From: <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca> Subject: HAB: No, Re: Lacan and Habermas: understanding as control? Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2001 22:14:16 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) On Sun, 14 Jan 2001 13:41:10 -0800 (PST) Gary D <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com> wrote: > K: I don't have the time or energy to run through it all. > G: Excuse ME. But I suppose you'd like me to more than "run through" your long passages on Lacan. Or maybe not. So, back to Hegel... Habermas notes that Hegel's categories, developed in his earlier work: language, tools and family, designate three equally significant patterns of dialectical relation: symbolic representation, the labour process, and interaction on the basis of reciprocity; and each mediates subject and object in its own way (Habermas, Theory and Practice [1973]: 142). Summarizing his thesis, Habermas argues "It is not the spirit in the absolute movement of reflecting on itself which manifests itself in, among other things, language, labour, and moral relationships, but rather, it is the dialectical interconnections between linguistic symbolization, labour, and interaction with determine the concept of spirit" (Habermas 1973: 143). With this aim in mind, Habermas seeks to demonstrate a moral tension built into self-consciousness and social life from the beginning. His analysis of Hegel aims to further articulate the developmental relation between labour and interaction, while at the same time keeping them rigorously separated [Habermas develops a richer distinction between instrumental and communicative later]. Starting with the "I" Hegel articulates the fundamental experience of the philosophy of reflection; namely, the experience of ego-identity in self-reflection: "I" ... is that initially pure unity relating to itself, and this it is not immediately, but in that it abstracts from all determinateness and content and, in the freedom of unlimited self- equality, passes back into itself. Thus it is universality; unity which is unity with itself only due to that negative comportment, which appears as abstraction, and which therefore contains all the determinateness, dissolved within itself. Secondly, "I" is singularity just as immediately as it is the negativity which relates to itself; it is absolute being-determinate which confronts the other and excludes it; individual personality. The nature of both the "I" and the concept consists both of this absolute universality, which is just as immediately absolute singular individuation [vereinzelung], as well as a being-in-and-for-itself, which is simply being-posited, and which is this being-in-and-for itself only through its unity with being-posited. Neither the "I" nor the concept can be comprehended if the two above- mentioned moments are not conceived simultaneously in their abstraction and in their perfect unity (from Hegel's Science of Logic, quoted in Habermas 1973: 143-144). This experience of the self, as the knowing subject [subject comprehended as substance qua self-relating negativity], abstracts from all possible objects in the world and refers back to itself as the sole object. The subjectivity of the "I" is determined as reflection - it is the relation of the knowing subject to itself: represented as "pure unity relating to itself," the "I think," capable of accompanying all inner representations. For Hegel the dialectic of the "I" and the "other" is understood within the framework of intersubjectivity of spirit: the "I" communicates not with itself as its "other," but instead with another "I" as its "other." The experience of self-consciousness is no longer considered the original one. For Hegel, the experience of the "I" stems from the experience of interaction, in which the "I" learns to see itself through the eyes of another subjects. Self-consciousness, as Habermas stresses, is the derivation of the intersection of perspectives. Self-consciousness is formed only on the basis of mutual recognition; it must be tied to the self being mirrored in the consciousness of another subject (Habermas 1973: 144-145). In other words, the "I" develops through the power of reflection which is / cannot be understood otherwise / intersubjective. In a way, subjectivity per ce is individual, while the medium through which the subject articulates this is radically intersubjective. The immediate paradox of the formation of self-consciousness only through an encounter with another self-conscious being, is solved in Hegel solely with a theory of spirit (Habermas 1973: 145). Spirit is not beneath subjectivity, then, rather the medium within which one "I" communicates with another "I" and from which, as an absolute mediation, the two mutually form each other into subjects (we can see dynamics of this process in the film Bi-Centennial Man - whereby Andrew Martin 'the robot' comes to be recognized as something he already is - human; the emptiness of the monological subject in Boxing