File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_2002/habermas.0203, message 73


Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2002 18:47:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: HAB: re: Habermas - The Dialectician? (Matt, #71)


Matt:

It's nice to see that you tacitly agree with me (though you
may not yet recognize) that:

G>There is nothing basically "dialectical" about Habermas's
work.

That is, the short quotes you extract from very different
works corroborate that

 (1) "Dialectic" for JH pertains to the mentality that is
the "object" of critique, which is a different matter from
what is the character of the critical hermeneutic that JH
is exhibiting.

(2) The concern for systems problems is important to the
theory of social evolution; but this is a very different
matter from the *discourse* of lifeworld AND system, which
is constituted by multiple modes of inquiry (isomorphic
with multiple modes of action) that INCLUDE systemic
"critical" phenomena (and analysis) in the *reconstruction*
(not dialectical) of change processes (themselves not
prevailaing over the rationality of lifeworld AND system,
in principle).  

But JH's discursive-methodological and conceptual
assumptions are not *constituted* by the kind of
waiting-for-crisis or searching-for-crisis (if not
fostering it) that you would internalize (apparently) as
*your* dynamic of reconstructive analysis, as if life has
no interest for you, unless a crisis is brewing. 

You claim that "there is a dialectical core to Habermas's
mode of inquiry," but all of your examples are about the
*object* of inquiry, not JH's mode of inquiry, and you do
nothing with those quotes but display them, without any
specific focus on what JH is talking about in the very
*different contexts* that those quotes come from--as if
something self-evidently compelling is shown by the things
themselves--as if your posting is basically impulsive (or
no time to make the case you confess you don't know how to
make--not surprisingly, since it can't be made). 

It would be very interesting to look at each one in the
contexts you signal with your extractions, then draw the
contextual examinations into a tenable argument, and
finally make a bald assertion, that "Habermas's theory of
social evolution is a theory of crisis *par excellence*,"
into a *conclusion* about his method--i.e., not confusing a
theory *within* a discourse and the method (or "logic") *of
inquiry* which that discourse exhibits. 

Take one passage--lets say from TCA2--and look at the
assumptions of JH's *work*, not merely the character of the
"object". 

--------------------

You didn't really address my question about "what do you
mean by 'dialectic'...?" Rather, you merely asserted that
"postive dialectic" is an "alternative paradigm". But an
*attitude* or stance of "open-ended futurity" is not a
paradigm of interpretation; rather, well, an attitude. 

If we were to look in detail at JH as critical reader, we
would see that "synthesizing strategies" misses the
prevailing character of his critical hermeneutic. In
particular, one would see that he is not reading "in
opposition" to Horkheimer and Adorno (as well as not using
that reading as a foundational discourse, in the sense that
we derives basic principles through critique; even for
Kant, dialectic was only a mode of "critical" inquiry, not
the governing dynamic itself. In fact, the architecture of
JH's thinking is established in TCA in detail *before* the
critical reading of H&A begins. More accurately, perhaps,
TCA *recalls* the fundamentals of JH's thinking in, more of
less, _CES_ and enriches that relative to a new body of
readings; and theoretical elaborations and revisions of
earlier formulations. 

No doubt, you are attached to such rubrics as "the
dialectical logic," but your own exposition only shows that
this means conflict-resolution, just as I indicated
earlier, to you and to Steve. The basic character of an
interest in learning, events of individuation,
constructiveness (discovery and innovation), imagination,
understanding, the interplay of modes of validity
(genuineness, appropriateness, and realism) in ordinary
action, etc., are lost. You're in a procrustean bed. 

Thanks for calling my brief indication of temporality an
"eloquent description," but I was FAR from indicating any
"homeostasis," let alone some "ideal condition of the
lifeworld." Remember, you asked "where is the 'life' in
lifeworld?", and I indicated briefly the direction in which
I understand this "life" (*in accord* with JH's sense of
world relations--and Gadamer's understanding of art, by the
way--hardly a matter of homeostasis for *him*). 

You say that my "rendition of the lifeworld ... overlooks
systematic distortions and conflictual threats to the
symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld." On the contrary, I
didn't overlook your concerns at all, earlier, and I
haven't overlooked your perspective presently. You are
apparently heavily shadowed by the prospect of distortion
and conflictual threat, while I've been very receptive to
your concerns and views, in an unconflictual way (albeit
sometimes brattish). 

Look, Matt: *Our* lifeworld "lives" through the archive of
our history on this list. One can see that I don't take a
dialectical (postive/negative, subject-object,
oppositional-synthetic) stance toward your views. And
*that* archived practice is my "argument" for the
non-dialectical character of critical hermeneutics, as far
as my "rendition of the lifeworld" is. 

But it would be wonderful to focus on lifeworldliness as
*JH* understands this in TCA, rather than quibble about me
(or you).
 
Once again, best regards,

Gary






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