Subject: [HAB:] HAB: links and abstracts Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2004 10:57:11 -0500 After Habermas, Edited By JOHN MICHAEL ROBERTS: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=1405123656 <http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=1405123656> Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida by Giovanna Borradori, reviewed by Axel Paul: http://www.logosjournal.com/axel.htm <http://www.logosjournal.com/axel.htm> Bernhard Peters <../biography/peters.html> , "Ach Europa" -- Questions about a European public space and ambiguities of the European project: http://www.eurozine.com/article/2004-06-21-peters-en.html <http://www.eurozine.com/article/2004-06-21-peters-en.html> Obituary of Stuart Hampshire by Alan Ryan: http://news.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=532268&host=3&dir=271 <http://news.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=532268&host=3&dir=271 > Cass Sunstein, "We Need to Reclaim the Second Bill of Rights": http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/sunstein_roosevelt.html <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/sunstein_roosevelt.html> Is Euro-patriotism Possible? by Jan-Werner Müller: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/ <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/> Anti-totalitarianism as a Vocation: An Interview with Adam Michnik, by Thomas Cushman: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/sp04/cushman.htm <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/sp04/cushman.htm> The Importance of Norberto Bobbio, by Nadia Urbinati: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/ <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/> Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments, by GILLIAN HADFIELD <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=20450> : http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=537303 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=537303> Samuel Wheeler, review of Prado, C. G. (ed.), _A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy_: http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2004/6/wheeler-prado.html <http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2004/6/wheeler-prado.html> Are Our Utopian Energies Exhausted?: Habermas's Radical Reformism, European Journal of Political Theory </isis/browsing/AllIssues/ingenta;jsessionid=h5b1u247bt39.circus?journal=pub infobike://sage/ept> , July 2004, vol. 3, no. 3, </isis/browsing/TOC/ingenta;jsessionid=h5b1u247bt39.circus?issue=infobike:// sage/ept/2004/00000003/00000003> pp. 267-291(25), Johnson P. Abstract: This article starts off by giving Habermas the opportunity to defend the 'remnants of utopianism' in his thinking that might seem to fly in the face of grim sociological realities. He wants to cut the ground from under a fashionable scepticism about our capacity to use a description of the unrealized potentials of the present as the basis for orienting ourselves to a desired future. This is to be done by persuading us that we have been looking in the wrong place for an account of the utopian significance of modernizing achievements. The defeat of utopian energies thesis rests on a one-sided description of modernization processes that neglects their complex and ambiguous achievements and, in particular, ignores the legacy of democratic Enlightenment. Yet Habermas's own estimation of the ambiguous legacies of cultural modernization also appears to be one-sided. The last part of the article finds that his argument with the end of utopian energies thesis rests on a narrow appreciation of the range of ways in which the potentials of cultural modernization have been described. There is, after all, a residual totalizing description of the role of the theorist in Habermas's inability to concede the irreducible integrity of Romantic hopes for emancipated futures. J¸rgen Habermas: European or German? European Journal of Political Theory </isis/browsing/AllIssues/ingenta;jsessionid=2cq6thx40clw3.circus?journal=pu binfobike://sage/ept> , <<...OLE_Obj...>> July 2004, vol. 3, no. 3, </isis/browsing/TOC/ingenta;jsessionid=2cq6thx40clw3.circus?issue=infobike:/ /sage/ept/2004/00000003/00000003> pp. 293-314(22) by Turner C. Abstract: Habermas's recent writings on the future of Europe advocate a European constitution as a means of consolidating the achievements of post-war social democracy and providing European level institutions with a normative foundation without the need to appeal to the idea of Europe as a 'community of fate'. This article argues that, while these aims are laudable, the terms in which Habermas formulates them owe much both to a domestic German agenda and to his theory of communicative rationality and the public sphere, which restricts the horizon within which the legitimacy of a European polity might be discussed and entails premature assumptions about what the core of a European identity consists in. It ends by suggesting an alternative sense of the European achievement and European identity. The Post-National Constellation: Habermas and ``the Second Modernity'' <<...OLE_Obj...