Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 11:16:31 -0700 (PDT)
From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: HAB: Re: Discourse Ethics & Pluralism (Adam)


[A] ...norms must, as Habermas says, 'be capable in principle of
meeting with the rationally motivated approval of everyone involved.'
(TCA Vol. 1, quoted by McCarthy in Calhoun, p.55). OK.  The problem
is: so-called 'universal' reasons, justifying norms, will have
different weight for people of different cultural backgrounds with
different values. 'We cannot agree on what is just without acheiving
some measure of agreement on what is good.'(McCarthy ibid p.62)

[G] Habermas's "capable in principle" pertains basically to
procedural means, not substantive "'universal' reasons". 

A universalistic means of gaining approval (discourse ethic) claims
to apply to any given situation of shared deliberation or
norm-formation. The results may or may not be universalistic, and a
universalistic result (e.g., UN Declaration of Human Rights) may be
"now" only a realistic hope for universality. The deservedness of
universality of, say, a notion of justice as fairness may be
compelling in terms of universal (it is claimed) features of all
deliberators' cognitivity; accordingly, the universalistic claim is
universalizable. But actual universality of such a notion-the real
universalizability-depends (in my allegedly Habermasian view) on how
well the recognition of universal features of cognitivity fares in
historical-cultural environments, and thus how well the
universalistic means of gaining approval fares among cultural
differences. A claim that non-appreciation of what's universal (and
thus inhospitality to universalistic normative proposals) is a
developmental and cultural evolutionary matter *can* be a
non-paternalistic claim, as a proffered sense of universality may
learn from its sojourn of advocacy (as science is an endless learning
process), and (thereby) universalistic proposals undergo revision
relative to their discourse-ethical advocacy.

Indeed, "achieving some measure of agreement on what is good"
(McCarthy) is necessary-but also very feasible! What is good for the
Earth is good for all cultures. What is good for medical health is
good for all cultures. What is good for economic development is a
question that easily makes sense in all cultures (though its
substance is culturally relative! EVEN AS economic development
requires knowledge about technology, markets, management, etc. that
is not culturally relative). What is good for education is a
universalizable *question*. So many *issues* are universalizable. The
*question* of what's good is readily entertained in a universalistic
manner. "Common ground" is a profound metaphor, in anthropological
depth and geographical reality. 

[A] We need to have similar conceptions of what constitutes 'the good
life' before we can start looking for ways to improve it.

[G] I believe that the need is more modest: We need to have
overlapping goods-and we do!-before we can look for ways to
coordinate different futurities, so to speak, in the commons (on
Earth, in shared Time). 

[G-earlier]...A *proposed* norm is not a norm until it is accepted as
such...

[A] So what about when, due to a plurality of competing value systems
and ethical beliefs, a norm (proposed or accepted by one group), is
unable to be accepted as such (by another)?

[G] Then revise the proposal. Revision may so transform the proposal
that a wholly new proposal replaces the insufficiently acceptable
one. 

[A] The political implications that concern me, as I wrote earlier,
are: 'If a societal majority are happy with their life, i.e. its
'good', they're not going to want to 'bracket' their conceptions (of
what is good) in dialogue with a minority with different views i.e.,
difference will not be respected.'

[G] But (again) such group-think suggests a tribalism that is just a
stage of cultural evolution toward pluralism. We can meet this
provincialism with attractions of pluralistic openness to discovery,
diversity, hybridization-attractions which are based in the appeal of
learning, creativity-even novelty. There are lots of ways to recover
the open-mindedness of the Inner Child. But this is not to say we can
always be successful at this or with all projects of educing insight
(the history of human development is still a relatively short story).

[A] This problem, as McCarthy shows, is bad enough between different
political communities but becomes even more irresolvable where one
group holds a norm to be universally applicable to all humans. 

[G] What problem? What group, for example, has the discretion to
"hold" a norm "to be..to all humans"? 

[A] McCarthy gives the examples of euthanasia, abortion, pornography
etc. 

[G] What's this supposed to be a problematic example of? Advocacy of
views on actual issues is not itself domination!

[A] What might be relative ethical issue for one group may be
incontrovertibly normative for another.

[G] So what? Let the *interplay* of views prevail!

[A] I thought, as I said, the rationales underlying discourse ethics
were openness, a respect for, and awareness of alternatives and a
willingness to  listen and accomodate to, the opinions of others. But
it seemed to me that for discourse ethics to be effective it relies
upon these as prerequisites, (before debate is even entered into),
prerequisites which, in politics are seldom forthcoming.

>[Gary wrote] That's disputable; the prerequisites *are* forthcoming
in many 
>cases. But what is politics for, if not to advance the better
intuitions and conceptions of its own prerequisites, where these are
not yet "forthcoming"?

[A] They are forthcoming when they want to be, when it suits (and it
seems naive to think otherwise).

