Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 20:58:55 -0800 (PST) From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com> Subject: HAB: "liberal eugenics," paragraph 25 QUALITY CONTROL AS INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF HUMAN LIFE (25) [3rd par. of section 11] JH associates PID-based rejection of "our" deficient embryo with "instrumentalization of conditionally created human life." But this isn't valid, due to the use here of 'human', 'instrumentalization,' and 'created'. First of all, JH begs the issue of when *potential* human life becomes rightfully human, an issue which JH renders (later in section II) as so "ontologically" ambiguous that reasonable disagreement about "moral status" on overtly ethical grounds (according to JH) compels public policy to seek neutrality. The living potential is *allegedly* human, but so too are unfertilized eggs potentially human. Though JH makes good points about distinguishing the PID-based situation from an abortion decision, there's more than just "something" (par. 26) to be learned from that controversy. Secondly, no use of the embryo is suggested by the parents; a choice is made to reject the outcome of chance (the notion of conditionally "created" is bogus). So, where's the instrumentalization? JH says that the choice (his instrumentalization) is made "according to the preferences and value orientations of third parties." I don't know what he's talking about. Is this not a situation of presumably (as a matter of fairness) conscientious adults (desiring to be parents) having the counseled choice of whether or not they are willing to devote 2 decades of their life to a presumably severely handicapped child that doesn't yet exist? JH is evidently projecting a situation of decisionism that is not constructive, since the context is unevaluable without specifics. He says that "Selection is guided by the desired genome make-up." So also do such desires figure into mate selection and choices made at sperm banks. JH is confusing a deliberately purposiveful opportunity for commitment and an instrumentalist attitude toward opportunity. JH elsewhere celebrates authorship in a life--which would presumably apply to a couple choosing to "make a life" *together* that they author--so why doesn't the opportunity for choice in parenting count within a framework of authentic purpose? This touches on a Big Problem in JH's thinking, in my opinion. JH never has clearly distinguished purposefulness from instrumental action. The difference is this: Instrumental action presumes goal specificity (and instrumentality in this context is as good as its goals; instrumental action is not as such *instrumentalist*, i.e., not enacted as if means justifies ends). Purposeful action presumes *direction* without presumption of where one will go, as commitment to a course of learning may be an end unto itself, and the endeavor of actualizing the directional commitment is fulfilling itself. In fact, though, lives are entwinements of purposes and goals. We set goals on our course and hope to complete those goals in the course of life. But the purposefulness of commitment calls for new goals for the sake of the purpose. The writer writes to write, such that a completed project is an opportunity for a new project. Committing oneself to a shared desire to "make" a family does not instrumentalize the event of pregnancy; nor does freedom to decide against an undesired pregnancy do more than determine that the embyro will not become our child. JH claims that "A decision on existence or non-existence is taken in view of the potential essence." But he's not distinguishing existence in the physical sense from existence in the relevant, human sense. Only actualized intelligent life exists, in the relevant sense. Existing, in the relevant sense, is more than being alive (which is relevant for considerations of euthanasia). At best, with the declined (or "rejected") embryo, a decision on potential existence or non-existence is taken; there is no "potential essence" apart from potential existence. So, relative to an abortion decision, JH invalidly asserts that this "existential choice of interrupting pregnancy" is not substantially relevant, because an existential choice on the part of the parent(s) is involved in both cases. JH is incorrect to earlier (previous paragraph) characterize the women's abortion decision simply in terms of "self-determination". I wager that most women who have faced an abortion devision will tell you that the primary struggle was *not* what the baby would do to her life, but whether she was able, ready or willing to have a child at that time in her life. No woman, normally, chooses abortion *primarily* for the sake of her own freedom. Freedom is a consideration in whether or not one is ready and able to sustain a commitment to parenting, but it's care about a potential child that the issue of freedom serves. Claiming self-determination in *choice* (decision freedom) is not the same as claiming self-determination as a primary *reason* for the decision chosen (though I don't doubt that some women characterize their decision to abort in terms of their need to retain or advance their freedom or career). Next: WHAT MORAL BEHAVIOR IS / WHAT MORAL RULES ARE (31) and PURPOSE OF MORALITY: DUTY OF CARE (32) __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Make a great connection at Yahoo! Personals. http://personals.yahoo.com --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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