Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2002 18:47:03 -0800 (PST) Subject: HAB: re: Habermas - The Dialectician? (Matt, #71) Matt: It's nice to see that you tacitly agree with me (though you may not yet recognize) that: G>There is nothing basically "dialectical" about Habermas's work. That is, the short quotes you extract from very different works corroborate that (1) "Dialectic" for JH pertains to the mentality that is the "object" of critique, which is a different matter from what is the character of the critical hermeneutic that JH is exhibiting. (2) The concern for systems problems is important to the theory of social evolution; but this is a very different matter from the *discourse* of lifeworld AND system, which is constituted by multiple modes of inquiry (isomorphic with multiple modes of action) that INCLUDE systemic "critical" phenomena (and analysis) in the *reconstruction* (not dialectical) of change processes (themselves not prevailaing over the rationality of lifeworld AND system, in principle). But JH's discursive-methodological and conceptual assumptions are not *constituted* by the kind of waiting-for-crisis or searching-for-crisis (if not fostering it) that you would internalize (apparently) as *your* dynamic of reconstructive analysis, as if life has no interest for you, unless a crisis is brewing. You claim that "there is a dialectical core to Habermas's mode of inquiry," but all of your examples are about the *object* of inquiry, not JH's mode of inquiry, and you do nothing with those quotes but display them, without any specific focus on what JH is talking about in the very *different contexts* that those quotes come from--as if something self-evidently compelling is shown by the things themselves--as if your posting is basically impulsive (or no time to make the case you confess you don't know how to make--not surprisingly, since it can't be made). It would be very interesting to look at each one in the contexts you signal with your extractions, then draw the contextual examinations into a tenable argument, and finally make a bald assertion, that "Habermas's theory of social evolution is a theory of crisis *par excellence*," into a *conclusion* about his method--i.e., not confusing a theory *within* a discourse and the method (or "logic") *of inquiry* which that discourse exhibits. Take one passage--lets say from TCA2--and look at the assumptions of JH's *work*, not merely the character of the "object". -------------------- You didn't really address my question about "what do you mean by 'dialectic'...?" Rather, you merely asserted that "postive dialectic" is an "alternative paradigm". But an *attitude* or stance of "open-ended futurity" is not a paradigm of interpretation; rather, well, an attitude. If we were to look in detail at JH as critical reader, we would see that "synthesizing strategies" misses the prevailing character of his critical hermeneutic. In particular, one would see that he is not reading "in opposition" to Horkheimer and Adorno (as well as not using that reading as a foundational discourse, in the sense that we derives basic principles through critique; even for Kant, dialectic was only a mode of "critical" inquiry, not the governing dynamic itself. In fact, the architecture of JH's thinking is established in TCA in detail *before* the critical reading of H&A begins. More accurately, perhaps, TCA *recalls* the fundamentals of JH's thinking in, more of less, _CES_ and enriches that relative to a new body of readings; and theoretical elaborations and revisions of earlier formulations. No doubt, you are attached to such rubrics as "the dialectical logic," but your own exposition only shows that this means conflict-resolution, just as I indicated earlier, to you and to Steve. The basic character of an interest in learning, events of individuation, constructiveness (discovery and innovation), imagination, understanding, the interplay of modes of validity (genuineness, appropriateness, and realism) in ordinary action, etc., are lost. You're in a procrustean bed. Thanks for calling my brief indication of temporality an "eloquent description," but I was FAR from indicating any "homeostasis," let alone some "ideal condition of the lifeworld." Remember, you asked "where is the 'life' in lifeworld?", and I indicated briefly the direction in which I understand this "life" (*in accord* with JH's sense of world relations--and Gadamer's understanding of art, by the way--hardly a matter of homeostasis for *him*). You say that my "rendition of the lifeworld ... overlooks systematic distortions and conflictual threats to the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld." On the contrary, I didn't overlook your concerns at all, earlier, and I haven't overlooked your perspective presently. You are apparently heavily shadowed by the prospect of distortion and conflictual threat, while I've been very receptive to your concerns and views, in an unconflictual way (albeit sometimes brattish). Look, Matt: *Our* lifeworld "lives" through the archive of our history on this list. One can see that I don't take a dialectical (postive/negative, subject-object, oppositional-synthetic) stance toward your views. And *that* archived practice is my "argument" for the non-dialectical character of critical hermeneutics, as far as my "rendition of the lifeworld" is. But it would be wonderful to focus on lifeworldliness as *JH* understands this in TCA, rather than quibble about me (or you). Once again, best regards, Gary __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Try FREE Yahoo! Mail - the world's greatest free email! http://mail.yahoo.com/ --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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