Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2003 01:57:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: HAB: Interest in Social Change


Re: Matt, "Children of the Enlightenment," 26 Dec.

M> Doesn't [the following] risk conflating the moral
interest with self-interest?

G>>...Desire, need and idealization are the basis of [M>>>
"social change"] interests, and they arise *anyway*, be it
in the flow of a good life or in a less than good life
prior to their frustration. Dissolution of anomie, etc.,
*results* in a good flow of articulate desire, need, and
idealization, which is naturally motivating.

G: No. Where's the risk?  

If interest in social change is *genuine*, it must be
compelled by the real interests of those who desire, need
and idealize specific changes; moral evaluation of
interests don't look like an issue of genuine articulation
of these interests. 

The specificity of shared interest implies participation of
interested parties in the shared articulation of the
desire, need or ideal of social change. A *social* interest
in change is what the interest in social change genuinely
is, and it requires participation to gain definition.
Moreover, social change is best conceived as a
participatory venture by those who have an interest in it.
Participation in social change requires motivation that
arises genuinely from lifeworld interests, if the change is
to be validly expressive of those who are interested in it.


*Among* results of a change process may be *normative*
arrangements (or matters of normative validity). But there
can't be normative validity without genuine assent to
arrangements proposed as normative. So, an aggregate
genuineness of the approval process is necessary for norm
formation. EVALUATION of the deservedness of a proposed
norm can be a matter of this---a matter of the genuineness
of process—OR it may be a matter of "moral" evaluation,
regarding general social values. 

A problem of conflation doesn't belong to the interest in
social change. 

-------------------------------------------------
M>>> An ethic of care ...carries a lot of justificatory
baggage, ....

G>> [Not at all].... the intuitive appeal of an ethic of
care *begins* pre-philosophically. ....Adults know quite
intuitively the self-esteeming value of caring for self and
others, and caring about issues. The humanitarian sense of
care is not difficult to appreciate. Standards of care have
normative appeal based in apprehensions of care in our
lives. Duties of care can easily be understood as
derivative of lifeworld-based standards of intimate and
humanitarian care.

M> .... Even if the "is" is granted - ("Adults know quite
intuitively the self-esteeming value of caring for self and
others, and caring about issues.") - and this intuition is
by no means universal - then there remains a justificatory
gap when translating the questionable fact of this
intuition into any sort of ought.

G: I see no problem in justifying care, and I see no
problem in claiming that others ought to care for
themselves. If you object that you ought to care for
yourself, what could be the non-pathological basis of the
objection? Also, on what basis would you object that one
should care about others? Tendencies toward sociopathology
need to be addressed not basically as moral problems, but
as clinical problems, since the normative basis of care in
healthy family, social and educational experiences is
easily explicable. The justification of an ethic of care
comes from *knowledge* about healthy family, social, and
educational processes that has normative appeal and a real
basis. That "this intuition is by no means universal" is
part of why we need social workers, special needs
educators, community development programs and NGOs in
post-colonial nations, etc.

Regards, 

Gary




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