Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2003 00:40:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [HAB:] What makes a human right universal?


Two weeks ago, I wrote this posting, saved it as a draft at
the last minute for some forgotten reason (boiling water?),
then forgot to send it. I don't recall that JH addresses
the "nature" of human rights anywhere; rather he presumes
them for use in arguments about other things, e.g.,
legitimation, in _Postnational Constellation_

-------------------------------------------------

*Why* are there *human* rights? 

Can anyone have an *inherent* right without implying a
claim that the right belongs to them in the sense of a
"natural" or an "essential" entitlement? What is the basis
of any one human right? Is this question different from
asking: "What is the nature of any human right?"? (Do
different human rights have a different basis or nature?)

In other words, given that there are rights / entitlements
claimed to be inherent (human rights), what can such
inherence be, if not natural?

What real sense can there be to claiming "universal"
rights, if not implying that such rights are inherent? What
can inherency mean non-naturalistically?

Can a theory of human rights be justified in natural terms?
If not, what IS the basis of the claim that a human right
is "universal"?

In the American Declaration of Independence, "we hold these
truths to be self-evident." In the UN Universal Declaration
of Human Rights" (not a declaration of universal human
rights?), there is no argument. It is declared by the
"universe" of signatories (a Rortyean stature). 

Does a Habermasian universalism necessarily imply some
ontological stance such as moral naturalism? 

Cristina Lafont wants to transpose the stature of realism
from truth-functionality to moral universals---or, rather,
insist that JH must do (or tacitly does) that. 

But Habermasian "weak naturalism" would be the backdrop for
ontological commitments about universal rights, rather than
epistemic realism. Rights would be really construable
because they are naturally existing. 

So, discursive reflection might justify rights naturally
(taking human rights as the backdrop for other rights),
without transcendental illusions. 

No?

Gary






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