From: <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: HAB: Lacan and Habermas: understanding as control?
Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2001 12:42:19 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)


On Sat, 13 Jan 2001 19:31:00 -0800 (PST) Gary D <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com> wrote:

> K: ...The unconscious can only be apprehended in language - discourse

> G: But not discourse in JHs sense; discourse in the mundane 
linguistic-theoretical sense of a piece of conversation, but 
unconscious-as-language is only validly an *analogy*. And discourse isnt 
constructive here (not that I enjoy being disagreeable).

Freud distinguishes between two uses of the term: as an adjective, it simply 
refers to mental processes that are not the subject of conscious attention 
(what you mentioned to be nonconscious). As a noun (das Unbewuszte) it 
designates one of the psychical systems of mental structure. The unconscious, 
for Freud, marks a radical separation from consciousness by repression and thus 
cannot enter the conscious-preconscious system without distortion.

Now, for Lacan (after the 1950s), the unconscious cannot simply be equated with 
that which is repressed. This is obviously where Habermas's interpretation of 
Freud and Lacan's differ. Lacan argues against most of Freud's followers who 
reduced the uncs to being 'merely the seat of the insticts.' Against this, 
Lacan argues that the unconscious is neither primordial nor instinctual - it 
is primarily linguistic: the unconscious structured like a language (Seminar 
III, pg. 167). This linguistic approach is qualified by Lacan's arguing that 
the reason why the unconscious is structured like a language is that we only 
grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of it which 
is articulated by passing into words (Seminar VII, p. 32). Lacan further 
describes the unconscious as a discourse - "the unconscious is the discourse of 
the Other" (and this is where Habermas's understanding of discourse isn't that 
far off from Lacan's). This means that one should see in the unconscious the 
effects of speech on the subject (Seminar XI, p. 126). The subject here is the 
subject of the unconscious. The unconscious, in other words, is the effects of 
the signifier on the subject, in that the signifier is what is repressed and 
what returns in the formulations of the unconscious (symptoms, parapraxes, 
jokes, dreams). Again, the unconscious is structured as a function of the 
symbolic. In this sense, the unconscious is not interior, since speech and 
language are intersubjective phenomena, the unconscious is 'transindividual 
(Ecrits, p. 49) - the unconscious is 'outside.'  If the unconscious appears 
interior, this is an effect of the imaginary... which runs interference between 
the subject and the Other. For Lacan, because of this, the unconscious is 
irreducible, so that aim of analysis cannot be to make conscious the 
unconscious. Two other terms are relevant: memory (the unconscious is a kind of 
symbolic history) and knowledge (a kind of knowledge anyway, an 'unknown 
knowledge' - something that does not fail to be).

The similarities between Habermas and Lacan here are interesting. The 
unconscious as radically intersubjective. However, where Habermas and Lacan 
depart is the 'placing' of this intersubjectivity. Lacan argues that it is 
exterior, Habermas argues that it is interior. The aim for Habermas is to 
resymbolize what has been repressed or distorted (theoretically guided 
self-reflection), the aim for Lacan is not necessarily to 'cure' the analysand, 
rather, to express truth (which is why Lacan sees psychoanalysis as a science). 

For Habermas, so it would seem, Lacan is guilty of an objectivist fallacy. 
However this anticipated response does not do justice to Lacan's understanding 
of truth. Without going into these distinctions I'll point out this. One of the 
key differences between Lacan and Habermas has to do with the effective 'power' 
of self-reflection. For Lacan, simply because one understands something does 
not mean that they can control it. For Habermas, understanding always implies 
control (this goes back to KHI where Habermas talks about the ego's 'controlled 
employment' - and is part of the reason why Whitebook takes Habermas to task in 
his essay on Nature and Habermas).

