions of speech. In
ideal speech situation condition for argumentative action are believed to be ideal one that
means that in the discourse there is no other force that the force of better argument. Not inner
(example prejudices) or outer (ideologies, short of time, short of knowledge) restrictions does 
determine the out come of discourse. Only the force of better argument - which guide line is
immanent to the language itself - determines the speech situation. In ideal spceeh situation
systematically distorted communication is excluded (Habermas 1984a, 177; Warheitstheorien). In this imagin-

ative (but also factual) ideal speech situation there is possible to gain consensus (or consent)
about all those subjects (questions, substance)  that generally are discursive in their nature Ma-

ny questions example concerning good life and personal convictions are not discursive sub
jects, but modern pluralistic society we can live together without sharing common view about
good life - common misinterpretation is to claim that Habermas demands overrunning (over
reaching) totalitarian style consensus.

Habermas sets four conditions for ideal speech situation:

i) All who potential participants of discourse, must have equal rights use speech acts in such
way, that discourse could be permanently open to claims and counter claims, questions and
answers.   
ii) All who participate to discourse, must have equal chances to present interpretations, to
make assertions, recommendations, explanations and corrections (I believe this means presen
tation of ad hoc hypothesis) and also equal chances to problematizes (problematisieren) or
challenge the validity of these presentations, to make arguments for and against. This way all
possible critics shows up and no unreflected prejudice remains. 

These two conditions make possible free discourse and pure communicative action where:
iii) participants by presentative speech acts (repräseantative Sprechakte)  express equally their
attitudes, feelings and wishes and also where participants are honest to each other (sich selbst
gegenüber wahrhaftig sind) and make their inner nature (intentions) transparent.  
iv) participants have equally chances to order and resist orders, to promise and refuse, to be
accountable for one's conduct and to demand accountability from others. Only this way the
reciprocity of action-anticipations (Reziprozität der Verhaltenserwartungen) is realised
(Habermas 1984a, 177-178; see also Benhabib 1986, 285). 

According to Habermas conditions i) and iv) must be full filled for discourse in general could
be possible. Second condition (the postulation of freedom of speech) and  third condition (the
postulation of authencity) together makes possible the power of rational motivation (the best
arguments win). Nevertheless Habermas warns us that the idea of the ideal speech situation
could be deceptive criterion alone for rational consensus (trügerischen in letzter Instanz
allein) (Habermas 1984a, 179).   

Habermas claims that the ideal speech situation is not just theoretical construction. In every
empirical speech situation participants voluntarily tends to full fill the conditions of ideal
speech situation. But no empirical investigation or study could ever reveal the facticity of
ideal speech situation, but it still operates (acts on) there. "The ideal speech situation is neither
just a empirical phenomenon nor construction but in the discourse full filled condition of
reciprocity. This condition could be - but not necessarily - contrafactual; when it is made
contrafactual , it is operatively acting (working) fiction. Thus I rather speak about foreseeing
or anticipating of the ideal speech situation. Anticipation alone is not a guarantee for that we -

dare (...) establish rational consensus; at the same time the ideal speech situation is a critical -

standard by which actually achieved consensus can be questioned and also legitimated
(verified) (...) " (Habermas 1984a, XXX). With his obscure formulations Habermas tries to try
to get hold of this very difficult concept of ideal speech situation. It is not only moral maxim
(Kant) or cunningly behind operating spirit (Hegel). It is simultaneously real element of dis
course and contrafactual standard for actual discourse.

With the theory of communicative action Habermas, without any explanation, just stops using
the concept of ideal speech situation (he also dropped some other concepts too like ideology,
interests of knowledge and consensus theory of truth) and started referring to the universal
presuppositions of argumentation. Shifting is shown already in his article What is Universal
pragmatics (1979) where he does not use the concept of ideal speech situation. He starts to
speak about "universal conditions of possible understanding" and "general presuppositions of
communicative action" (Ibid, 1). In his article Discourse ethic..., where Habermas sets groun-
ds for discourse ethic, he rely on Robert Alex's formulation of universal presuppusitions of
argumentation (Habermas 1995, 88-89):

"(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for
wanting to do so. 
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part
in a discourse.
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights
as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2)."

In sections 2.1 and 2.2 is represented those conditions that are necessary for "common com
petitive quest for truth". These sections also implicates participant's reciprocal acknowledging
of responsibility and authenticity (Wahrhaftigkeit). Section 3.1. Habermas calls rule of open
ness (transparency). Section 3.2. secures symmetrical interaction and section 3.3 excludes
outer constrain.

In this article Habermas mention that these presupposition he earlier described as features of
the ideal speech situation. He says that he does not want to specify, renew or change his for
mer notion of the ideal speech situation (Habermas 1994, 139).

In his book Between Facts and Norms Habermas goes further and claims that talk about the
"ideal communication community" (Karl-Otto Apel) and "the ideal speech situation"  tempts
improperly hypostatisation of validity claims. Habermas wants to replace this "counterfactual
comparing to ideal conditions" with (by) Brunkhorst's "idealizing presuppositions".
Brunkhorst states that "the idealizing presuppositions we always already have to adopt when
ever we want to reach mutual understanding do not involve any kind of correspondence or
comparision between idea and reality" (Brunkhorst according to Habermas 1996, 323). Still it
remains unclear, what profound way this concept of ideal speech situation or ideal communi
cation community differs from Brunkhorst's idealizing presuppositions.

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Congratulation, you have readed the hole story. Now sent some critical comments. ;-)







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