From: "John Wright" <john.wright15-AT-worldnet.att.net> Subject: Re: HAB: Hab's method in BFN Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 13:52:40 -0400 I'd like to point out, in addition to what has been been said, that normative theory and empirical theory are often seen as in conflict. As I understand, this theoretical conflict emerged in 20th century political theory especially with Schumpeter's highly descriptive work on modern democracies, as set over against strictly normative theorists like Arendt and Wolin. Hannah Pitkin's _Wittgenstein and Justice_ has a very nice (if somewhat dated) treatment of the nature of this (perhaps now somewhat dated) conflict. In short, descriptive theorists found theorists like Arendt to be anachronistic and utopian, with good grounds. Normative theorists found that while the descriptions offered by their opponents may be accurate, they miss the normative core of irreplaceable concepts, the employment of which puts us under certain practical commitments, even if we fall very short. I think that Habermas valiant efforts to show that deliberative democracy can have a foothold in a contemporary society are in some respects the most important aspect of his work, and show us the right direction for critical political theory. It is easy enough to praise deliberative democracy, but then it often comes off as a bit wistful and utopian. Habermas' careful grappling with the conditions of modern society offer us a reconstrucitve self-understanding that can serve as basis for detailed criticism of existing political and social institutions with a view to maintaining the necessary conditions for legitimacy/moral validity. And to the skeptic he can convincingly redistribute the burden of proof by saying things like ''it suffices to make it plausible that in a perceived crisis situation, the actors in civil society . . . can asume a surprisingly active and momentous role" (BFN 380), and then proceed to make a strong case for the plausibility of that claim. Habermas has long set himself against the dual tendencies in 'postmetaphysical' thought, from postmodernist and empirical theorists, that take the wind out of the participant attitude in norm-guided social action. As Steve suggests, it is to Habermas' credit that he responds to these disparate groups not by ignoring them, but by attempting to stand within them and show that one can still make strong arguments for discourse ethics and deliberative democracy. Best John John R. Wright, Ph. D. Department of Philosophy State University of New York at Stony Brook Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750 ----- Original Message ----- From: "Stephen Chilton" <schilton-AT-d.umn.edu> To: <habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> Sent: Monday, May 21, 2001 12:18 PM Subject: Re: HAB: Hab's method in BFN > Matt-- > > I have a somewhat different take on this from Fred Welfare's (if I > interpret him correctly). Your question seems to assume that H. > is intending / needs to provide an absolute, theoretical grounding > of his position. However, the Munchhausen trilemma shows that > such purely theoretical grounding is impossible; some other form > of justification is required. H. uses a reconstructive > (dialectical) logic, where theory and empirical reality are > *always* mutually correcting, neither having priority over the > other. So it seems to me that his consideration of empirical > doubts is important -- not only immediately, to fend off those > empirical issues that might undercut his theoretical position, but > also in the long run, as a sign that he is staying intellectually > honest by considering these problems. > > Best to all, > > Steve > > **************************************************************** > | Stephen Chilton, Associate Professor, Dept of Pol Science > | Univ of Minnesota-Duluth / Duluth, MN 55812-2496 / USA > | > | 218-726-8162/7534 FAX: 726-6386 Home: 724-6833 (home) > | www.d.umn.edu/~schilton EMAIL: schilton-AT-mail.d.umn.edu > | > | "I always said I wanted to be somebody, but I should have > | been more specific." > | -- Lily Tomlin (via Sara Chilton) > **************************************************************** > > On Sun, 20 May 2001, matthew piscioneri wrote: > > > Dear List, > > > > Given the high level of theoretical abstraction H. frequently makes > > reference to in _BFN_, why does he feel the need to give 'time' over to > > dealing with 'empirical doubts' about the coherency of his model? > > > > The conflation of prescriptive/descriptive/idealising tendencies in the > > _BFN_ is VERY frustrating. Where do other List members feel Habermas wants > > to go in this work? I don't mean the explicit 'theme' of the work as much as > > its 'objective' as a theoretical 'product'. > > > > MattP > > _________________________________________________________________________ > > Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. > > > > > > > > --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > > > > > > --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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