File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_2001/habermas.0110, message 114


Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 20:58:55 -0800 (PST)
From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: HAB: "liberal eugenics," paragraph 25


QUALITY CONTROL AS INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF HUMAN LIFE (25)
[3rd par. of section 11]

JH associates PID-based rejection of "our" deficient embryo with
"instrumentalization of conditionally created human life." But this
isn't valid, due to the use here of 'human', 'instrumentalization,'
and 'created'.

First of all, JH begs the issue of when *potential* human life
becomes rightfully human, an issue which JH renders (later in section
II) as so "ontologically" ambiguous that reasonable disagreement
about "moral status" on overtly ethical grounds (according to JH)
compels public policy to seek neutrality. The living potential is
*allegedly* human, but so too are unfertilized eggs potentially
human. Though JH makes good points about distinguishing the PID-based
situation from an abortion decision, there's more than just
"something" (par. 26) to be learned from that controversy. 

Secondly, no use of the embryo is suggested by the parents; a choice
is made to reject the outcome of chance (the notion of conditionally
"created" is bogus). So, where's the instrumentalization? 

JH says that the choice (his instrumentalization) is made "according
to the preferences and value orientations of third parties." I don't
know what he's talking about. Is this not a situation of presumably
(as a matter of fairness) conscientious adults (desiring to be
parents) having the counseled choice of whether or not they are
willing to devote 2 decades of their life to a presumably severely
handicapped child that doesn't yet exist? JH is evidently projecting
a situation of decisionism that is not constructive, since the
context is unevaluable without specifics. 

He says that "Selection is guided by the desired genome make-up." So
also do such desires figure into mate selection and choices made at
sperm banks. JH is confusing a deliberately purposiveful opportunity
for commitment and an instrumentalist attitude toward opportunity. JH
elsewhere celebrates authorship in a life--which would presumably
apply to a couple choosing to "make a life" *together* that they
author--so why doesn't the opportunity for choice in parenting count
within a framework of authentic purpose? This touches on a Big
Problem in JH's thinking, in my opinion. JH never has clearly
distinguished purposefulness from instrumental action. The difference
is this: Instrumental action presumes goal specificity (and
instrumentality in this context is as good as its goals; instrumental
action is not as such *instrumentalist*, i.e., not enacted as if
means justifies ends). Purposeful action presumes *direction* without
presumption of where one will go, as commitment to a course of
learning may be an end unto itself, and the endeavor of actualizing
the directional commitment is fulfilling itself. In fact, though,
lives are entwinements of purposes and goals. We set goals on our
course and hope to complete those goals in the course of life. But
the purposefulness of commitment calls for new goals for the sake of
the purpose. The writer writes to write, such that a completed
project is an opportunity for a new project. Committing oneself to a
shared desire to "make" a family does not instrumentalize the event
of pregnancy; nor does freedom to decide against an undesired
pregnancy do more than determine that the embyro will not become our
child.  

JH claims that "A decision on existence or non-existence is taken in
view of the potential essence." But he's not distinguishing existence
in the physical sense from existence in the relevant, human sense.
Only actualized intelligent life exists, in the relevant sense.
Existing, in the relevant sense, is more than being alive (which is
relevant for considerations of euthanasia). At best, with the
declined (or "rejected") embryo, a decision on potential existence or
non-existence is taken; there is no "potential essence" apart from
potential existence. 

So, relative to an abortion decision, JH invalidly asserts that this
"existential choice of interrupting pregnancy" is not substantially
relevant, because an existential choice on the part of the parent(s)
is involved in both cases. JH is incorrect to earlier (previous
paragraph) characterize the women's abortion decision simply in terms
of "self-determination". I wager that most women who have faced an
abortion devision will tell you that the primary struggle was *not*
what the baby would do to her life, but whether she was able, ready
or willing to have a child at that time in her life. No woman,
normally, chooses abortion *primarily* for the sake of her own
freedom. Freedom is a consideration in whether or not one is ready
and able to sustain a commitment to parenting, but it's care about a
potential child that the issue of freedom serves. Claiming
self-determination in *choice* (decision freedom) is not the same as
claiming self-determination as a primary *reason* for the decision
chosen (though I don't doubt that some women characterize their
decision to abort in terms of their need to retain or advance their
freedom or career). 

Next: WHAT MORAL BEHAVIOR IS / WHAT MORAL RULES ARE (31) and PURPOSE
OF MORALITY: DUTY OF CARE (32)

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Make a great connection at Yahoo! Personals.
http://personals.yahoo.com


     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005