File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_2000/habermas.0011, message 80


From: EDavisMail-AT-aol.com
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2000 13:45:29 EST
Subject: Re: HAB: Re: What are institutions?


I've been out of the loop for a while, however--judging from the last couple of postings--the list is touching on a crucial issue here.

Sometimes Habermas's view appears to be a dialogue that is destined to end in a monologue.  What I mean is that despite the diverse or at least distinctly intended views that contribute to consensus, that consensus does in a sense constitute a single world view and hierarchy of goals--that is, a single intentionality.  (These concerns are typically voiced against symbolic interactionism [Meade] regarding it's conformist tendencies.)  Within the context of democratic politics, we're rediscovering Weber's apprehesions of an "iron cage".  

I see equivocations in Habermas's work with regard to a "generalizable interest" (especially between his earlier and later work).  A similar point and question can be made regarding H's references to a "collective will".  Remember, we're talking about intentionality and communication.  The questions is:   Are we talking about a shared set of goals or a shared set of principles or rules--indeed, institutions--by which to live?  (And yes, I concede to the clever retort that a possible goal would be to uphold certain rules or institutions.  Indeed, that is the solution I will suggest at the end of this email.)  "Collective will" can be a highly misleading term if it applies to a shared set a rules or cultural patterns, because a "collective will" connotes instead a shared set of goals held by an organized whole.  Undoubtedly, Adorno's apprehensions apply here as well as the Marcusian fears of "one-dimensionality".  In short, if "collective will" and "generalizable interest" mean !
a shared goal or intention, then
 we may be well on our way to totalitarianism.

In the 19th Century, one finds countless so-called "socialist" theories which ultimately view society as an autarkic individual--with one intention.  Actually, it was one of the most outspoken advocates of laissez-faire capitalism that was the first to point this out.  Namely, Frederic Bastiat in his pamphlet titled "The Law".  It's an excellent read, especially since Bastiat has an oddly postmodern sensibility and propensity to delve into textual analyses.  

Among 20th Century works, F. A. Hayek's THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952) is truly remarkable.  See especially the chapters on "Conscious Direction" and "Engineers and Planners".  Another fascinating and highly accessible statement along these lines can be found in Vaclav Havel's SUMMER MEDITATIONS, in the chapter titled "What I Believe".

I suppose, on a broader level, I'm making a reference to Foucault (who incidentally, lectured quite favorably on Hayek)--specifically his two senses or power.  The first, of course, has do to with a legistlator or King or some other source of intentionality or will.  This is the more obvious sense of power that we find throughout liberalism with reference to the state.  The second has very little to do with intentionality; rather, it has to do with structural relations and context--with all those corporeal, material, and psychological things that make a particular manifest intention even possible alongside its constrained choice set (redundancy for emphasis).  The second has much more to do with institutions or cultural patterns.

Rather abruptly, I suggest that it is better to integrate or harmonize goals (ideally, in a mutually beneficial way) via principles or rules rather than to unify them.  The latter typically leads to mass-totalitarianism.  The former has it's own problems, yet it at least alows for diverse, harmonious yet numberous intentionalities.

Erik R. Davis
MA, Economics: Austrian School

In a message dated Thu, 30 Nov 2000 12:32:17 PM Eastern Standard Time, Rob Schaap <rws-AT-comedu.canberra.edu.au> writes:

<< G'day again,

>>Habermas's view does not include intentionality.
>
>GD: This is false. Speech acts are actions. All actions are intentional.

Aren't we risking a bit of a pointless dichotomy here?  Yeah, there's
always an intentionality in an action, but communicative rationality is
about a group arriving at a point no single intention has produced, no?
Habermas's stuff about the reason-in-language, about the procedure/setting
for the resolution of competing validity claims, and about that decisive
stronger argument - well, it means nought if there's a one-to-one
intention-outcome relationship, no?

Or am I missing points again?

Cheers,
Rob.




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