Subject: Re: HAB: Interest in Social Change
Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2003 14:13:05 +0000
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<P>Dear Gary,</P>
<P>Thanks for the reply. Overall, in response, I hear Camus [_The Rebel_] and a strange type of love embedded in the emancipatory interest. When convenient I like to adhere to the problematic of the is/ought gap. I also don't think justifying care to be all that awkward. Care resonates with compassion and love. </P>
<P>Happy New year,</P>
<P>MattP.<BR><BR></P></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>>From: Gary E Davis <GEDAVIS1-AT-YAHOO.COM>
<DIV></DIV>>Reply-To: habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
<DIV></DIV>>To: HAB <HABERMAS-AT-LISTS.VILLAGE.VIRGINIA.EDU>
<DIV></DIV>>Subject: HAB: Interest in Social Change
<DIV></DIV>>Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2003 01:57:07 -0800 (PST)
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>Re: Matt, "Children of the Enlightenment," 26 Dec.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>M> Doesn't [the following] risk conflating the moral
<DIV></DIV>>interest with self-interest?
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>G>>...Desire, need and idealization are the basis of [M>>>
<DIV></DIV>>"social change"] interests, and they arise *anyway*, be it
<DIV></DIV>>in the flow of a good life or in a less than good life
<DIV></DIV>>prior to their frustration. Dissolution of anomie, etc.,
<DIV></DIV>>*results* in a good flow of articulate desire, need, and
<DIV></DIV>>idealization, which is naturally motivating.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>G: No. Where's the risk?
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>If interest in social change is *genuine*, it must be
<DIV></DIV>>compelled by the real interests of those who desire, need
<DIV></DIV>>and idealize specific changes; moral evaluation of
<DIV></DIV>>interests don't look like an issue of genuine articulation
<DIV></DIV>>of these interests.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>The specificity of shared interest implies participation of
<DIV></DIV>>interested parties in the shared articulation of the
<DIV></DIV>>desire, need or ideal of social change. A *social* interest
<DIV></DIV>>in change is what the interest in social change genuinely
<DIV></DIV>>is, and it requires participation to gain definition.
<DIV></DIV>>Moreover, social change is best conceived as a
<DIV></DIV>>participatory venture by those who have an interest in it.
<DIV></DIV>>Participation in social change requires motivation that
<DIV></DIV>>arises genuinely from lifeworld interests, if the change is
<DIV></DIV>>to be validly expressive of those who are interested in it.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>*Among* results of a change process may be *normative*
<DIV></DIV>>arrangements (or matters of normative validity). But there
<DIV></DIV>>can't be normative validity without genuine assent to
<DIV></DIV>>arrangements proposed as normative. So, an aggregate
<DIV></DIV>>genuineness of the approval process is necessary for norm
<DIV></DIV>>formation. EVALUATION of the deservedness of a proposed
<DIV></DIV>>norm can be a matter of this---a matter of the genuineness
<DIV></DIV>>of processOR it may be a matter of "moral" evaluation,
<DIV></DIV>>regarding general social values.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>A problem of conflation doesn't belong to the interest in
<DIV></DIV>>social change.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>-------------------------------------------------
<DIV></DIV>>M>>> An ethic of care ...carries a lot of justificatory
<DIV></DIV>>baggage, ....
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>G>> [Not at all].... the intuitive appeal of an ethic of
<DIV></DIV>>care *begins* pre-philosophically. ....Adults know quite
<DIV></DIV>>intuitively the self-esteeming value of caring for self and
<DIV></DIV>>others, and caring about issues. The humanitarian sense of
<DIV></DIV>>care is not difficult to appreciate. Standards of care have
<DIV></DIV>>normative appeal based in apprehensions of care in our
<DIV></DIV>>lives. Duties of care can easily be understood as
<DIV></DIV>>derivative of lifeworld-based standards of intimate and
<DIV></DIV>>humanitarian care.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>M> .... Even if the "is" is granted - ("Adults know quite
<DIV></DIV>>intuitively the self-esteeming value of caring for self and
<DIV></DIV>>others, and caring about issues.") - and this intuition is
<DIV></DIV>>by no means universal - then there remains a justificatory
<DIV></DIV>>gap when translating the questionable fact of this
<DIV></DIV>>intuition into any sort of ought.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>G: I see no problem in justifying care, and I see no
<DIV></DIV>>problem in claiming that others ought to care for
<DIV></DIV>>themselves. If you object that you ought to care for
<DIV></DIV>>yourself, what could be the non-pathological basis of the
<DIV></DIV>>objection? Also, on what basis would you object that one
<DIV></DIV>>should care about others? Tendencies toward sociopathology
<DIV></DIV>>need to be addressed not basically as moral problems, but
<DIV></DIV>>as clinical problems, since the normative basis of care in
<DIV></DIV>>healthy family, social and educational experiences is
<DIV></DIV>>easily explicable. The justification of an ethic of care
<DIV></DIV>>comes from *knowledge* about healthy family, social, and
<DIV></DIV>>educational processes that has normative appeal and a real
<DIV></DIV>>basis. That "this intuition is by no means universal" is
<DIV></DIV>>part of why we need social workers, special needs
<DIV></DIV>>educators, community development programs and NGOs in
<DIV></DIV>>post-colonial nations, etc.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>Regards,
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>Gary
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>
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