Helena; and the general framework of struggle - anticipating feminist objects, in Angels and Insects). Consciousness (ie. intersubjectivity) exists as the middle ground on which the subjects encounter each other, so that without encountering each other they cannot exist as subjects (Habermas 1973: 145). Hegel writes, "As spirit, the product of Reason, the first product is the middle as its own concept, [or] as consciousness; and it realizes itself in consciousness, i.e. it is memory and speech; from this middle the spirit generates the practical antithesis through understanding and formal Reason, and supersedes it in labour." Habermas notes that Hegel retains Kant's empty identity of the "I" but reduces this "I" to a moment, by comprehending it under the category of the universal. "I" as self-consciousness is universal, because it is an abstract "I," having arisen from the abstraction of all contents given to a subject that knows (qua intersubjectivity) [ie. subjectivity is intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity]. In the same way it abstracts from all external objects, the "I" retains itself as identical also abstracts from the succession of inner states and experiences. The universality of the abstract "I" is displayed in that all possible subjects are determined as individuals while at the same time introducing each subject as inalienably individual; the unity of the universal and the singular (Habermas 1973: 145). For Habermas, then, "Spirit is the communication of individuals in the medium of the universal, which is related to the speaking individuals as the grammar of a language is, and to the acting individuals as is a system of recognized norms" (Habermas 1973: 146). We should not that Habermas's analogy here bears a sharp resemblance to Kant - immediately "spirit" is reduced to - understood through - regulative rules (grammar --> recognized norms). I'm interested in this point in particular: why rules? Habermas continues, Spirit(the universal) permits the distinctive links between these singularities: "Within the medium of this universal - which Hegel therefore called a concrete universal - the single beings can identify with each other and still at the same time maintain themselves as nonidentical" (Habermas 1973: 146). The original insight that Habermas attributes to Hegel consists in that the "I" as self-consciousness can only be conceived if it is spirit, "if it goes over from subjectivity to the objectivity of a universal in which the subjects know themselves as nonidentical are united on the basis of reciprocity" (Habermas 1973: 146). Habermas then equates the process of individuation as a process of socialization, which cannot be conceived as the adaption to society of an already given individuality, but as that which itself produces an individuated being. Moral relationships, as Habermas notes, are clarified by Hegel in terms of the relationship between lovers: "In love the separated entities still exist, but no longer as separated - as united and the living feels the living" (Hegel quoted in Habermas 1973: 147). Love, then, is the reconciliation of a preceding conflict. Habermas argues that the distinctive element of this resolution can be understood only if it is seen as a dialogic relation of the complementary unification of opposing subjects, signifying a relation of logic and of the praxis of living. What is interesting about this point is that "love" - psychoanalytically understood - is a transference relation - something which cannot be formulated in regulative principles "there is no sexual relation" sayeth Lacan. What is dialectical, for Habermas, is not unconstrained intersubjectivity itself, but the history of its suppression and reconstitution. The distortion of the dialogic relationship is "subject to the causality of split-off symbols and reified logical relations... relations that have been taken out of the context of communication and thus are valid and operative only behind the backs of the subjects." The struggle for recognition, then, meets up with the "causality of fate" through ideological distortions of intersubjective relations. Again, this foreshadows Habermas's reading of Freud - if not determining it. Habermas illustrates this point with reference to Hegel's discussion of a "criminal" from his fragment on the Spirit of Christianity. The "criminal" is one who "revokes the moral basis" (the complementary interchange of noncompulsory communication and the mutual satisfaction of interests) by putting himself as individual in the place of the totality. The criminal (in the exact same manner as the neurotic), then, sets himself up as the universal. This assumption triggers the process of fate which strikes back at him. The struggle engendered by the actions of the criminal ignite hostility, which marks a loss of complementary interchange and generates what Habermas will eventually call moral consciousness. The criminal, then, is confronted by the power of deficient life and experiences guilt" (Habermas 