Subject: HAB: life world
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2002 22:41:59 +0000


Dear Matthew,

I was hoping to write something substantial but does not seem like so I will 
just pen down few of my guesses or woderings...

I cannot agree when you write:
{What may be causing you difficulties is that in quote #1 Cooke is outlining 
how the modern lifeworld was integrated and then gets reproduced:}

because it is obvious to me after rereading the passage that she is defining 
and hence differentiating lifeworld from system. I have no problem with the 
rest of your mail.

To put roughly I have the impression that Habermas is working with two 
different conceptions of 'lifeworld'. The first let us say, Husserlian and 
the other Heideggerian. Habermas does not realise this or at least does not 
make it explicit any where I know. On the contrary I have an impression that 
he plays with the ambiguity, as he does with many other concepts.

[btw i have an impression that sociology has taken its toll on Habermas over 
the years and philosophically, he has become a very lose thinker, to say it 
mildly. Although in recent years he has come back to his original 
philosophical vocation_____do you agree with this impression?].

Husserl, by using lifeworld, was mainly concerned with overcoming 
over-systematisation and over-theorisation, thus by brining in the concept 
of 'lifeworld' he was actually pointing towards what may be termed as 
'pretheoretical' understanding which can be overlooked under the spell of 
theories especially under the influence of overtheorisation.

Heidegger on the other hand is not much concerned with 'pretheoretical' and 
'theoretical' distinction in general sense. He is more interested in 
discursive and prediscurisive distinction. By brining in the concept of 
'lifeworld' he was pointing towards the 'prediscursive' aspect, which 
according to him form the implicit background of our discursive activities.

I think Habermas takes these two concepts and combine them under one rubric 
and uses their dual aspect for agrumenatative convenience. One other reason 
may be that he does not recognise much of his debt to Heidegger, due to well 
known reasons.

Now obviously both concepts have things in common but 'pretheoretical' does 
not necssarily correspond to 'prediscursive', and certainly does not 
correspond to it in the specific case of Husserl. This is why I say that 
these two conepts are at loggerheads.

Sorry for these very hasty formulations but hope they will convey my point.

regards
ali



>"The basis for Habermas' distinction between social (life world) and 
>functional (system)integration (and thus between 'system' and 'lifeworld') 
>is whether coordination of action depends on or bypasses the consciousness 
>of the individual in her capacity as an agent" [Maeve Cooke, Language and 
>Reeason, A Study.. p. 5].
#2 is about the function of the lifeworld.

>"More precise, [Habermas] uses "lifeworld" to refer to the stock of

>implicit assumptions, intuitive knowledge, and socially established 
>practices that functions as a background to all understanding. The 
>lifeworld is "the horizon-forming context of communication" and functions 
>both as a restriction and as a resource" (ibid. p. 14).
Still not sure where the tension is?

>Now I think both description are at loggerhead with each other and point to 
>the tension in Habermas' concpetion of 'lifeworld'. Lifeworld can either be 
>a level of consciouness or background and hence (necessarily) escaping 
>consciousness. It cannot go both way.

Are you asking after the ontological status of the lifeworld? Is it a type 
of consciousness etc.?

It simply doesn't pay to get TOO ontologically "positive" about key motifs 
in Habermas's theory construction. They act as heuristic devices and have a 
use by date (eg. the ideal speech situation).

Habermas invokes a type of transcendental deduction to "verify" the 
lifeworld along the lines of unless there was a lifeworld everyday 
communicative interaction could not proceed. It does, so there must be a 
lifeworld.

The problem I have with this counterfactual aspect of Habermas's theory 
design is as Dieter Henrich points out that it conflicts with Habermas's 
professed naturalism. BUT, Habermas does make clear the very (meta) 
theoretical plane on which he is operating (more abstract than Parsons if 
that was possible!).

trust this illuminates something for you.

MattP



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