After a great deal of reflection, one of the ESSENTIAL differences between 
Habermas and Lacan comes down to this: For Habermas, the power of reflection, 
linked through the illocutionary dimensions of language, necessarily entail a 
merger between understanding and self-control. If we understand the genesis of 
a symptom, we can control it. For Habermas, it cannot be otherwise. If we 
understand the source of a communicative disturbance, then we can act 
differently. For Lacan understanding - which occurs through the traversing of 
fantasy, does not entail control. Simply because one takes responsibility for 
everything; conscious and unconscious through the traversing of fantasy, a 
place between desire and drive - what Jane Malmo (Jane B. Malmo, "Towards a 
Limitless Love: From Symptom to Sinthôme in Milton's Samson Agonistes" New 
Formations 23 Summer 1994, 90ff) refers to as "being in one's own power" - does 
not mean that one is under one's own control. For instance, in the movie Fight 
Club, Jack's identification with the sinthome, the point at which the real, 
imaginary and symbolic order entwine, is a recognition and a taking 
responsibility for what he has desired all along: a 'second' death. So, even 
though Jack takes responsibility for his actions - even those which were beyond 
his control - this does not mean that he can make Tyler disappear voluntarily 
(Tyler is Jack's psychotic hallucination). Arriving at this threshold, Jack 
undertakes a unique and profoundly singular act - he puts a gun into his mouth 
and pulls the trigger in a violent "passage a la act." Ie. Jack recognizes 
that Tyler is part of him, but this recognition doesn't allow him to control 
Tyler. The truth of Jack's desire, then, brings him to a point and 
recognition of helplessness. His 'suicidal' act, then, is something he 
undergoes as a means of transformation. As Malmo notes, "Such an act cannot be 
generalized as a set of rules, or written down among the laws that everyone 
obeys." For Habermas, 'therapy' ends up with a 'cure' - it links truth with the 
intersubjective coordination of action. For Lacan, truth is must be separated 
from praxis. Simply because one understands, and even if one is motivated to 
change, it does not mean that they can operate autonomously. Habermas makes 
this connection: between communicative freedom and communicative action. Lacan 
does not. This is CRUCIAL, absolutely crucial for understanding the differences 
between Lacanian psychoanalysis and Habermasian social theory - furthermore, if 
Lacan is correct, much of Habermas speech act theory must be revisited. A point 
not to be missed here is this: through the traversing of fantasy an actor can 
change their actions and coordinate their activity in a more harmonious manner 
- but not necessarily.

Naturally, the Habermasian response would be this: either the analysand has not 
'properly' understood the problem, or, Lacan is guilty of failing to make 
adequate connections between linguistification and communicative action. And a 
Lacanian rejoinder might bet his: traversing the fantasy / identification with 
the sinthome leads to the recognition of the way in which someone enjoys (the 
truth of their desire). But this, in and of itself, is not a guarantee of 
'autonomy' - it simply means that the person in question is, in principle, 
capable of articulating their interests - is able to give reasons for and so 
on. But this does not mean that their desire enters into communicative harmony 
with others because the linguistification of desire does not reduce / return 
desire to the public sphere - rather - points to the unique way in which the 
individual relates to their jouissance - which is radically singular. This, it 
seems to me, is congruent with Maeve Cooke's argument that communicative and 
instrumental reason are born of the same moment, the idea that instrumental 
action isn't simply parasitical on communication action (as Habermas argues on 
the first page of his essay "What is Universal Pragmatics?").

So, just to say a bit more here. I don't think I've misunderstood Habermas 
here. Clearly, for Habermas, rationality and communication are linked through 
the illocutionary dimension of language. I also don't think I'm misunderstood 
Lacan on this point. The crux of the matter is 'what happens at the point of 
understanding.' Does it give us control or insight? On some level it gives us 
both, simultaneously, but as Malmo notes: being in ones own power is not the 
same as being in ones own control.

> A semiotic notion of language (like Lacans) cannot capture the illocutionary 
or actional character of the unconscious INTERacting like (*analogously* to 
how) language goes.

It isn't that Lacan fails to capture the illocutionary aspect of language. 
Lacan's comments about the transsubjectivity of language should make this 
clear - Lacan isn't guilty of semanticism. Lacan is firmly aware that in saying 
something the speaker does something. Habermas brings together the categories 
of meaning and force - emphasizing the rational foundation illocutionary force. 
If I'm not mistaken, illocutionary force consists of an actors capacity to 
motivate a hearer to act on the premise of a commitment to seriousness - 
sincerity. I'm not questioning this. I'm not going to dispute the 
binding/bonding power of communicative utterances. My point is that this is 
only an ideal case - because communication isn't limited to communicative 
action - and if we do not take communicative action to be primary, then Lacan's 
explanation is plausible - even within the general confines of Habermas's 
general framework.