1973: 148). The guilt suffered by the criminal emanates from the repression of the "departed life" which the criminal himself has provoked. The "causality of fate" is the power of suppressed life at work, which can only be reconciled when, out of the experience of the negativity of a sundered life, the longing ("the passion for critique") for that which has been lost arises and necessitates identifying one's own denied identity in the alien existence one fights against (Habermas 1973: 148). I'm tempted to speculate about the assigned role of guilt here. It seems to me to be too narrowly conceived... what if we 'get off' on feeling guilty? What if 'normative rules' function to sustain enjoyment through their very transgression. In other words: can we not consider grammatical rules those rules which we establish *only* so that breaking them yields richness in poetry... (we have examples of televangelists who decry adultery only to find them committing the deed behind closed does... in other words: obedience to the law *and* its transgression are two sides of the same coin). The struggle for recognition, in Hegel's early work, depicts the relation between subjects who attach their whole being to each detail of a possession they have laboured to gain: a struggle of life-and-death. The result, Habermas notes, is not the immediate recognition of oneself in the other (reconciliation) but a position of the subject with respect to each other on the basis of mutual recognition; the basis of the knowledge that the identity of the "I" is possible solely by means of the identity of the other. Hegel's critique of Kant links the constitution of the "I" to formative processes, which Habermas understand to be the communicative agreement of opposing subjects. It is not reflection, then, which is decisive, rather, the medium in which the identity of the universal and the individual is formed. For Hegel, it is the shared existence of a primary group, the family, that is taken to be the existing middle of reciprocal modes of contact. Hegel then introduces two further categories as media of the self-formative process: language and labour. As mentioned, Spirit is an organization of equally original media: Habermas argues, "these three fundamental dialectical patterns are heterogeneous; as media of the spirit, language and labour cannot be traced back to the experiences of interaction and of mutual recognition" (Habermas 1973: 152). Summarizing, Habermas notes that language does not already embrace the communication of subjects living and acting together. Language, here, is only the employment of symbols by the solitary individual who confronts nature and gives names to things. He notes that Hegel speaks of the "nighttime production of the representational faculty of imagination, of the fluid and not yet organized realm of images" (Habermas 1973: 153). Hegel sees the essential achievement of the symbols to be representation, a synthetic act, encompassing naming and memory. The symbol has a double function: first, the power of representation consisting of making something present that is not immediately given, possessed of meaning (for us). Second, these symbols are produced by us, by means of speaking consciousness. Through symbols, the speaking consciousness becomes objective for itself and in symbols experiences itself as subject. Language, then, must achieve a twofold mediation: of resolving and preserving the perceived thing in a symbolic, which represents it, and on the other, a distancing of consciousness from its object, in which the "I" by means of symbols it has produced itself, is simultaneously with the thing and with itself. Language, as Habermas notes, is the first category in which spirit is not conceived as something internal, but as a medium which is neither internal nor external (Habermas 1973: 153). The dialectic of labour does not mediate between subject and object in the same manner as the dialectic of representation; beginning not with the subjection of nature to self-generated symbols, but with the subjection of the subject to the power of external nature. Labour demands the immediate suspension of immediate drive satisfaction. In this twofold respect, Hegel speaks of the subject making itself into a thing - "reifying itself" - in labour: "Labour is the this-worldly making oneself into a thing. The splitting up of the "I" existing in its drives is precisely this making oneself into an object" (Hegel quoted in Habermas 1973: 154). Habermas notes, the splitting up of the "I" existing in its drives is the splitting of the "I" into the reality testing ego and into the repressed instinctual demands. By way of the subjection of oneself to causality of nature, consciousness, returning back to itself from reification, returns as the cunning [or artful] consciousness. Again, we can see shadows of Freud here. Just as language, the tool is a category of the middle, by means of which spirit attains existence. But the two moments, Habermas observes, pursue opposing