Subject: HAB: Re: Re: THEORY & PRACTICE
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 09:28:29 -0700


A not so brief summary....
(part of my dissertation / notes)

After providing a sustained critique of 'traditional' theory, drawing on
Hegel, Marx, Pierce, and Dilthey as providing the most fertile ground for
further inquiry, Habermas outlines his general theoretical framework as
follows: "There are three categories of processes of inquiry for which a
specific connection between logical-methodological rules and
knowledge-constitutive interests can be demonstrated. This demonstration is
the task of a critical philosophy of science that escapes the snares of
positivism. The approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a
technical cognitive interests; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences
incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically oriented
sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interests that... was at
the root of traditional theories" (KHI, 308).

Habermas's distinction between the three distinct human interests is
supported by five theses:

1) The achievements of the transcendental subject have their basis in the
natural history of the human species.
2) Knowledge equally serves as an instrument that transcends mere
self-preservation.
3) Knowledge-constitutive interests take form in the medium of work,
language, and power.
4) In the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one.
5) The unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that
takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has
been suppressed (KHI, 312-315).

According to Habermas, the three interest structures are fundamental, but
not in the sense of a new 'first philosophy.'. Of the three orientations,
Habermas sees the emancipatory interest is the most tentative and
provocative, and perhaps the most vital. At this stage in his work Habermas
argues that the emancipatory interest lying undisclosed at the heart of
traditional theory is quasi-transcendental, and can be located in the
anthropological constitution of the species. The uncovering of the
emancipatory knowledge constitutive interest establishes a substantial link
between separate and distinct forms of deontological social coordination,
scientific knowledge, and self-reflection. In TP that you scrippled some
notes for, Habermas clarifies his understanding of reflection by dividing it
into two parts: critical reflection (ideology critique) and reconstruction
(theory of communicative competence).

To highlight the import of this emancipatory interest by way of critique,
Habermas argues that as long as theoretical analysis retains an emphasis on
ontology, as opposed to the contingent sociality of the human species, "it
is itself subject to an objectivism that disguises the connection of its
knowledge with the human interest in autonomy and responsibility" (KHI,
311). Ontology is a problem for Habermas because the implied objectivism of
its substantial claims belies confusion between two distinct modes of
reasoning: purposive and communicative, or, monological reasoning and
dialogical reasoning. This neglect pays the price of rendering its lingering
interest structure invisible and suppresses the kind of self-reflective
criticism that Habermas seeks to encourage; thus succumbing to a scientific
form of moralism without acknowledging this to be the case. Habermas's point
is not that the questions and concerns of ontological inquiry are false, but
that an unmediated knowledge of any 'first philosophy' cannot be adequately
clarified within the bounds of a communicatively conceived rationality, at
least not in a non-fallible way.

In general, Habermas's Critical Theory prompts critical reflection on both
the objects of the social sciences and its basis in the anthropological
interest structure of the species. Only when the social sciences take into
consideration both sides of this dialectic can the epistemological claims of
the social sciences be considered 'rational,' thus linking knowledge with
human interests and bridging the strained gap between theory and practice.
For Habermas, the empirical-analytic sciences and the historical hermeneutic
sciences reflect human interests which are essential for the development of
a socialized, individuated, and rational society. However, in Habermas's
view knowledge, and the means through which knowledge is acquired, cannot be
meaningfully separated from questions of socialization and institutional
complexity. It is thus also necessary, on pains of disfiguration and
distortion, to grasp the interest structure underlying science and its
objects to begin with. The critique of knowledge is therefore only possible
as a comprehensive social theory, in what Habermas calls "the
self-reflection of the science" (KHI, vii). Accordingly, self-reflective
knowledge, once detached from a scientistic understanding, accounts for the
reflexive unity of elements which traditional theory has illegitimately
severed: knowledge and human interest and the way in which our human
interests guide our interested knowledge: erkenntnisleitende Interessen.

To this end, Habermas outlines two forms of inquiry that are provisionally
paradigmatic for emancipatory fields of inquiry: psychoanalysis and the
critique of ideology; the former dealing with structural and institutional
bases of power affecting communicative patterns from without, and the latter
with intrapsychic disturbances brought on by deformations in socialization
and individuation from within. Significantly, Habermas further argues that
Freud's psychoanalysis, read as a theory of linguistic analysis, radicalizes
and realizes Marxian conceptions of ideology critique (McCarthy 1978, 56). I
regard Habermas's interpretation of Freud is crucial for this project since
the perceived inadequacy of Freud's thought, in the end, also turns out to
be one of the reasons why Habermas felt lead to abandon the idea of a
distinctly emancipatory interest

The origin of Habermas's understand of human interests is diverse. Not only
does Habermas comprehend human interests through the traditional categories
of Kant and Fichte, but he also draws on Hegel, Freud, and the Frankfurt
School to further their significance for contemporary social theory. From
Habermas's earliest work dealing with Hegel, he identifies 'interests' as
being at the root of human praxis, manifest in the form of the dialectic of
nature and reason, subject and object (TP, 209). The concept of interest,
which Habermas understands to be a critical concept for epistemology,
encapsulates the movement of self-reflection, as stemming from inclination
through to a knowledge-constitute interest (TP, 262). Habermas's
appropriation of Freud is decisive in accounting for this transformation of
the inclination toward self-preservation and the theoretical orientations
that can be thematized subsequently. What is crucial for my thesis here is
Habermas's understanding of an emancipatory interest, which Habermas takes
to be at the heart of traditional theory, having to do with the
reconciliation between knowledge and interest as manifest in critical
self-reflection.

