From: <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: HAB: Lacan and Habermas: understanding as control?
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 09:40:42 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)



On Sun, 14 Jan 2001 15:00:11 EST Vunch-AT-aol.com wrote:

> The Other as I understand it in Lacan consists of the rules of the social 
order, rules of etiquette, and a certain degree of scientific objectivity about 
how mechanical things work. The Other can certainly seem like a superego, as in 
the Other = (M)other.

Lacan locates the superego in the symbolic order, as opposed to the imaginary 
order of the ego (Seminar I, 102) - and has a close relationship with the Law 
as a symbolic structure which (paradoxically) regulates subjectivity in the 
sense that it prevents disintegration. On the other hand, it also has a 
'senseless' and blind character of pure imperativeness. In linguistic terms, 
the superego is an imperative - "Enjoy!" Related to voice, in terms of its 
imperativeness, it invokes drive.

The Other (the big Other), designates radical alterity, an other-ness which 
transcends the illusory otherness of the imagainry, because it cannot be 
assimilated through identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity with 
language and the law, and hence the big Other is inscribed in the order of the 
symbolic - is the symbolic insofar as it is particularised for each subject. 
For Lacan, it is the mother who first occupies the position of the big Other 
for the child because it is she who receives the child's primitive cries and 
retroactively sanctions them as a particular message...

So I would agree that there is a relationship between the superego and the big 
Other, but certainly there are important differences between superegoic 
functions ("Enjoy!") and Otherness... Otherness is the alterity of language 
(which includes the gestures, cliches and such that go along with it) while the 
superego expresses the Sadistic logic of the symbolic...

> The basic competency that Habermas requires of social actors who attempt to  
coordinate their actions successfully is only found in the concept of a  
post-conventional self. A self that is not simply the manipulative object of 
the Other, but a self that can transcend the social order and reflect 
critically about it! This self is not in contradiction with Lacan's idea about 
the subject.

Well, yes, it sort of is (I think). For Lacan, the subject is split. The split 
or divided (barred) subject ($) denotes the impossibility of the ideal of a 
fully present self-consciousness; the subject will never know herself or 
himself completely,but will always be cut off from her or his own knowledge. 
This splitting indicates the presence of the unconscious and is an effect of 
the signifier. The subject is split by the very fact that one is a speaking 
being, since speech divides the subject of the enunciation from the subject of 
the statement. Lacan theorizes this split subject in terms of a division 
between truth and knowledge.

Putting this with Habermas is difficult. For Habermas, the subject can never be 
completely transparent to itself either - so, so far, we're on the same page. 
However, Habermas argues that in speaking the subject pragmatically presupposes 
that they can avoid the division (so to speak). In other words, what Habermas 
brings to light in terms of a formal pragmatic analysis almost fits, to the 
letter, Lacan's understanding of the discourse of the Master: the Master makes 
every attempt to 'mask' the division of the subject (what Habermas locates as 
a presupposition, Lacan argues is a functional characteristic of the Master). 
The Master qua Habermas, is the one who puts "language" (as opposed to the 
slave) to work. If we follow Lacan, this always produces a surplus 
enjoyment that the Master then attempts to appropriate. I find the similarities 
between Lacan's account of the Master and Habermas's account for formal 
pragmatics fascinating...

> The unconcious for Lacan is 'structured like a language' which means that the 
solutions to our social situations can be found through language.  Here, I see 
no opposition between Lacan and Habermas.

The statement means that what we know about the unconscious we only know 
through language. I don't think this directly means that solutions to our 
social situations can be found through language. We have to be careful what we 
mean by "solutions" here. When we go looking for solutions - Lacan essentially 
takes up the position that we are looking for a Master - and he notes that 
those who go looking will certainly find one!

> However, Habermas does not address gender differences nor sex-role 
distinctions, which Lacan does; the role of the phallus as essentially 
determining and/or canceling/erasing significations is an operation which 
Habermas attempts to accomplish through his reconstructive efforts and expects 
the individual to accomplish reflectively.  Reflection however seems to amount 
to theoretical argumentation, a far deeper pursuit than mere word-play; which is
not to say that Lacan is reduced to word-play but that their respective 
solutions seem to involve 2 distinct levels of analysis.

Argumentation is a specialized form of discourse, for Habermas. What Lacan is 
concerned with is not argumentation per ce, but the orientation that we take up 
in this procedure. What are we arguing for? Again, I think Lacan's four 
discourses are helpful here: Master, Hysteric, University, and Analyst. 
Habermas's understanding of the performative attitude of the subject is 
equivalent to Lacan's understanding of the Master - the agent who 'pretends' 
(presupposes) to be one and undivided. The result of this 'pretention' is an 
every increasing production of object a, the lost object. From this 
perspective, the Master, who desires to be Master of the Other, is blind to the 
truth of his own desire (ie. that he is, in fact, castrated). The Master, then, 
clings to a 'master signifier' - to plug the fundamental lack by means of which 
the Master believes himself to be one - what Lacan calls egocracy. Interestly, 
the only way for the Master to retain his position of Master is to remain 
silent - to avoid signifiers and save themselves from being divided. In the 
end, the only successful Master is a dead one, one who has entered eternal 
silence. Why is this interesting? Well, according to Habermas the subject takes 
up a performative attitude which entails a fundamental orientation toward 
mutual understanding. Understanding and consensus, rationally motivated 
agreement, is, once actualized, silence. Once we agree, we no longer talk about 
what we agree about. So, the Master - or a series of Masters, in a conversation 
will cut it as short as possible - reaching for the first sign of consensus. 
I'm struck by the widespread similarities here. By way of contrast, we can look 
at the kind of arguments that Habermas dismisses as contradictory: Derrida, 
Horkheimer and Adorno... all of these arguments *appear* subjectivist only from 
the perspective of the Master (who pretends not to be divided). From another 
position, the Hysteric for instance, these arugments do not appear this way...

ken



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