Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2003 14:57:48 -0700 (PDT)
From: Gary E Davis <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: [HAB:] Deflationary truth, part 1


In _Truth and Justification_'s essay "Truth and
Justification"'s section titled "Truth and Justification,"
Habermas begins to clarify the relationship between truth
and justification. So, you can't miss the signal importance
of this relationship for him! (I couldn't resist.)

And the way he does this clarification is to explicate his
"pragmatic" approach to truth relative to the "semantic"
(deflationary) and an epistemic approach to truth, which
I'm going to examine in detail, deflationary here (and one
later posting). 

Taski's Convention T is the matter at hand for JH (though
deflationary theory is not just about Tarski), so that's
all we have to care about, as to what the "semantic" theory
is about, relative to JH's interest in using a semantic
level of concern to make a differentiation between that and
the pragmatic level. 

T: "P" is true iff p. 

Standardly, truth theory seeks the simplest practicable
examples (instantiations of S). JH uses an infelicitously
complex example (instantiation) for S, so let me use a
simpler example:

'The rain outside continues' is true iff the rain outside
continues. 

Habermas uses the formulation T above, but I think that
this is misleading. The deflationist has in mind:

T1: "P(s)" is true iff s is the case, where s is the state
of affairs denoted by P.

I may know that s is the case by looking out the window,
having remembered beforehand that the rain earlier
continued, such that I'm now feeling anxiety about not
having my umbrella in hand. But alas, the rain has stopped;
I don't need my umbrella, and P(s) is false. Knowing
whether or not the rain continues involved nothing
linguistic.

But JH claims that Convention T / T1 is a 2-part linguistic
condition. 

JH: ...the truth-predicate when used in this way
establishes a relation of equivalence between two
linguistic expressions---the whole point of the Tarskian
strategy of explanation depends on this. (OPC 361)

G: Sure, Convention T depends on such a relation; but it's
*about* a linguistic and non-linguistic state of affairs.
JH recognizes this:

JH: ...what is envisaged in every case are pictures of
relations that extend beyond language. (ibid.)

G: Our relations to states of affairs can be (and often
are) independent of the linguistic representation of states
of affairs; perception, broadly conceived (intelligence
generally) is richly non-linguistic. 'True' pertains to the
lingustic relation to non-linguistic states of affairs,
such that T1. If I'm blind, I would have to hear the rain
or stick my hand out the window to know that s is the case.
Non-linguistic animals, too, may know that the rain
continues and may choose to stay dry (which is why the cat
is still on the mat, and the birds are not flying).
(Animals have knowledge and make cognitive determinations
without language.)

So, I could agree that:

JH: ...the disquotational function...already presupposes
the representational function. (ibid.)

G: Though, it seems redundant to say "already pre-". But
it's not the case *for linguistic reasons* that:

JH: ...the disquotational function is not sufficiently
informative because it already presupposes the
representational function. 

G: Recognizing that the rain continues supposes the
perceptual function, which is nothing more than to perceive
rain continuing. T1 supposes decidability, including
perception of states of affairs, but that's not a
linguistic supposition; it's a cognitive supposition
(represented epistemically as this *cognitive* supposition
proven by experience). 

An infant may understand what rain is, even though he has
no linguistic representation of this. He perceives the rain
continuing and infers that he will get wet if he sticks his
arm beyond the cover of the stroller cover. An instrument
in a room may indicate precipitation, such that a computer
that is connected to the instrument flashes the message
"The rain continues." 

So, there is a distinction between understanding and
meaning in at least this sense: Cognition involves more
than linguistic representation. 

JH seems to conceal this, for his purposes, in writing
that:

JH: One understands the meaning of Convention T when one
knows what is *meant* [sic] (gemeint) [sic] with the
right-hand side of the biconditional. (362)

G: Is this different from saying that one understands
Convention T, etc.? That is: What's the difference between
understanding X and understanding the meaning of X? JH is
making the point that understanding the meaning of a
compound T requires understanding the meaning of its
components. Likewise, understanding anything may require
understanding its components (though the gestalt nature of
perception and understanding is such that the
differentiation of components is usually a separate act; JH
is stipulating a situation that is abstracted from basic
experience). One has to be disposed to find out if the rain
continues, in order to evaluate whether of not the
assertion of this is true. So, yes:

JH: ..."the meaning of the truth-predicate in the
sentence...is parasitic on the assertoric mode....

G: But, obviously, whether or not the indicated state of
affairs exists is not parasitic on linguistic cognizance of
it. Also, I may represent the state of affairs with a sound
recording or a photograph. What's "deflationary" about
Convention T is that it expresses no dependence on a
"thick" notion of truth as a property; rather it displaces
the question of what is meant by 'true' to the variable
means of establishing whether or not s is the case. "P(s)
is true" need mean nothing more than that: s. If you want
to know whether "The rain continues" or not, get real: Find
out. The deflationist point seems to be that the
"truth-predicate" has no ontological baggage. 

But:

JH: ...with respect to the pretheoretical orientation
toward truth inherent in everyday practices, a semantic
conception of truth does not help us at all. (363)

G: Not true. "[A] weak realist supposition of a world
independent of our descriptions" may keep a semantic theory
pertinent to science, JH notes (OPC 362), and such a
supposition seems quite ordinary, from an "everyday"
perspective (especially for the everydayness of our complex
societies!). Besides, "methods of inquiry and theory
selection" (362) are an extension of competences based in
everyday practices, according to cognitive research into
the "scientist in the crib" and for research into the
foundations of real science (citations available). So, it
follows that the semantic conception may be quite helpful,
as my discussion above has shown, I hope. It seems to me
quite useful to include a semantic sense of
truth-predication in a general approach to truth that is
appreciative of everyday practices.


[to be continued]


Gary






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