Arguing that there is a discernable relationship between three distinct
theoretical attitudes with specific corresponding human interests, Habermas
maintains that epistemological reflection requires a transformed
understanding of the disinterested contemplation or value-free notion of
science and truth. Habermas's concept of truth, in contrast, is understood
not in the sense of a 'correspondence' with reality, but in the sense of
validity, contextualized and given substance by an interested community of
investigators.

By drawing attention to the general orientation and interests guiding the
social sciences, Habermas establishes a connection between the accumulation
of knowledge and anthropologically deep-seated interests. The first
interest, pertaining to the empirical-analytic sciences, has to do with
predicting and controlling the environment, what Habermas calls a technical
interest. Equivalently, the reproduction of human life is equally dependent
upon and in fact situated within intersubjective relations, the inquiry into
which is grounded in a second, practical and historical-hermeneutic,
interest. Habermas argues the interest in both kinds of knowledge, technical
and normative, is a fundamental and invariant characteristic of human beings
as socially evolved natural and cultural beings. Habermas maintains that
these interests can be formalized in terms of a theoretical orientation, and
investigated according to specific methodological principles. If these
orientations are uncritically taken to be independent from one another the
sciences can be said to preserve an objectivism that disguises and
suppresses the "transcendental framework that is the precondition of the
meaning of the validity of such propositions" (KHI, 307). Only by taking
into consideration the 'abandoned stages of reflection' can the unity of
knowledge and human interests be realized.

The third interest, the emancipatory interest, discussed by Habermas takes
the form of a self-reflective inquiry and is read as an inherent property of
language use oriented by the attempt to understand. Self-reflection,
understood as praxis, thus plays an invaluable and irreplaceable role, and
yet does not collapse the distinction between practical and technical
interests. Critical reflection, understood as the idea of reason grasping
itself as interested, thereby brings depth to, and the potential for, the
reconciliation of practical and technical interests. This third model of
inquiry that Habermas considers, and the interest in which it is grounded,
is an interest in liberation from pseudo-natural constraints whose
ideological power resides in their non-transparency. The act of
self-reflection is, in itself, simultaneously 'knowing and acting' - a
communicative and discursive force - and is at the heart of Habermas's
understanding of progressive enlightenment through reflection.

Although Habermas's claims regarding the idea of an emancipatory interest
fell under immediate criticism, his position is clarified in his essay "Some
Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis." Habermas writes,
with regards to the relation between politics and social theory, "Even if
one admits that inherent within reason is also partisanship in favor of
reason, still the claim to universality, which reflection as knowledge must
make, is not to be reconciled with the particularity which must adhere to
every interest, even that which aims at self-liberation" (TP, 15). This
insight linking knowledge with cognitive processes, both in its particular
and universal moments, further gives rise to a meaningful distinction
between instrumental and communication action (KHI, 212). As indicated,
Habermas argues that these interests are invariant, necessary for the
reproduction of the species and quasi-transcendental, even when the interest
itself is particular and contingent (TP, 8).

The above mentioned distinction that Habermas makes between instrumental and
communicative rationality is essential to his work. For Habermas,
instrumental action is governed by technical rules based on empirical
knowledge. Purposive-rational action seeks to successfully realize defined
goals under given conditions while communicative action (symbolic
interaction), by way of contrast, is governed by binding consensual norms
that define reciprocal expectations about behaviour (TRS, 99ff). When
processes of inquiry become locked into instrumental aims their normative
character is neglected and lost, flatted in the rush to achieve goals rather
than heed the proper social dimensions of any such coordination of action. A
notable example of this conflation is indicated by Habermas with regards to
his infamous phrase "Left fascism," when he proposed, correctly or
incorrectly, that the emerging student protests risked becoming
one-dimensional forms of actionism, loosing sight of their original
democratic and democratizing aims (AS, 83-84, 233).

The distinction between the empirical-analytic sciences and hermeneutic
understanding, nor its basis in language and labour, should be
underestimated or overestimated. Habermas has consistently maintained that
strategic actions, since they are derivatives of communicative action, can
in fact broach gaps in communicative relations. Such interjections are given
credence in Habermas's analysis of the student movement, where he notes that
symbolic disruptions, such as protests or theatrical gestures, can be used
to instrumentally encourage democratic and open forms of communication and
debate. As Martin Beck Matustik further observes, "Habermas emphasizes the
'symbolic character' of nonviolent protest. Protest may violate accepted
norms, but 'solely with the intention of appealing to the capacity of reason
and sense of justice of the majority in each particular case' ... The peace
movement is, by definition, intrinsically committed to pacifism. Its
violation of accepted social and legal norms is symbolic or derivative of
democratic decision making" (Matustik 2001, 115)...

I should mention, Martin Beck Matustik's book Jurgen Habermas: A
Philosophical-Political Profile is, without a doubt (at least my doubt) one
the best books on Habermas I've read. Matustik systematically goes through
Habermas's work, citing several key 'political' learning points: 1945, 1968,
1989, 1991, and 1999. The book is clearly written and, although not
uncritical, has as its primary aim understanding Habemas's position, in the
best kind of way. For those interested in the theoretical work underlying
it, you'll have to turn to his earlier book Postnational Identity and for
his attempt to bring together a series of often mutually exclusive
paradigms, Specters of Liberation. If there is opportunity, I highly
recommend having a look at it (esp. for anyone interested in Habermas's
'politics' - the student movement, nationalism, new social movements etc).

Hope this helps to some degree.

ken



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