Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 22:11:58 -0800 (PST) From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com> Subject: HAB: Toward An Ethic Of Being Human ("liberal eugenics," sec. III beginning) WHAT IS CALLED "MORAL"? WHAT IS CALLED "ETHICAL"? [continuing from October with JH's "On The Way To Liberal Eugenics?"] At the beginning of section III, the upshot from section II on whether human rights apply to embryonic life is inconclusive for JH. "It is, therefore, all the more important to search for a solution which is at once conclusive and neutral with respect to competing world views, ..." But that importance has not been established in section II (in paragraphs I'm bypassing for now), while JH provided excellent explication of what is at stake *for public policy*. But his sense of the "moral" environment has been too questionable (which I hope I've shown) to accept that public policy is yet an approrpiate locus of focus (so to speak). Yet his now-presumed mode of attention is the backdrop of his entrance into section III, "the embedding of morality in an ethics of the species." Putting this aside, as much as I can (while his public policy stance continues), the topic of an ethics of the species remains just as compelling. Putting aside a probable impropriety of imposing a public policy focus on ethical life when the reality of ethical life is so questionably represented by JH, it remains very useful to examine his sense of an ethics of the species, relative to the most controversial prospect of applied genomics: genetic enhancement. It's quite plausible to claim that JH should have titled section III "The embedding of ethics in a morality of the species." GIVEN, for him, [1] the importance of a search for neutral conclusiveness (mentioned above) and that [2] "the question of how to deal with unborn life is an ethical one" (paragraph 39 or first paragraph of section III), THEN: "The philosophical debate, disembarrassed of sterile polarizations, may then focus on the issue of an appropriate ethical self-understanding of the species" (39 bottom). The ethics-of-the-species focus is apparently intended to provide a basis for conclusive neutrality in relation to (IRT) competing worldviews, which also happens to be the interest of his morality. JH: "I call 'moral' such issues as deal with the just way of living together. Actors who may come into conflict with one another address these issues when they are confronted with social interactions in need of normative regulation." Dealing with the just way might also be addressed by actors not in conflict, but conflict resolution is JH's focus. Unconflicted address of "the just way" ("the"?) would pertain, say, to a search for guidance, in the interest of living justly *before* conflict, living pro-actively IRT just ways (or *the* just way, JH would have it). Is a just way called for outside of government (jurisprudence, regulation, legislation)? That is: apart from our citizenship? Is "morality" the doctrine that justice pertains to contexts unrelated to political life? Is "morality" the doctrine that *everything* is political? Is a (or *the*) morality of the species meant to be anything *else* than a basis for governmental deliberation (IRT applied genomics) and regulation of medical services (IRT genetic counseling)? CAN there be an *ethics* of the species that primarily addresses ethical life and *therefore* provides a theory for governmental thinking (and genomic "citizenship")? Is there anything else to JH's "moral" issue than ethics and government/citizenship? Does the moral disappear into this dyad? Inasmuch as this is the case--ethics vs. law (in short)--then this should be made and kept clear, not confusing ethical issues and governmental issues--and not confusing issues via a comprehensive doctrine of the moral that seems (given JH's overall discussion) basically cynical, if not *unfair* to its subject. Just way, good way, valid way of reading the issues....just ways "of living together". *Living* together. Living *together*--at all scales? Where is, what is, how goes the boundary between good justice and just goodness, re: intimacy, kindredness, solidarity? One CAN say, though, that different ways of life can live together--no: *more* than this: Different ways of life can *flourish* together. And such a pluralism, such a hybridity of cultural evolution (ultimately speaking) can surely be *understood*, made *coherent*. So, then, the pluralism can cohere as such--pluralistically, too (as a discursive pluralism of coherings or discourses on specific cultural pluralisms: Cultural Theory). It follows from this, then, that culturally-based *conflicts* can be understood or found coherent relative to cultural discourses--just as interpersonal conflicts can be understood relative to lifeworld-based coherings. And why not in the equal interest of all involved? JH writes that "No such rational acceptability may be expected [...relative to...] preferred way[s] of life and ... identity forming beliefs." I disagree. Strong evaluation here. But *suppose* acceptability can't be expected. Acceptable understanding is obviously possible and very credibly probable; and otherwise subject to *hope*. Besides: "Rational" acceptability is secondary among *reasonable* persons (I will argue, because validation is only one side of the reasonable coin of constructive valuation and accountability). Hope, openness, generosity, trust, reflection--and other virtues we might hold dear--belong to us all. And if you disagree (the belonging isn't universal), that's OK. I'll appeal to you about what's really appealing, because I *do* hope, trust, grant, and think you'll understand. Next: THE INTERFACE OF CULTURAL, PERSONAL AND EXISTENTIAL-ONTIC (SELFNESS) [paragraph 42 or 4th para. of section III] __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Make a great connection at Yahoo! Personals. http://personals.yahoo.com --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005