[G] Maybe your problem here is that you believe that openness, etc.,
*requires* the openness of the other (if not demands openness).
Openness *attributes* openness to the other, but communicative life
is commonly about *making* openings where openness is apparently
absent. Openness is *often* there when it appears not to be! These
are cases where "I" need to self-reflectively learn about my own
sense of openness. Critical reflection is part of openness.
*Instilling* critical reflection as a *shared* endeavor is part of
communicative openness. Yes, "they are forthcoming when...it suits,"
and those are opportunities for instilling the appeal of more
frequent suitable forthcomings. Communicative action is not
*basically* disputation!

[A] Where the universalisation of competing norms is (logically)
impossible 'good-willed members of the same political community'...as
a 'moral-political alternative to coercion may well have to involve
elements of conciliation, compromise, consent, accomodation, and the
like.' (McCarthy ibid p.67)  If this is correct and the problem
cannot adequately be dealt with by Habermas's discourse ethics, …

[G] An unjustified surmise (i.e., you haven't make arguments about
this, as well as-in my view--the claim is unjustifiable).

[A] …then it seems a bit hopeful to rely, in the case of irresolvable
pluralism, 

[G] What kind of notion is "irresolvable pluralism"?  Pluralism
*thrives* on the creative hybridization of differences. Who needs to
be generally resolved about differences (outside of needs for
collaboration, coodination and cooperation, that is
project-centered)?

[A] …on the consent, compromise and accomodation of the 'good-willed
members' of political communities.

[G] I have no problem with being "a bit hopeful" and attributing good
will to others. 

[A] Gary suggests…that we, "*deepen* one's sense of ethical issues to
find a shared ethical *background*,...

[G] It was a question: *Can* we…?  I'm optimistic.

[A] ..."... rather than bracketing ethical issues for the sake of
pragmatic, minimalist regulatives of infrastructure." He asks, "Is
the ethos of care anthropologically deep, while the ethos of law is
relatively superficial?"  I agree completely and think there is an
anthropological deepness to the ethos of care and that law is at best
a confused, often misguided attempt at its articulation. 

[G] I'm delighted, too, that *you're* optimistic about this. But I
don't believe that law is "at best" confused vis-à-vis an ethic of
care. Besides, we haven't been talking about law; we've been talking
about cultural difference in norm-formative interaction, no? Formal
procedures of law are a special kind of norm formation that is
culturally neutral via constitutional procedures. 

[A] I disagree with Williams's scepticism…

[G] Further delight. But *I* appreciate (I believe)-and suppose you
do, too-that disagreeing here is a very big can of worms (but I'm
prepared to fish). The burden of advocacy is daunting. 

[A]... and [I] agree with McDowell (_Mind and World_) that there MUST
be a normative dimension to the concept of rationality inherent in
our shared status qua members of the same species....

[G] Habermas disagrees with McDowell, in "Genealogy of the Cognitive
Content of Morality," and I'm eager to focus on this disagreement. I
hesitate to say (but now do) that I see light in the room of
so-called "moral realism" that Habermas finds not worth his while. 

[A] ...BUT; in order for discourse ethics to uncover the necessary in
a sea of relative contingencies it seems we need something more.

[G] Needing a good fishing pole, I say. ('Fishing pole': metonym for
'discursive path'). What might be disclosed, though, wouldn't be (in
my view) "the necessary," rather-I'm not going to say. Rather, let me
ask:  What is the nature of social evolution?

[A] How can we, in political/cultural conflict, agree to 'deepen' our
sense of ethical issues without bracketing that over which we
disagree first? 

[G] Good question. But doesn't one normally bracket the substance of
disagreement in critical examinations, so that one may examine our
presumptions? Doesn't such bracketing provide a clearing for finding
shared ground on which to critically examine differences together?
Hypothesization of incommensurables in good disputation is no special
barrier to deepening the scale of our shared considerations. 

[A] How can we agree on what is right before we have agreed on what
is 'good'? 

[G] In my opinion (now writing in my own way) it's an interplay of
scales of relevance, I think-proffered rights and proffered goods
finding their shared topography of equilibration, inasmuch as we
*need* to collaborate, coordinate, or cooperate. Beyond need, desire
accomplishes what it can, and makes time for seeing what's new and
interesting.

[A] ...should we go with McCarthy and accept (and hope) that
'good-willed members of the same political community'...as a
'moral-political alternative to coercion may well have to involve
elements of conciliation, compromise, consent, accomodation, and the
like.'

[G] I don't have a problem with that, especially since good will is
common, and what we *need* for collaboration, etc., is not agreement
about the nature of the world, but agreement about where we're going
together in the "world" we share. World constitution happens as a
matter of ongoing evolution, as much as (at least, probably more
than) constitution is deliberately constituted---by we designers of
shared futurities-who are also designers of divergent futurities in a
pluralism of interplaying Projects that influence each other-or
don't.

I enjoyed this!


Gary


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