Date: Wed, 03 Sep 2003 10:36:41 +0300
Subject: Vs: [HAB:] success vs. aim; meaning vs. rationality; act vs.


A> This sort of speech act in a way openly flouts the
>demands of justifiability or appropriateness; they >wear, as
>it were, their invalidity on their sleeves.
>
>G: On the contrary, perlocutionary action may be
>justifiable and appropriate. Didactic, directive, and
>instructional activity is often justifiable, because >it
>implies and is comprised by illocutionary activity and
>aspects. 


This case of didactic and teaching in this context is very interesting. The question is, what role perlocution have in teaching. Is teaching always strategic action with perlocutive intention? 

In his critical theory of education Robert Young tries to solve the problem by dividing perlocutive speech acts into three types: 

"Imperatives which appeal to known positive or negative sanctions which the person in power can control (type 2) and imperatives which appeal to a known normative context of legitimate authority (type 1) (...) But there exists another general class of perlocutions which might be called 'deceptions' or 'ulterior purposes' (type 3). In these, as Strawson has shown, a speaker has to succeed in getting a hearer to accept an illocutionary claim in order to succeed in some further purpose, which must remain concealed." (Young 1989, 106) 

By this threefold division Young develops his own theory of indoctrinative teaching (that is manipulation in teaching): 

"If the ideal pedagogical speech situation (IPSS) is one in which the student is able rationally to assess views or, at least, come to hold them in 'a manner open to rational assessment', then only those speech acts which are illocutionary but not perlocutionary (in senses 2 and 3) can characterise the form of action we would want to call 'educational' rather than 'indoctrinatory'." 

The problem here is that the teaching is a very special form of human interaction, which is why the concepts of illoction, locution and perlocution are poorly suited to the act of teaching. Is teaching, in its essence, communicative or strategic action? One could present very convincing arguments in favour of the notion that teaching is not at all communicative action. According to Habermas original view, interaction is always strategic if perlocutive aims are involved. Where teaching is concerned, one could define didactic aims as perlocutive aims. From this point of view, teaching always remains as a perlocutionary action (in senses 2 and 3), in which the teacher attempts to influence others (Beeinflussu-ng des Gegenspielers-), and the teacher's success can be evaluated by criterion of effectiveness (the validity claim of the instrumental and strategic action). In this respect, teaching is always strategic action and teachers undeniably use perlocutionary speech acts (in senses 2 and 3).

One could also claim like Oelkers (1983, 'Pädagogische anmerkungen zu Habermas' Theorie kommunikativen Handeln, Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, vol. 30, 2/83) that teaching cannot be placed along the axis of communica-tive-strategic action. Jan Masschelein's solution to this problem is to conceive pedagogical action as simulated communicative action (1991, Kommunikatives Handeln und Pädagogisches Handeln,. Leuven University Press, Leuven.)

My own conclusion I have presented in article "Habermas and the Problem of indoctrination". It should be should published in internet in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education <http://www.vusst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/main.htm>

For Antti: Tässä viikon sisään pitäisi tulla ulos ensimmäinen kirjani nimeltä "Kommunikatiivinen opettaminen * Indoktrinaation kriittinen teoria" (Jyväskylä: SOPHI). Siinä esitetty kokonaisuudessaan oma Habermas-tulkintani.

Sorry my long and and intentionally perlocutive reply.

Rauno Huttunen
Senior assistant
Department of Education
Unversity of Joensuu





     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---