File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_2002/habermas.0206, message 44


Subject: HAB: life world [Thomas]
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 02:01:56 +0000


Thomas,
Few questions in turn.

[Perhaps Habermas's "lifeworld" can also be understood in the Hegelian sense 
as that whole set of circumstances against which identity formation takes 
place prior to the advent of critical reasoning.]
so you are saying that 'lifeworld', system distinction is only applicable to 
modern societies?

[It is therefore an "our" world of intuitiveness and convention, a 
background from which the critical self differentiates but may return to.]
does not critical self emanate from it as well? and how it differentiates 
itself? and why it needs to return to it?

[It would thus be more like culture and hence 'organic' (being antecedent to 
"myself" and our being part of which we cannot fully 'get back behind it') 
whereas "system" is that which is clearly rationalized, fully comprehensible 
and transformable in total.]

but why? what is that which makes this distinction between 'lifeworld' and 
system possible in the first place? Why system and not lifeworld is totally 
comprehensible? Now Habermas clearly impute rationality to lifeworld. He 
says that in modernity lifeworld becomes conscious of itself, or more self 
conscious than traditional societies. Rationality of life world (self 
consciousness) is said to be one of the defining character of modernity.

Furthermore what is the difference between rationality and rationalisation 
of lifeworld on the hand and rationality and rationalisation of system?

[This understanding of "lifeworld" would recognize Habermas's Kantian, 
Freudian and pragmatic sensibilities in his acknowledging of limits to 
critical-theoretical explication and justification.]

lifeworld is the limit of critical reason? if so how would you relate 
communicative rationlity to critical reason and how communicative 
rationality in turn is related to lifeworld?

[In particular, as rationalist and defender of modernity, he is presented 
with the fact that reason itself cannot be discursively justified.]

but that is what he does! and mind here, Habermas has very restricted 
conception of discourse (as compared to Foucault for example)..

[In moral matters we could even say reason requires a kind of faith. In 
whatever case, however, we can appeal to having inherited reason from our 
own lifeworld background. A background which while presenting limits to 
unearthing and dissection, we must simultaneously move forward with.]

of course even Kant knew that, but is Habermas calling for faith in 'our' 
lifeworld? or he is trying to 'prove' the (rational) superiority of our 
lifeworld?,

best
ali


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