Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2002 14:48:26 -0400
Subject: Re: HAB: life world


Ali wrote:
>[Tom wrote: Perhaps Habermas's "lifeworld" can also be understood in 
>the Hegelian sense as that whole set of circumstances against which 
>identity formation takes place prior to the advent of critical 
>reasoning.]
>so you are saying that 'lifeworld', system distinction is only 
>applicable to modern societies?

I would say "lifeworld" is applicable to all societies, but only 
critically applicable to modern societies (since the action of 
critique initiates modernity). It is critical distinction that makes 
"lifeworld" conceptually possible, though not in the total way which 
we can objectify (and thus alter) "system" which is our own 
constructed extension to lifeworld. It occurs to me that lifeworld is 
bound up with the problem of origins, both micro and macro.

>[It is therefore an "our" world of intuitiveness and convention, a 
>background from which the critical self differentiates but may 
>return to.]
>does not critical self emanate from it as well? and how it 
>differentiates itself? and why it needs to return to it?

Hmm.. I'm saying the critical self "differentiates" (not necessarily 
'emanates') from lifeworld (a critical difference? ;-). My own 
conception of the critical self is that although it may depend and 
interdepend on life/world for it's content, it is indeed independent 
(free willing) when it's activity is recognized as it's own. Forgive 
me for lack of a more thorough explanation, but basically it 
differentiates by recognizing itself as the one in the many 
(self-activity as synthesizer of appearances). To answer your third 
question, I don't think we 'need' to return to it, though we may. The 
pre-critical lifeworld simply provides a kind of non-alienated 
experience for the self, albeit a conventional or habitual one.

>[It would thus be more like culture and hence 'organic' (being 
>antecedent to "myself" and our being part of which we cannot fully 
>'get back behind it') whereas "system" is that which is clearly 
>rationalized, fully comprehensible and transformable in total.]
>but why? what is that which makes this distinction between 
>'lifeworld' and system possible in the first place? Why system and 
>not lifeworld is totally comprehensible? Now Habermas clearly impute 
>rationality to lifeworld. He says that in modernity lifeworld 
>becomes conscious of itself, or more self conscious than traditional 
>societies. Rationality of life world (self consciousness) is said to 
>be one of the defining character of modernity.

What makes the distinction possible is dialectical progression. 
Dialectic drives greater cognitive differentiation of given lifeworld 
simultaneously with greater cognitive unifying abilities 
(systematization). When critical subjects begin to understand (via 
dialectic) that there is an implicit unity already-existing in the 
manifold appearance of their life/world, they then set about creating 
an explicit unity (system). Note how this explication demonstrates 
the inherent 'problem of origins' in the concept of lifeworld.

>Furthermore what is the difference between rationality and 
>rationalisation of lifeworld on the hand and rationality and 
>rationalisation of system?

I hope my previous statements help to explain my response here, but 
basically "system" can be rationalized in total whereas lifeworld can 
only be rationalized in part. This 'problem' (if you see it that way) 
is exemplified in the post-modern realization that to 'uproot' local 
culture in favor total, systematic rationalization is to kill the 
'life' (it's rootedness) of a lifeworld. In a commonsense way, 
'culture is life' - cultural activities are what make life worth 
living.

>[In particular, as rationalist and defender of modernity, he is 
>presented with the fact that reason itself cannot be discursively 
>justified.]
>but that is what he does! and mind here, Habermas has very 
>restricted conception of discourse (as compared to Foucault for 
>example)..

Actually, to my knowledge he doesn't try to 'justify' this, he simply 
acknowledges that he holds 'a preference for reason'. In this sense 
he can be seen as recognizing the freedom for other's to 'opt out' of 
reason, yet at the same time stand firm to the fact that entry to 
proper discourse means recognizing it.

>[In moral matters we could even say reason requires a kind of faith. 
>In whatever case, however, we can appeal to having inherited reason 
>from our own lifeworld background. A background which while 
>presenting limits to unearthing and dissection, we must 
>simultaneously move forward with.]
>
>of course even Kant knew that, but is Habermas calling for faith in 
>'our' lifeworld? or he is trying to 'prove' the (rational) 
>superiority of our lifeworld?

In a sense, yes! He is trying to say that we should have some faith 
in ourselves (going forward), because we cannot totally rationalize 
our own histories, our own development, our own back-grounds. And we 
should give up trying to do so (trying to rationalize backwards). 
That is for religion - faith in the origin of origin. I do not think 
he is trying to 'prove' the rational superiority of 'our' particular 
lifeworld, though others may come to this conclusion because he does 
of course come from a particular lifeworld. The fact is that we 
cannot possibly avoid this kind of accusation, nor should we bother 
trying to avoid it (let's recognize our own particular heritage, *one 
within many* heritages), yet the rationalizing self must move 
forward. The only alternative seems to be self-hatred and eventually 
suicide via radical-postmodernism.

Regards,

Tom


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