Date: 07 Nov 2001 09:07:00 -0600
Subject: HAB: Habermas and practical philosophy


Gary, do you object to characterizing Habermas's work, overall, as 
practical philosophy?

Gadamer wrote, in 'Hermeneutics as practical philosophy' (in Reason in 
the Age of Science) [long quote]:

"Practical philosophy, then, has to do not with the learnable crafts and 
skills, however essential this dimension of human ability is for the 
communal life of humanity. Rather it has to do with what is each 
individual's due as a citizen and what constitutes his arete or 
excellence.  Hence practical philosophy needs to raise to the level of 
reflective awareness the distinctively human trait of having 
prohairesis, whether it be in the form of developing those fundamental 
human orientations for such preferring that have the character of arete 
or in the form of the prudence in deliberating and taking counsel that 
guides action.  In any case, it has to be accountable with its knowledge 
for the viewpoint in terms of which one thing is to be preferred to 
another: the relationship to the good.  But the knowledge that gives 
direction to action is essentially called for by concrete situations in 
which we are to choose the thing to be done; and no learned and mastered 
technique can spare us the task of deliberation and decision.  As a 
result, the practical science directed toward this practical knowledge 
is neither theoretical science in the style of mathematics nor expert 
know-how in the sense of a knowledgeable mastery of operational 
procedures (poiesis) but a unique sort of science.  It must arise from 
practice itself and, with all the typical generalizations that it brings 
to explicit consciousness, be related back to practice.  In fact, that 
constitutes the specific character of Aristotelian ethics and politics."

There is plenty here that Habermas might object to; but I think there is 
also a basis for agreement.  I am suggesting that that basis, a sort of 
sketch of the concept of practical philosophy, captures fairly well the 
overall nature of Habermas's various interests and efforts.

It might be fruitful to use this text by Gadamer as a stalking horse, to 
consider the points of divergence from a Habermasian point of view.  
(Gadamer goes on in the essay to say that practical philosophy is 
broader in its interests than theoretical science, which must be 
subordinate to practical interests.)

(As an aside, I think that perhaps the Gadamerian deposit in Habermas's 
thought is more pervasive than has been recognized explicitly.)

Bill Hord


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