From: "John Wright" <john.wright15-AT-worldnet.att.net>
Subject: HAB: Re: Skepticism and Moral Motivation
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 01:05:55 -0400



Antti M Kauppinen wrote:

> This is an important distinction for Habermas, because he is trying to
> answer the moral skeptic, particularly in MCCA. I think he makes a very
> convincing case for the necessity of morality in general from the
> external perspective and even for the impossibility of consistent long-term
> skepticism (based on the idea that nobody can maintain a non-pathological
> practical relation-to-self without *mutual* recognition) from the
> deliberative perspective, but I don't think his argument works for
> the occasional skeptic, who suspends moral rules only in certain
> specific situations. One could perhaps say that Habermas shows the
> skeptic to have a normative reason to act morally, but not that he has a
> motivational reason (or would have a motivational reason if he were to
> deliberate rationally starting from his present values and commitments),

 As I understand it, in showing the long-term pathology of a skeptical stance toward
morality, H. shows that an agent would have a 'motivational reason' to act morally
insofar as her present values and commitments extend as far as an attachment to her
own psychological flourishing (which is to say, so far as her motivational set is not
self-destructive) -- this by showing that 'communicative action' is a necessary and
nearly unavoidable component of any culture's interactional repertoire and that as
social beings we interact with others in order to maintain our sense of self.  He
seems to be attempting to draw out the consequences of refusing to enter the kind of
communication that would put us under normative commitments to the point where they
would apply to very basic features of our subjective motivational sets, and,
therefore seems to me to be attempting to give an internalist motivational framework
to discourse ethics.  If successful it seems to me that what you are calling the
'occasional skeptic' would simply be an immoral agent.  That doesn't seem to be an
objection to his approach, unless I fail to understand what you mean by this term.

I don't think you can legitimately separate out the 'normative' from the
'motivational', for H., since 'norms' broadly speaking for H. are things that arise
within the practice of communcation; if we are already so motivated to enter
communication, then, we are already motivated to abide by its norms -- that's part of
the beauty of the pragmatic approach.  It seems that what you've called the
explanatory perspective would need (on H's views) to be measured by its adequacy to
our participant perspectives when it comes to social action, lest we spin out to
systems theory or something (on the other hand, H's reconciliation with Darwin is not
entirely clear to me).

But there is a question about whether H's approach to moral skepticism in fact
succeeds.  While interaction may be necessary for psychological survival, and some
normative commitments may always figure in communication, do moral norms always
pattern the communication that we need for self-esteem (as seems to be the crux of
his response to the skeptic)?  It seems to me that the answer would be no.  For
example: I may individuate quite happily within a community and then have my brother
approach me in my early twenties to perform a suicide bombing mission.  I agree, an
enter into strong normative commitments, such that I would have a _deep_ crisis of
self-esteem if I backed out; indeed, I would be considered wholly contemptible by my
peers.  But there is little fear of that, I go quite happily and meet my end,
smiling, very proud of my actions indeed.


> > A "motivation problem" is different for the ethical form of "Why be
> > moral?" vs. the moral form
>
> I agree with this; this goes both for the deliberative and the
> explanatory perspective. In both cases, articulating reasons for the
> moral case is much harder. It is easier to show both why I should be
> ethical and why people in general should be ethical. If I wasn't
> ethical, I would be acting contrary to my and/or my community's values
> (strong evaluation) that form a core of my identity. If I wasn't moral,
> I would be acting contrary to universal norms that cut across
> communities and may not have particular appeal in mine.
>

The kind of norms that are moral norms make validity claims that extend beyond my
particular community, but are rooted in the communicative practice of some community.
H. would be an internalist about moral norms, insofar as they emerge for him from a
practice of discursive testing, and so, if we've gotten up the gumption to enter
moral discourse, we've committed ourselves to recognize the validity of any claim
that survives, such that if we fail to follow through in our behavioral sequels, then
voila, we're immoral.

It's  not clear that there can be a relevant internalist/externalist distinction
about ethical values if we accept the way H. talks about them, since they don't make
any claim to apply to all of us (humans). The real point of the debate about moral
reasons for action concerned the particular way in which moral norms bind on us,
since they claim to bind on all of us.  One wonders whether there can be a question
of 'motivation' to value something.  Lack of some values may simply be a determinant
of my belonging in some community or not.  So, if I act unethically, I will either
see myself as bad, or as not one of 'them.'



John R. Wright, Ph. D.
Department of Philosophy
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750









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