Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2004 13:34:20 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [HAB:] re: The good of dialectical therapy [Fred]


Fred,

Thanks for your stimulating comments.

F> … In my view, [lifespan stage] transitions are not
easily negotiated and  seem dialectical in the sense
that changing circumstances as well as conflicted
values must be adjusted to and decided upon.  

G: But are the elements of conflicts in opposition to
each other? If one is conflicted between, say,
obligation to family and obligation to career, it's
not that one obligation is opposed to the other; or is
a negation of the other. Also, the person isn't
opposed to either obligation. Rather, the conflict
arises, in part, from *identification* with both or
from high valuation of both. 

Also, why characterize a conflict as *basically*
dyadic? Its elements are not only two obligations, but
two identifications or high valuations, none of which
are opposed to the other's status. The conflict may be
a matter of each deserving more time than seems
feasible. Thus, the conflict becomes one of *time
management*: giving adequate time to each seems
mutually exclusive; oppositions seem to lie in the
trivial "physicality" of not being able to be two
places at the same time or at each place enough. 

But maybe the conflictual sense of infeasible time
management belongs to misunderstanding between oneself
and one's supervisor: unfair workload, and conflict
resolution at the workplace needs to happen. What's
dialectical about that? If we delve into that
conflict, we will find another ethos of multiple
identifications, and a transposition of the problem of
time management to the workplace itself. 

Or maybe it's a matter of misunderstanding between
oneself and one's partner about one's commitment to
family. Delving into that will lead to a similar
internal ethos of multiple identifications.

Or probably, it's both: problems at home *and*
problems at work. Or problems at work brought into the
home; or conversely.

So, where's the essential dyad among all the dyads?
All dyads are merely proximal. Basically, the ethos of
the lifeworld is very multimodal. Really dialectical
processes belong---I would argue---to the structure of
interaction in *some* conflict resolutional processes
and to *some* parts of therapeutic interactions.

Even inasmuch as *dyadic* conflicts can be located
within an ecology of relations, the notion of
dialectic contributes nothing to understanding the
dyads, and the ecology is not a set of relations
awaiting conflict in order that there be change.
Indeed, the development of the ecology---the
lifeworld---doesn’t need conflict for learning, rather
only *appeal* or interest that motivates processes of
discovery and formation. A child loves to learn, which
(we hope) becomes a lifelong love, which never was (or
never should have been, given human nature, I would
argue) basically a matter of conflict resolution. 

Learning *can* be theorized as problem-solving, *in
part*, but the motivation to learn merely *includes*
problem-solving, rather than being constituted by it:
Fascination can't be understood as something
essentially problematic. Rather, it's a motivating
appeal. 

I agree that, *ideally*,…

F> … a shifting  theoretical perspective responsive to
social and temporal changes resonates with our
historical and intellectual (aesthetic) awareness.

G: But to see [F} "our nature and social context" as
"bifurcations" that "seem to take up a dialectical
perspective readily" involves a seeming that takes up
that perspective in the first place, whereas (I would
argue) the lifeworld's social and temporal resonance
is fluidly multimodal or manifold (rather than even
fluidly multi*dyadic*). 

F> So, I do agree with you that psychological
processes should be addressed but I don't mind if 
other social scientific fields address them also.  

G: Neither do I. I don’t wish to reduce everything to
psychology. Yet, I wouldn’t characterize psychology as
one among "other social scientific fields." Rather, I
would characterize the *social* sciences and
psychology as part of the *human* sciences or, better,
*anthropological* sciences and argue for the primacy
of psychology in anthropological sciences *inasmuch*
as:

--- Learning is important to understanding
development. (Habermas appropriately implies that only
individuals learn; _CES_: 121.)
--- The bases of insight are key to understanding
problem-solving. 
--- Individuation is important to understanding others
as "ends in themselves."
--- Reason is a matter of intelligence prior to
after-the-fact accountability.
--- The creativity of action is necessary for social
innovation and political economic progress.

F> However, my main claim in all of this is that
anti-communicative processes, namely
force/coercion/manipulation/harassment through
emotions/ideas/frameworks are unaddressable by
governmental/institutional/community procedures.   

G: I would argue contrary to that. One aspect of
Habermas’s _BFN_ is to show how coercion can be fair.
Force can’t be equated with manipulation or
harassment. 

Also, teleological action is not as such
anti-communicative, since communicative action is
necessary for actualizing social purposes, while
social purposiveness is primordial for social life. 

A key power of communicative action is to bring
articulation of needs and desires ("emotions") into
social relevance, thus giving lifeworld "frameworks"
potential for influence (i.e., power---granting
empowerment) within community processes and
institutional procedures. 

F> Basically, there is no referee/umpire/common
authority for social-emotional and psychological
processes.  

G: Yes and no. Let me just say no (though I could just
say yes.) Habermas’s work is largely about the nature
of social authority. Mature autonomy may speak truth
to power because it is *both* autonomous (to a
sufficiently insightful degree) and mature (e.g.,
credible from points of view that claim to be
nonpartisan, bipartisan, or impartial); i.e.,
individuality may reasonably be its own authority
about its own needs and desires and may become able to
stand well as reasonable person relative to social
authority that is fair. 

F> The best we have at this time are learning 
processes, education and therapy, which help
individuals to negotiate  transitions.

G: And that’s quite a lot.

Again, thanks,

Gary


P.S. I'm sorry that I'm slow to really begin the
"evolving-AT-" project, but, as I indicated there, it
will happen in a big way, hopefully beginning in early
August:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/evolving/

There's much to say about what I'm intending to do,
including that postings by me will become mainly
update announcements about Webpage topic developments
of the evolving project---influenced by   others'
interest. (Thanks, Frederik! Thanks, Fred.)
Subscription won't cause something voluminous in your
mailbox. (You might create a email folder/filter for
postings that always have "[evolving]" in the subject
line, since the links to topics will be to permanent
URLs). 

You don't have to be a subscriber to respond! But I
will only forward postings to the group that directly
relate to the development of my project, though I will
substantively respond to all response and likely
include properly-quoted response in topic
developments. I'm looking for response that stimulates
my own discursive development, as Fred's posting today
does. If that interests you, then you'll enjoy
evolving-AT-. 





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