Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2001 20:15:26 -0800 (PST)
From: Gary D <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: HAB: Validity of "ontological space"


This is a response to Matthew's "Re: HAB: Habermas & Wittgenstein"
today


Dear Matthew:

If you will give an example of "JH's continual talk of meaning as ...
ontological space," this would be useful for understanding (If his
space-talk is continual, there should be difficulty finding multiple
examples).  

I'm glad to see evolutionary issues become a focus, but I'm not in
favor of sweeping objections to JH across multiple texts. What /
where in _MCCA_ (if *there*) is "...Kantian
transcendentalism...prioritized over a Dawwinian pragmatism." You
mention _MCCA_, but you seem to have _TCA_ in mind. Are you trying to
integrate JH's discussion in TCA of anthropological deep-seated bases
of linguisticality (an issue of basic ontogeny) and the highly
postconventional, discursive issues of the quasi-transcendental
character of discourse ethics in _MCCA_? Such an integration would be
profoundly interesting, but it would be a major project--certainly
not something to balk at because it's not straightforward.

In my view--and I'm confident of this--JH would agree that "we [can]
make a viable critical program which does not NEED to pretend that
[altogether] we are discontinuous with the rest of nature" (You said
"in some ways" where I inserted "altogether", which I'm getting to). 

There's great value in appreciating that nature is a complex notion,
such that we *are* "in some ways" discontinuous with nature (We *do*
need to not merely "pretend" that we are discontinuous with nature).
Instinctuality or inherent adaptability is a common attribute of
nature, yet human intelligence provides for a culturality that is
acquired over many years through intentional preferences (in
principle, at least); and we can each act deliberately and be highly
deliberative. So, it's obvious that we *are* already always in some
ways discontinuous with a naturalistic sense of nature. *Human*
nature is significantly human in respects that don't pertain to
nature generally. On the one hand, then, we *should* appreciate the
discontinuity that is real, to whatever extent is valid.  

On the other hand, we *are* "continuous" with nature; we are
creatures, and JH's clear acknowledgement of this in his TCA
discussion of "biologically deep-seated" abilities (and elsewhere) is
quite isomorphic with cognitive anthropological research that his own
discussions don't seem to anticipate. Last week I mentioned a
philosopher who analyses basic concepts (cognitive fundamentals) as
*abilities* (Ruth Garrett Millikan), and abilities are importantly
kindred with *competences*, a basic notion in JH's career. A
prominent theme in cognitive anthropology is evolution of
intelligence (even evolution of mind), which provides a ready context
for understanding our continuity with "nature" in a way that is
isomorphic with JH's sense of social evolution. Cognitive
neuroscience is in part a natural science (as physiology) which is
homologous with it's purely cognitive (humanistic or psychological)
aspects, which directly relates to linguistic-cogntive analyses of
development such as Habermas'. So, I don't see a problem (though I
don't expect that others are into all this as much as I am, so I'm
sympathetic to your skepticism).

*That* "there may be room to actually move onto a postmetaphysical
plane of critical inquiry" requires a lived difference between (1)
action and (2) content of action; (2) representation and (1) stance
toward representations. Validity is presumed by any action that is
taken seriously. You say "my general worries...lay with...remnants of
platonism...." I suppose you're not putting me on or deceiving me; I
suppose it's the case *that* your general worries are what you say
they are. You presume the subjective validity of your statement, and
I accept that. I'm not about to accuse you of masking your
intentions. 

It's certainly appropriate for you to share your worries with me, in
this venue; it's not an inappropriate action on your part; it's not
odd or out of place. Additionally, I suppose you mean 'worries' and
'remnants' (and all the other words you use) similarly enough to how
I read these words that I'm probably not misreading you; and you have
to presume a fair degree of readability on my part (as well as your
own intuitions of what English I understand). Maybe you're presuming
too much when you simply use 'platonism' and 'eliminativism' (or,
yesterday, 'Sellarian'); so, it's not odd to question what you mean,
in your statement(s). So, there's lots of normative validity presumed
by your action, most of which I accept as more than merely claimed.
It's there. Your act feels valid to me. 

However, IS it the case that remnants of platonism show in JH's work?
You tacitly claim this, but I don't think it's valid. In fact,
there's no platonism in JH's work (I claim). We disagree. We pose
different, incompatible validity claims about what is in fact
presumed by JH's work--in some specific context, let's say (in order
to go on constructively). 

So, you see, you are unavoidably presuming acceptable stances of
validity in your one statement about worries, which is presumably an
acceptable statement to make. I can work consensually with you on
this, taking most all of your tacit stances (or world relations) for
granted--maybe questioning only: What do *you* mean by "platonism"
and, then: Is it the case that JH shows remnants? In this case
(otherwise going along), I'm treating all parts of your assertion as
valid--genuine and appropriate--but taking you dependence on a
truth-functional proposition about JH's suppositions as
questionable--a mere validity *claim* (maybe even suspecting that
you're misusing 'platonism', which would be to question the
normativity of your employment of a technical term). So, not all of
what you may presume to be valid, in making your statement
(expressing your worry) works for me; some of your statement seems to
imply merely validity *claims*, not implying acceptable evidentiary
plausibility about what JH in fact presumes in his argument. I accept
your pretense of genuineness (subjective validity) and most of your
pretense of shared understanding between us (and fully accept the
normativeness of your act: stating your worry to me through the HAB
list). BUT if you're factually wrong about JH's presumptions
("remnants"), then your *worry* is invalid, as it depended on a false
representations of JH's presumptions (untenable reading or
inferential projections, whatever--we don't know yet). In this case,
your *previously* expressed worry remains a genuine expression, but
it's re-presentation would become ingenuous, it you were to raise the
issue again next month, as if the issue were new to you (no matter
how appropriate the venue or your use of language). If someone raises
an issue, it's soundly dissolved, but re-emerges unphased by past
interaction, I would conclude that this someone had not been
communicating seriously in the past, therefore is probably not
communicating seriously in the present, and I would probably not
respond to their worries. 

So, getting analytic can be very tedious. But there's no avoiding the
validity basis of speech in world relations of intentions and
self-representations; shared understandings, acceptable venues and
timeliness; and impartially assessable indications of what is the
case. 

Validities of our stance in any action--and thus tacitly implied
claims about what is OK--express the richness of meaning available
between us. Why would anyone want this to become obsolete? Perhaps
one wants the other to be just a fantasy, for only in fantasy bonds
(like Plato's re-joined sexes in the ur-World of incestuous
Belonging) can validity become obsolete. There, in the bliss of
angelic personification--or God's unconditional grace--I may no
longer worry about relevance to meaningful communication in-the-world
and/or constructive activity with mortal others.


G'day (if you know what I mean). Otherwise:


Cheers,


Gary



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