courses. The name-giving consciousness achieves a different position with respect to the objectivity of the spirit than does the cunning consciousness that arises from the process of labour. Whereas the symbols of ordinary language penetrate and dominate the perceiving and thinking consciousness, the cunning consciousness controls the processes of nature by means of its tools (Habermas 1973: 155). "The objectivity of language retains power over the subjective spirit, while the cunning that outwits nature extends subjective freedom over the power of objective spirit" (Habermas 1973: 155). For Habermas, what is most interesting, is "the relation of the employment of symbols to interaction and to labour... [and] ... the interrelation of labour and interaction" (Habermas 1973: 159). Because instrumental action follows conditional imperatives, it enters into the causality of nature and not the causality of fate. A reduction of interaction to labour, or derivation of labour from interaction, is not possible. However, Hegel does establish an interconnection between the legal norms, in which social relations based on mutual recognition is first formally stabilized, and processes of labour (Habermas 1973: 159). Under the category of actual spirit, interactions based on reciprocity appear in the form of a social relation, controlled by legal norms, between persons "whose status as legal persons is defined precisely by the institutionalization of mutual recognition" (Habermas 1973: 159). The institutional reality of the ego identity consists in the individual's recognizing each other as proprietors in the possessions produced by their labour or acquired by trade - the exchange of equivalents is the model for reciprocal behaviour, the institutional form of exchange is the contract; the contract is therefore the formal establishment of a prototypical action in reciprocity, as an ideal exchange (Habermas 1973: 159-160). The institutionalization of ego-identity, the legally sanctioned self-consciousness, is understood as a result of both processes: that of labour and that of the struggle for recognition. The labour processes enters into the struggle for recognition in such a manner that the result of this struggle, the legally recognized self-consciousness, retains the moment of liberation through labour. As Habermas notes, Hegel does not reduce interaction to labour, nor does he elevate labour to resolve it in interaction; he keeps the interconnection of the two in view, insofar as the dialectics of love and conflict cannot be separated from the successes of instrumental action and from the constitution of a cunning consciousness. The result of emancipation by means of labour enters into the norms under which we act complementarity (Habermas 1973: 161). To summarize, Habermas finds in Hegel's Jena lectures a link between labour and interaction, as self-formative processes. Although this dialectic is dissolved in Hegel's later work, it provides the groundwork for a rigorous distinction between instrumental and communicative action: wherein which instrumental action is parasitical on communicative action. Habermas's Return to Hegel, 1999 Habermas has, most recently, returned to his analysis of Hegel - since many of the debates surrounding his work are related to the Kant-Hegel axis (Habermas 1999). He re-affirms that Hegel "was the first to put the transcendental subject back into context and to situate reason in social space and historical time" (Habermas 1999: 129). Habermas revisits this debate in light of the work of Michael Theunissen, focusing on the "repressed intersubjectivity" in Hegel from an epistemological angle (Habermas 1999: 129). This gist of Habermas's article is that the love- relation "provides the first pattern of mutual recognition and is moreover an important exemplification of the interpenetration of the universal, the particular and the individual" (Habermas 1999: 130). This is followed by a reading of the Master and Slave as an introduction to the intersubjective constitution of objectivity; the way in which our knowledge of the objective world has a social nature. Habermas notes, as he did in his earlier work, that in Hegel's Jena years, between 1803 and 1805, that "language is presented as the medium through which theoretical consciousness develops and work as the medium through which practical intelligence develops and the results of these twin powers persist only in the horizon of an intersubjectively shared world. Language and labour, then, form parts of the culture of a community or of the material infra-structure of society (Habermas 1999: 138). In the final analysis, according to Habermas, "for a language to be shared and a social practice to be joined one condition must be met. Participants who find themselves related to one other in an intersubjectively shared life-world must at the same time presuppose - and assume that everybody else presupposes - an independent world of objects that is the same for all of them" (Habermas 1999: 142). I can't