Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 14:59:35 +0200
From: Iver =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D8rstavik?= <iver.orstavik-AT-svt.uib.no>
Subject: Re: HAB: Hab's method in BFN


Although I do not have the time for a legthy reply now, I would like to
flag my agreement with Matt P Peter S about the pertinence of some
uneasiness concerning how Habermas deals with the distinctions between what
is, what is possible, and what ought to be. I agree that he tries to avoid
the constraints connected especially with the positivist distinction
between what is and what ought to be. and somehow to merge pragmatic and
dialectical ideas og the possible. I also think that this attempt at bottom
may betray his project as influences influenced by Hegel, and that this
influence may conflict with his his support for Kantian universalism in
moral theory, for liberal democracy in political theory, and more generally
his strong requirements of rational accountability. Where is the cruel
labour of the negative in Habermas theory,  who does it affect, and how
does he justify its effects? In short, I believe this uneasiness may relate
to some of the most interesting and problematic aspects of his work. I
would be much interested in reading any contributions daring to attempt
articulating the uneasiness in question and related thoughts! 

Iver Orstavik

At 12:36 24.05.01 -0400, you wrote:
>I think that Matt P's unease -- My original unease stemmed from the
>uncertainty
>(I still have) over whether Habermas's _BFN_ is designed to state what *is*,
>what *should* be or what *could* be !!! -- is both a very usual and an
>interesting unease.  It seems to me that it is built on the assumption that
>those (is, should, could) are *the* relevant distinctions, i.e., that we
>should distinguish facts from values, and distinguish both from what is
>possible in the future.
>
>I think that a lot of the intellectual impetus of, e.g., Hegel and Marx was
>to disagree with those distinctions and try to recast the project of
>philosophy and social theory.  In one way or another, Hegel is, it seems to
>me, trying to comprehend political reality in the Philosophy of Right in a
>way that does not separate facts, values, and possibilities, but sees that
>the (philosophical) means of comprehending the world (i) grows out of the
>values and development of that world and (ii) shapes how we understand it.
>
>In many ways, I think Habermas, through all his concerns, follows important
>parts of that tradition.
>
>
>Peter G. Stillman
>
>office:  Rocky 204; office hours by appt.
>
>Political Science Dept.
>Vassar College (#463)
>Poughkeepsie, NY, 12604-0463
>845-437-5581; fax = 845-437-7599
>
>
>
>
>     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---




     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---