Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 09:59:43 -0700 (PDT)
From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: HAB: Re: Discourse Ethics and pluralism (Adam)



--- Adam Elston <adamelston-AT-hotmail.com> wrote:

[A] ...O'Sullivan writes that, 'it is not clear that
discourse...offers a means of integration in the contemporary world,
even when that integration is thought of (as Habermas thinks of it)
as based on procedural considerations, rather than on the acheivement
of substantive agreements.'(p.743)

[G] John Wright's posting today addresses *this* well (though he's
overtly responding to your closing concern), insofar as O'Sullivan
and you are addressing political concerns. But lifeworld "means of
integration in the contemporary world" are as manifold as the
lifeworld domains that might call for integration (But to what degree
*is* integration validly called for?). Generally, discourse is not
*intended* to offer a means of lifeworld integration. Diverse
communicative life offers this (Besides, one should desire
unintegrated pluralism for the creative hybridization that is so
provided). Discourse is a special, abstracted form of communicative
action pertaining to analytical inquiry, examination of questionable
validity presumptions, and *conceptual* integration at diverse levels
(Consider the generic university as discourse community;
investigative journalism and intelligent commentary as discourse
community). Communicative integration is grounded in shared forms of
life, not procedural considerations of discourse. It's a common
mistake of Habermas readers (as well as generalist readers of
philosophy) to suspect that Habermas/philosophy understands the world
to be born from The Concept, rather than conceptuality built from the
grounds of shared life. 

[A] For O'Sullivan, Habermas's 'intersubjective nature of
rationality' 'does not in itself ensure that difference is adequately
respected in the sphere of  political philosophy.'(p.744)

[G] "In itself" INTERsubjectivity is interSUBJECTIVE. The stance of
oneself AS self and the stance of the other AS separate self are
expressed inevitably in the specific intentionality of any
expression, in the self-representation of the validity claim to
genuineness, and in the cognitive actuality of difference. This is
distinct from the relational intersubjectivity itself, expressed
inevitably in the illocutionary aspect of any expression, in the
normativity of the interaction itself, and in the cognitive actuality
of shared background understanding of language and situation. Of
course, linguistic intersubjectivity is not in itself a sufficient
basis for constituting "the sphere of political philosophy," but to
expect otherwise is specious. 

[A] If discourse ethics is concerned with determining the
acceptability of norms we must adhere to-rather than the values and
ends we should pursue, but, because of pluralism, 'it may be
impossible to find norms that are 'equally in the interests of all...

[G] But there's the mistake: Diverse interests don't set out to find
norms equally in the interests of all; they set out to define general
interests, on the basis of which they formulate regulatives that all
can accept as norms. A *proposed* norm is not a norm until it is
accepted as such. A range of regulatives may be proposed; a range of
formulations of the "same" (still ambiguous) regulative may be
proposed. A formulation is reached that is acceptable to all. *Then*
the regulative, as defined and elaborated (as to the responsibility
and accountability required), becomes a norm. So, it's silly, in my
view, to propose that:

[A] ...then...'discourse ethics must be based largely on a vision of
the 'damaged life', rather than an affirmative view of the 'good
life.'(Moon p.152)

[G] Habermas has never suggested that a view of life is what
discourse ethics is about. People forget that communicative life is
the substantive basis for evaluating both what needs discursive
examination and what is applicable to communicative life. Ethical,
lifeworld backgrounds form the basis for evaluating the acceptability
of governmental proposals ("governmental" in the sense that
acceptable "moral" outcomes work like legislations, juridications and
regulations).

[A] I asked the original questions because I thought that
'bracketing' of questions as to what constitutes the 'good life' is
political and, as such,  politically contestable.  

[G] But Moon is arguing with a straw man. "I" don't have to bracket
my interest in goods to be a political actor in a diverse society. I
have to *evaluate* the relevance of *my* interest to what is
appreciably *ours*.  When our interest is to institutionalize a
*common* good (e.g., access to education), then my own sense of this
good (based in an at-least-intuited sense of good life) figures into
my contribution to shared constructions just as others' sense of this
common good figures in, each sense coming from an individuated
background (diverse senses of educational opportunity). But holistic
senses of the good life are not likely the issue. One might make
cases for the relevance of more general goods in "our"
considerations; one might even appeal to everyone's interest in
large-scale considerations of the good society, invoking diverse
senses of good lives or satisfying lives. But we all will have to
come back to the shared work at hand-albeit more enlightened by the
diversity of perspectives (all of arguable degrees of relevance),
better understanding each other (all having a shared diversity of
interests and diversity of unshared interests)-in order to do
something constructive (and, hopefully, durable).  

[A]... I was asking whether Moon's dealing with these problems are
adequately representative of Habermas and whether discourse ethics
does call for this bracketing, 

[G] Moon's dealing (as you represent this) is not plausibly (let
alone validly) representative of Habermas.

[G-earlier] Is it not interesting to you that a conception of the
good life might be deeply *empathetic* or *altrustic* or itself
*pluralist*? Couldn't it be that "better all around" pertains
basically to valuing the all-aroundness of what's regarded as
"better"?

[A]Yes, it is interesting to me-this is what, until I read
O'Sullivan's critique and Moon, I thought was the rationale
underlying discourse ethics.  Openness, a respect for, and awareness
of alternatives and a willingness to listen and accomodate to, the
opinions of others. However, it seems to me that for discourse ethics
to be effective it relies upon these as prerequisites, (before debate
is even entered into),..

[G] Yes: Communicative conditions of the lifeworld, including the
variable developmental backgrounds of political particicpants, which,
aggregately, evolves through channels that the polis constructs.

 
[A]...prerequisites which, in politics are seldom forthcoming. 

[G] That's disputable; the prerequisites *are* forthcoming in many
cases. But what is politics for, if not to advance the better
intuitions and conceptions of its own prerequisites, where these are
not yet "forthcoming"? 

Regards,

Gary


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