help but think this presupposition has the status of a fantasy. Habermas calls it a pragmatic presupposition - that may be true - and that's fine, but we need to mull over what it means to operate according to presuppositions. If this is something that cannot be pragmatically escaped, then it seems to me that the idea of presuppositions itself is mistaken. We don't "presuppose" gravity - we just fall. So presuppositions must operate on another level - and I've suggested this is best examined in terms of fantasy, but, of course, this has different implications that the ones that Habermas discusses. Habermas notes, that in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit the 'struggle for recognition' appears quite differently than it did in his Jena years. Hegel's earlier version equated the 'struggle for recognition' as an equivalent of Hobbes' struggle of nature. In Hegel's master and slave narrative, the main argument is to prove that an impartial view is a necessary cognitive condition of the social constitution of self-consciousness: "being forced to work for the master, the socially dependent slave finally succeeds in turning the tables, thanks to the cognitive independence he acquires in virtue of what he learns from the work which he extends his control over nature" (Habermas 1999: 143). However this does not quite lead to the anticipated end of a reflexive and mutually symmetrical coordination of subjective perspectives in an impartial point of view, rather, both parties become "aware of the social nature of what they take to be objective knowledge and reasonable arguments" (Habermas 1999: 144). Which is to say, as Habermas attributes to the insight of Terry Pinkard, "a subject cannot achieve self-consciousness without realizing the 'sociality of reason'" (Habermas 1999: 144). Hence, "only such intersubjectively binding standards can enable us to develop, from a presumably impartial point of view, the same opinions about the same things we encounter in 'the' world" (Habermas 1999: 144). A couple of comments: 1. Habermas-Hegel present us with an interesting paradox. The self can only achieve self-consciousness by being mirrored by another. What this suggests, however, is not only that language is the medium of our recognitions, but also that mimesis and mimetic behaviour plays a key role in communication (in a previous post I distinguished between reflective and non-reflective forms of mimesis) [for an interesting book on mimesis - see Michael Taussig - Mimesis and Alterity]. 2. I think we need the Lord and Bondsman dialectic rather than the Jena dialectic that Habermas discusses - which, it seems to me, is consistent with the charge that Habermas and Wellmer sanction against Gadamer: that the radical Enlightenment remembers what hermeutics forgets - that existing relations are relations of domination. We do not enter into mutual relationships, language is note a 'complete' language came as we enter into it through social development. Habermas argues that the complete language game serves as a counterfactual presupposition - but I'm worried about this. Is there not a spectre of anxiety that haunts 'totality?' In this, I'm asking the question of indeterminacy... and how this accompanies our pragmatic attitudes. 3. Here we also encounter the key Hegelian problem of how we are to think Substance simultaneously as posited by subjects and as an In-itself: how is it possible for individuals to posit their social Substance by means of their social activity, but to posit it precisely as an In-itself, as an independent, presupposed foundation of their activity? As Zizek notes, "Lacan's Hegelian solution to this impasse is paradoxical and very refined. He accepts the communitarian critique of nominalist individualism, according to which it is illegitimate to reduce social Substance to the interaction of individuals: the spiritual Substance of a community is always already here as the foundation of the individuals' interaction, as its ultimate frame of reference, so it can never be generated from this interaction. The passage from individuals' interaction to social Substance involves a leap, a kind of leap of faith, which can never be accounted for by the individual's strategic reasoning about the intentions of other individuals: no matter how intricate and reflective this reasoning, the gap of a fundamental impossibility forever separates the interaction of individuals from the In-itself of the spiritual substance. However, the conclusion Lacan draws from this impossibility is not the obvious one: his point is not that since one cannot derive spiritual Substance from the interaction of individuals, one has to presuppose it as an In-itself which precedes this interaction. In an (unacknowledged) Hegelian way, Lacan asserts that it is this very impossibility which links an individual to his spiritual substance: the collective substance emerges because individuals can never fully co-ordinate their intentions, become transparent to one another.... In short, impossibility is primordial, and the spiritual substance is the virtual supplement to this impossibility: if individuals where able to co-ordinate their intentions via shared knowledge, there would be no need for the big Other, for the spiritual Substance as a spectral entity experienced by every individual as an external In-itself - the Habermasian intersubjectivity, the interaction of subjects grounded in the rules of rational argumentation, would suffice" (Zizek, The Indivisible Remainder, 1996: 138). 