Subject: Re: HAB: life world
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 01:57:47 +0000
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<P>Hello Ali: (and apologies for my messy cut and pastes!)</P>
<P>Fair enough:<BR><BR> >I cannot agree when you write: </P></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>>{What may be causing you difficulties is that in quote #1 Cooke is
<DIV></DIV>>outlining how the modern lifeworld was integrated and then gets
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<P>>reproduced:} </P>
<P>But, I would continue to suggest that in passage #1 Cooke is drawing attention to a differentiation between life/systemworlds *on the basis* of how the modern lifeworld was integrated and then gets reproduced</P>
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<P>>>"The basis for Habermas' distinction between social (life world) </P>
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<P>>>and functional (system)integration (and thus between 'system' and </P>
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<P>>>'lifeworld') is whether coordination of action depends on or </P>
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<P>>>bypasses the consciousness of the individual in her capacity as an </P>
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<P>>>agent" [Maeve Cooke, Language and Reeason, A Study.. p. 5]. </P>
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<P>>#2 is about the function of the lifeworld. </P>
<P>>>"More precise, [Habermas] uses "lifeworld" to refer to the stock of </P>
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<P>>>implicit assumptions, intuitive knowledge, and socially established </P>
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<P>>>practices that functions as a background to all understanding. The </P>
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<P>>>lifeworld is "the horizon-forming context of communication" and </P>
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<P>>>functions both as a restriction and as a resource" (ibid. p. 14). </P>
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<P>When Cooke writes *to the stock of* there seems a distinct modal change in her semantics from the "doing" of integration to the "being" of the lifeworld as a resource. The lifeworld is a sort of *thing* (and a theoretical construct at that!) that at the threshold of modernity which as a meaning-guaranteeing resource was changed-over from the religious/mythical basis to one constructed and then reproduced by social actors whose language practises were released from dogmatic control over the rationality bearing potential of language in archaic societies and who could take yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims blah blah blah.</P>
<P>In taking a yes/no positions these actors are both *implicitly* dependent on the lifeworld (quote #2) and at the same time reproduce the lifeworld (quote #1). This dual dynamic is what I am guessing is causing your queries. </P>
<P>All this isn't to say that I *accept* the lifeworld/systemworld distinction unquestionably. In fact I think Cooke points out that it has generated prhaps the most trenchant criticisms of Habermas's theory of communicative action. So, Ali, you are in excellent company in your doubts :-)</P>
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<P>Yes. My supervisor in philosophy said as much of Habermas's philosophy and my supervisor in sociology said as much of aspects of his sociology. What I tend to look at is Habermas's self-understanding of his endeavour, and in particular the programmatic fallibilism and pragmatism which guides his theory construction. It is theory as work-in-progress; it is theory which is meant to intervene to some extent in the realpolitik; it is a highly synthesized amalgam of other social and quasi-scientific researches, and perhaps most of all - especially in the TCA it is social theory constructed *through* an interrogation of the history of social theory in order to effect a change in social scientific paradigms largely based around themes drawn from the philosophy of language. Given all of this I don't expect TOO much philosophical tightness from Habermas. He is a bit cheeky really - using aspects of analytical philosophy, bits of Chomsky, bits of Piaget etc. In _A&S_ I think he describes his technique as finding an interesting new flower and concentrating on it until his attention passes on to something new. This is why I find cliched talk of Hbaermas as the "last of the Western rationalists" etc as disciplinary guff. If anything his brand of hermeneutics is subversive of the central tenets of the heritage of Occidental rationalism. Given that he desists from all of the rhetorical end-of-philosophy nonsense that some contemporaries grandiosely indulge themselves in and subverts in the actual methodology of his philosophical practice is very appealing to me.</P>
<P>Then again, why shouldn't people jump up on soap boxes and proclaim the end of philosophy and the western tradition all the time using the means of this tradition and in doing so extending it...</P>
<P>>[btw i have an impression that sociology has taken its toll on </P>
<DIV></DIV>>Habermas over the years and philosophically, he has become a very
<DIV></DIV>>lose thinker, to say it mildly. Although in recent years he has come
<DIV></DIV>>back to his original philosophical vocation_____do you agree with
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<P>>this impression?]. </P>
<P>To be honest I haven't caught up with the last three years of Habermas. However, if you mean his turn to discourse ethics then yes and no. For there is a continuity (obviously) between his critical communication theoretic and his more philosophical discourse ethics. This was a connection I was trying to ascertain in a post a couple of weeks ago in the thread about motivations etc. and am still trying to figure out :-)</P>
<P>Anyway, best regards</P>
<P>MattP</P></div><br clear=all><hr>Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at <a href='http://g.msn.com/1HM501201/41'>http://explorer.msn.com</a>.<br></html>
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