From: gelder-AT-em.uni-frankfurt.de Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 22:02:56 +0100 Subject: HAB: Habermas and Freud In limbering up for a more detailed discussion of Habermas' account of Freud I've been doing some reading. (Much stimulated by Kenneth MacKendrick and Gary Davis, whose mails I've been pondering for days, and to whom I will try and respond to in greater detail soon.) There are really two broad themes: 1) What is it that happens within psychoanalytic treatment? (*This* way of putting it gets one out of the bind that if one deals exclusively with the *theories* i.e. not with the *practical/clinical* aspects thereof, there's a tendency to turn the interprise into a history of ideas) If one agrees with Habermas' broad thesis - namely that the whole psychoanalytic enterprise is much weakened (castrated?) by the insistence that it is a natural science (that it should be seen as part of Psychiatry) what strategies are *then* open? (I've been reading Alfred Lorenzer, Ricoeur, and some specialist literature on transference/resistance.) 2) The way Habermas moves from these specific psychoanalytic issues to the wider project of what is, in Martin Jay's words, "an extraordinarily ambitious attempt to reestablish the foundations of the Western Marxist tradition as a whole." ("Juergen Habermas and the Reconstruction of Marxist Holism", from Jay's *Marxism and Totality*) Here the historical/theoretic background is the combination of Critical Theory/Psychoanalysis to be found all the way back to the cooperation between Horkheimer and Fromm starting 1930. (The date of Goethe prize awarded to Freud by the city of Frankfurt, and the founding of the first university-based psychoanalytic institute in the world. - Neither the Vienna, Berlin or Prague psychoanalysts had been attached to a university. Freud wrote Horkheimer a personal letter of thanks which the latter carried around with him for years.) Horkheimer, Fromm, Marcuse, Adorno - it's really an enormous literature. I find Wolfgang Bonss very useful: "Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft und Kritik - Zur Freudrezeption der Kritischen Theorie" in Bonss and Honneth: *Sozialforschung als Kritik*, 1982, as well as Dahmer: *Libido und Gesellschaft*, and Russell Jacoby's publications. The point of difference between me and Gary Davis seems to be the question whether (1) and (2) can *in principle* be discussed independently of one another or not. Psychoanalysts and all those - right through to Martin Jay - who are sceptical of the 'totalising' tendency in Habermas' thought will answer in the affirmative: a philosopher who makes generalisations in a specific field such as Psychology or Anthropology or Sociology without 'following through', i.e. grounding such a critique in detail, is inevitably going to be accused of dilletantism. Those who are interested in a 'theory of society' in the sense of a diagnosis of the contemporary world based on Habermas and the 'politicisation of speech-act theory' will disagree. To my mind it is a difference as old as Plato versus Aristotle, or Kant versus Hegel. i.e. it is not soluble. Attempts to give *both* sides their due - both the analytic, natural-scientific, cartesian approach to a specific field, *as well as* and the Hegelian, (or hermeneutic) 'history as a totality' approach - is what 'dialectics' is all about. i.e. there is no argument which is going to settle it either way. We're back to the question of what it is that happens when we dream (or laugh, or make a slip of the tongue, or listen to a piece of music, or look someone in the eye) and what it means to say the the 'natural-science'/'hypothetical-deductive method' approach to an apparently simple question like the above is in some way 'systematically distortive'. Happy dreams. F. van Gelder --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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