> K: Ok, I'm going to stop using the word "trauma" and remain consistent with 
Lacan's terms: jouissance. 

> G: I thought this was a Habermas list.

The more I get into this - the closer Habermas and Lacan seem to get. That's 
part of my trouble here. I have a resistance to seeing the closeness of the two 
thinkers because I'm working on a Lacanian critique... so the differences are 
exaggerated... at the same time, the differences are so great that they're 
almost mutually exclusive... the only way I can make sense of it is through a 
kind of free association between the two... and some of that work-product is 
what you get here. Overreading, misreading, antireading are the only strategies 
that I've got to differentiate the two in a way that can be communicated 
coherently - of course my reach exceeds my grasp. I understand that you are 
interested in a discussion that is wholly parasitic on Habermas's work... but I 
hope there are Habermasians who see 'outside' critique, as sketchy or 
ill-formed as it might be, worthwhile and productive. It takes years and years 
to understand Habermas, to check his sources, to work through some of the 
passages that are best understood in German and not in English... but Lacan is 
no different - the same can be said for Kant and Hegel, Gadamer... Freud, 
Klein... Zizek, Salecl, Zupancic... So I very much appreciate your patience, 
but I would ask for a little more speculative-space as well.

> K: Without going into a summary of Lacan's mirror phase (the imaginary 
identification with a fiction) - basically Lacan's thesis is this: when we 
learn a language it is imposed on us by the Other. 

> G: This applies only to authoritarian parenting styles. Good parents love to 
pretend their child can speak and understand more than can be verified (i.e., 
theres good openness), as part of the romance of shared word play. If anything, 
the baby seduces mommy into word play (in healthy parenting). By the way, the 
so-called mirror phase has been disproved by clinical infant research; it is 
indeed a fiction or adult reconstructions, but it's not indicative of what 
infants really go through. 

The mirror phase has been disproved? So the ego is not a product of the 
symbolic order? Wo Es war, soll Ich werden nevermore, eh? I'll agree with you 
here though: the mirror phase is a fiction - but without it "perspective" is 
impossible.

> G: Again, Ken, it might be good to read some stuff on how children acquire 
language, according to cognitive psychologists of the past two decades or so, 
rather than depending heavily on Lacans speculations from clinical practice 
with adults. 

Lacan is indebted, in many instances, to the work of Melanie Klein, whom I 
believe did have something to say about mother-child relations... as far as I 
can see - there is no necessary incongruence between cognitive psychology and 
the mirror stage. After all, how *we* see ourselves isn't identical to how 
others see us, or how we actually are. The mirror stage is simply another 
formulation of narcissism - something which Habermas takes full stock of in 
various places. For Habermas, narcissism can be overcome... my critique, which 
has been so for a long time now, has been this: after narcissism we would not 
longer recognize ourselves. In other words: some degree of narcissism is 
necessary in order to maintain the semblance of subjectivity. Now Habermas's 
charge against this is subjectivism. But my countercharge against Habermas is a 
false universalism... Habermas privileges a certain kind of ego in his 
deliberative model - the so-called 'post-conventional self.' The Lacanian 
rejoinder being: the subject (ego) is not substance. Sidenote: For more details 
on the relation of Klein and Habermas - see Emilia Steuerman, The Bounds of 
Reason: Habermas, Lyotard and Melanie Klein on Rationality, 2000).

I'm going to have to let go of the rest, not because I don't have 
counterobjections but because I don't have the time or energy to run through it 
all. Habermas's reading of Freud is informed by Hegel - so my comments 
regarding Hegel are not out of place - so going back to Hegel, as Lacan does, 
and as Habermas does, is fruit for conversation and debate - especially 
regarding the dynamics of subjectivity (and even more relevant because Habermas 
has recently published two [or more?] articles on Hegel).

ken



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