Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2003 23:52:38 EDT
Subject: Re: [HAB:] Illocutions and Coordination of action


In a message dated 9/3/2003 7:48:20 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mpiscioneri-AT-hotmail.com writes:

> Habermas introduces his speech act theory in _TCA_ to explain how 
> communicative languae has the capacity to *co-ordinate* social action. In 
> other words wherein lies its compelling/motivational force. This is why JH 
> looks to Austin/Searle if I remember correctly.
> 

Don't get angry Gary, I mean well.  In chapter 3 of TCA1, Habermas does base 
his Universal Pragmatics on speech act theory, but he does not privilege the 
representational function. He breaks with the 'logos' and moves to a conception 
of illocutionary forces which specify which validity claims a speaker raises, 
how he raises it, and for what purpose; as against the propositional contents 
which are irrational forces.

Illocutionary forces motivate one to accept an offer contained in a speech 
act and to accede to a rationally motivated bonding force by presupposing that 
actors relate to more than one world at a time: objective, social, and 
internal.  The problem is coordinating action.

Here, Habermas takes up Weber and distinguishes himself.  In Weber's action 
theory coordination accords with purposive rational action, Habermas with 
normative consensus and as based on reaching understanding as opposed to Weber's 
success motivation.  Communicative action means that agents are coordinated 
through reaching understanding; their actions plans are harmonized on the basis of 
common situation definitions.  It is the negotiation of definitions of the 
situation which is the essential element of the interpretative accomplishments 
required for communicative action.

The underlying competency issue is whether the speakers can distinguish 
between situations in which they are exerting an influence and those in which they 
are reaching an agreement, an understanding.  

Habermas criticizes Austin for failing to distinguish between speech acts and 
the context of interaction.  Acts of communication as speech acts with 
perlocutions function as the coordinating mechanism for other actions; they have to 
be disengaged from communicative action contexts before they can be 
incorporated into strategic action.  Habermas wants to locate the problem of 
coordinating action in the distinguish between perlocutionary effects and an orientation 
to reaching understanding.

Fred Welfare


--- StripMime Warning --  MIME attachments removed --- 
This message may have contained attachments which were removed.

Sorry, we do not allow attachments on this list.

--- StripMime Report -- processed MIME parts --- 
multipart/alternative
  text/plain (text body -- kept)
  text/html
---


     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---