Date: Sun, 02 Nov 2003 10:43:26 -0500
Subject: Re: [HAB:] What makes a human right universal?


Whatever Habermas has to say about this, I don't think the question is best 
answerable in the way that it is framed.  The use of "nature" in the 
Enlightenment was ahistorical but also provided a philosophical basis from 
which to challenge repressive feudal institutions (products of history gone 
awry).  I would say that rights are a natural entitlement, with the proviso 
that they are _potentially_ recognizable (if not always actually 
recognized) and are related to the evolutionary tendency towards 
self-actualization, itself related to historical circumstances in which 
this potential or tendency becomes activated.  This is not mere historicism 
(or diachronic relativism), which would absolutize the prevailing norms of 
any given period.  Rather, the very ability to ask your question is the 
very proof of the existence of this latent tendency, now activated.  So is 
human right a natural or historical entitlement?  It is both.  The minute 
the question is raised, even hypothetically, the dynamic of freedom is 
introduced into the situation.  Can the question be raised, or need it be 
raised, under every conceivable historical circumstance?  This would be the 
pivotal question.  Some say modernity (the development of liberal 
institutions) uniquely recognizes rights in a way that never existed 
previously, but whatever modernity's unique characteristics and tendency to 
enunciate rights as an abstract principle, it is implausible to suggest 
that nobody previously ever defended what they considered explicitly or 
implicitly to be their rights, or never rebelled against prevailing 
norms.  The very nature of such self-assertion though proves it is one 
natural tendency, if not the sole one.  And if one examines the structure 
of motivation in all social formations, one could construct an argument 
that human emancipation or self-realization is an inherent tendency of 
human beings, even sans a historical telos that guarantees its realization 
in advance.

At 12:40 AM 11/2/2003 -0800, Gary E Davis wrote:
>Two weeks ago, I wrote this posting, saved it as a draft at
>the last minute for some forgotten reason (boiling water?),
>then forgot to send it. I don't recall that JH addresses
>the "nature" of human rights anywhere; rather he presumes
>them for use in arguments about other things, e.g.,
>legitimation, in _Postnational Constellation_
>
>-------------------------------------------------
>
>*Why* are there *human* rights?
>
>Can anyone have an *inherent* right without implying a
>claim that the right belongs to them in the sense of a
>"natural" or an "essential" entitlement? What is the basis
>of any one human right? Is this question different from
>asking: "What is the nature of any human right?"? (Do
>different human rights have a different basis or nature?)
>
>In other words, given that there are rights / entitlements
>claimed to be inherent (human rights), what can such
>inherence be, if not natural?
>
>What real sense can there be to claiming "universal"
>rights, if not implying that such rights are inherent? What
>can inherency mean non-naturalistically?
>
>Can a theory of human rights be justified in natural terms?
>If not, what IS the basis of the claim that a human right
>is "universal"?
>
>In the American Declaration of Independence, "we hold these
>truths to be self-evident." In the UN Universal Declaration
>of Human Rights" (not a declaration of universal human
>rights?), there is no argument. It is declared by the
>"universe" of signatories (a Rortyean stature).
>
>Does a Habermasian universalism necessarily imply some
>ontological stance such as moral naturalism?
>
>Cristina Lafont wants to transpose the stature of realism
>from truth-functionality to moral universals---or, rather,
>insist that JH must do (or tacitly does) that.
>
>But Habermasian "weak naturalism" would be the backdrop for
>ontological commitments about universal rights, rather than
>epistemic realism. Rights would be really construable
>because they are naturally existing.
>
>So, discursive reflection might justify rights naturally
>(taking human rights as the backdrop for other rights),
>without transcendental illusions.
>
>No?
>
>Gary

_________________

Hell is other people's frame of reference.
          -- R. Dumain



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