4. With this in mind, we can read Hegel's "causality of fate" with Lacan. Of course we should note the similarity here between Lacan and Habermas. For Lacan, the moment you think, the choice is lost... and for Habermas, the moment you speak, the choice (the normative ideals within communication) is forfeit (ie. you automatically enter into the consensually-oriented pragamtics). This strange similarity however has very different implications. For Lacan, the 'mirror image' is a fixed (and identifiable) place... for Habermas this ideal is merely presupposed. If we do a strict correlation: the "transcendence within" in communication assumes an ideal communicative community - which is imaginary. Two different logics can be seen here. For Habermas, this transcendence within provides a certain transcendental constraint on discourse for the community. For Lacan, this point is a starting point for all subsequent deceptions. In a way, Habermas's notion of systematically distorted communication is the necessary consequence of the imaginary starting point. Communication cannot be anything but systematically distorted, in the same way that the 'hall of mirrors' in Lacan becomes the source of all misrecognitions. The problem is, Habermas equates this imaginary starting point as the guiding form of objectivity. Lacan, on the other hand, equates this imaginary starting point as the guiding form of alienation and misrecognition. So, for Habermas, once we assume this viewpoint, distortions disappear. For Lacan, once we assume this viewpoint, 'reality' becomes impossible. 5. The Unbeknownst Return to Kant. Habermas argues that self-consciousness is a derivative of communication, the synergetic production of self- consciousness through an interchange of perspectives. What is radical about Habermas's maneuver here is how he deploys "communication" as an "always already" regulative ideal. Communication is, a priori, fit for the task of individuation. Whereas Kant mistaken (according to Habermas) attributed autonomy to the subject, Habermas now attributes "autonomy" to communication (in the sense of "communicative freedom"). It is here, through Hegel, that Habermas equates Freud's psychoanalysis with Hegel's dialectic of the moral life: "The criminal recognizes in his victim his own annihilated essence; in this self- reflection the abstractly divorced parties recognize the destroyed moral totality as their common basis and thereby return to it" (Habermas 1971: 236). Benhabib, in a particularly striking formulation which illustrates the extend of Hegel's influence on Habermas's reading of psychoanalysis, writes The psychoanalytic notion of fate is interpreted as the silent force of those experiences that shape the spoken word. The communicative concept of autonomy implies that what resists articulation, even to oneself, originates in the dark recesses of the psyche and has not lost its "paleosymbolic linguistically" (Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, 1986: 338). The causality of fate is the betrayal of mutual reciprocity, the proximity of the causality of nature and psychical life. This insight is what leads Habermas to connect the emancipatory "passion for critique" with Hegel's dialectic of moral life. Neurosis, in effect, diminishes self-consciousness and, for that matter, communicative competence. However, we should be careful here because behind Habermas's "return to Hegel via Freud" is a smuggled "return to Kant" that remains unacknowledged at this point (Zizek, Plague of Fantasies, 1994: 25-26). Crucial to Habermas analysis is his argument that "the ego's flight from itself is an operation that is carried out in and with language. Otherwise it would not be possible to reverse the defensive process hermeneutically, via the analysis of language" (Habermas 1971: 241). This notion, of the potential reversal of defensive gestures, leads Habermas to take issue with Freud's distinction between word-presentations and thing- presentations, which he regards as problematic: "the assumption of a non-linguistic substratum, in which these ideas severed from language are 'carried out,' is unsatisfactory. In addition, it is not clear according to what rules (other than grammatical rules) unconscious ideas could be connected with verbal residues..." (Habermas 1971: 241). Habermas notion of a "reversal" of the defensive process is crucial here. One was once free and undistorted, becomes privatized, and slips into the unconscious, hardened in an apparently quasi- natural form. Psychoanalysis, according to Habermas, provides a means to reverse this process. Because the process of privatization first occurs in language, its reversal, for Habermas, is also linguistic: we can bring it back in an unmutilated form. Habermas must understand this reversal, in principle, in the most strict sense. In theory, at least, there can be no remainder or trace of the distortion residing in the original (normal) form. For Habermas, the criterion of 'normality' resides in the universality of the conscious intention of signification that governs all forms of expression. Where Kant places the transcendental "I" - Habermas places interaction. For Habermas, "ordinary language' is always already Kantian. As Zizek summarizes: "the coincidence of true motivations with expressed meaning and the concomitant translation of all motivations into the language of public communication" (Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment, 1994: 26). As such, Habermas's notion of the unconscious is derivative, derived from public communication. The instance of a non-linguistic aspect of the unconscious must necessarily be denied. Any non-linguistic substratum to the unconscious would be problematic for Habermas's claim that psychoanalysis reverses public communication: since the "lost object" would always return in a different form. The "word" retrieved would not have the same characteristics as it did prior to its privatization. If this is, in fact, the case, then "publicity" itself must be understood as a particular "deformation,"or at least institution, of interaction. In order to do this, Habermas must suppress any encounter with the register of the imaginary as a non-intersubjective Other. Publicity, for Habermas, serves as the sum linguistic constitution of all possible subjects. Introducing the idea of the imaginary, as a mediator between symbolic exchange and interaction, plays havoc with the way in which Habermas conceives monological and dialogical processes and his strict separation of labour and interaction. In fact, any monological exercise would, in this sense, already be dialogical (between the subject and the other). Through near exhaustive effort, I've tried, at least in some way, to illustrate the Habermas's reading of Freud is indebted to his reading of Hegel, which, in turn, is informed by the real locus of Habermas's identification: Kant. Part of the summary here is from rough notes and I've tried to clean them up. Everything else has been added ad hoc. > G: Habermas talks about validity, of course, rather than simply truth. > K: For Habermas, so it would seem, Lacan is guilty of an objectivist fallacy. > G: Bingo. It isn't that simple. For Lacan, it is not the analyst who 'knows the truth.' This is precisely the kind of transference that Lacanian analysis seeks to break with. The truth, for Lacan, is the truth of desire - which is radically unique for each subject. The 'truth' has been articulated when the analysand can go on verbalizing with the analyst... To formulate truth in terms of validity, then, is appropriate but awkward. There is much to be thought about here - between Habermas and Lacan. > K: If we understand the genesis of a symptom, we can control it. > G: No: If we understand a symptom, it dissolves as symptom and becomes an element in an explanation of the cause of the symptom. If we understand the genesis of a symptom, we understand the cause of the symptom. If I'm not mistaken, when we understand the cause of the symptom it dissovles as symptom... in other words, it ceases to be a cause - the causal relationship is "overcome" or "reversed." This implies control over the cause-which-ceases-to-be-a-cause. I think Gadamer calls this "the miracle of understanding." I worried here, but stand to be accurately corrected, that "reflection" is analogous to a "magic power." Of course Habermas would reject this... but... > G: See, if Lacan weren't operating (by your light) with a objectivist sense of truth, there wouldn't be the need for separating truth from praxis (which is counterproductive). Again, I'll stress that being able to verbalize ones life history does not mean that ones life history is within ones power. Just because I know why I duck whenever I see the colour red, doesn't mean I'll stop ducking. Full disclosure, exhaustive explanation - doesn't necessarily entail autonomy. > G: You have misunderstood Habermas "here" (in your presentation, as well as in your recollection of Habermas' point). Rationality and communication are linked through the *entire* VALIDITY BASIS of speech, which involves all dimensions of language and hinges on cognitive world relations which are subjective, intersubjective, and objectivating. Ok, I'm working on this one. Every since FvG raised the question of validity I've been thinking about it... but I'm still thinking... Thanks for your labour. I'm still working through it all. ken --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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