>> Res Publica </isis/browsing/AllIssues/ingenta;jsessionid=2cq6thx40clw3.circus?journal=pu binfobike://klu/resp> <<...OLE_Obj...>> 2004, vol. 10, no. 1, </isis/browsing/TOC/ingenta;jsessionid=2cq6thx40clw3.circus?issue=infobike:/ /klu/resp/2004/00000010/00000001> pp. 1-13(13) Giesen K-G. Abstract: For some years now, Jürgen Habermas, possibly the most influential European philosopher of today, has been producing a growing number of publications on world politics. In the historical context of the collapse of bipolarity and the advent of the triad, along with the punitive wars in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, he is very far from being alone: Jacques Derrida and Noberto Bobbio, Michael Walzer and John Rawls, to name only the most forceful, have also been thinking out loud about the new political configurations beyond the nation-state. The characteristic feature of Habermas's thought is to perceive a radically new historical configuration, which he calls a `post-national constellation' and which would justify the development of a new political project, as a transition to a new cosmopolitan law. In what follows, I examine the precise modalities that are supposed to transform his philosophical design into political and legal arrangements, attempting to dissect the Habermasian vision of a post-Cold War politics better adapted to the challenges of the new century, and to throw light on the ideology behind it, as a prolegomenon to the larger project Habermas invites us to undertake. Farewell to Justification: Habermas, Human Rights, and Universalist Morality Philosophy & Social Criticism </isis/browsing/AllIssues/ingenta;jsessionid=844kpeln9jb6.circus?journal=pub infobike://sage/psc> January 2004, vol. 30, no. 1, </isis/browsing/TOC/ingenta;jsessionid=844kpeln9jb6.circus?issue=infobike:// sage/psc/2004/00000030/00000001> pp. 73-96(24) Abdel-Nour F. Abstract: In his recent work, Jürgen Habermas signals the abandonment of his earlier claims to justify human rights and universalist morality. This paper explains the above shift, arguing that it is the inescapable result of his attempts in recent years to accommodate pluralism. The paper demonstrates how Habermas's universal pragmatic justification of modern normative standards was inextricably tied to his consensus theory of validity. He was compelled by the structure of that argument to count on the current or future availability of a unified framework within which all can potentially articulate their needs and interests. With his abandonment of the justification Habermas has rid discourse theory of this controversial assumption. In weakening its defense of human rights and universalist morality against the charge of ethnocentrism, he has strengthened his theory's foothold in the lived pluralist world. Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism? Ratio Juris </isis/browsing/AllIssues/ingenta;jsessionid=844kpeln9jb6.circus?journal=pub infobike://bpl/raju> March 2004, vol. 17, no. 1, </isis/browsing/TOC/ingenta;jsessionid=844kpeln9jb6.circus?issue=infobike:// bpl/raju/2004/00000017/00000001> pp. 27-51(25) Lafont C. Abstract: In this paper I analyze the tension between realism and antirealism at the basis of Kantian constructivism. This tension generates a conflictive account of the source of the validity of social norms. On the one hand, the claim to moral objectivity characteristic of Kantian moral theories makes the validity of norms depend on realist assumptions concerning the existence of shared fundamental interests among all rational human beings. I illustrate this claim through a comparison of the approaches of Rawls, Habermas and Scanlon. On the other hand, however, objections to moral realism motivate many Kantian constructivists to endorse the antirealist claim that reasonable agreement is the source of the validity of social norms. After analyzing the difficulties in the latter strategy, I try to show how a balance between the realist and antirealist elements of Kantian constructivism can be reached by drawing a sharper distinction between the justice and the legitimacy of social norms. "Truth and Justice, Inquiry and Advocacy, Science and Law," SUSAN HAACK <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=383931> , Ratio Juris, Vol. 17, pp. 15-26, March 2004 <JavaScript:WinOpen();> . Abstract: There is tension between the adversarialism of the U.S. legal culture and the investigative procedures of the sciences, and between the law's concern for finality and the open-ended fallibilism of science. A long history of attempts to domesticate scientific testimony by legal rules of admissibility has left federal judges with broad screening responsibilities; recent adaptations of adversarialism in the form of court-appointed experts have been criticized as "inquisitorial," even "undemocratic." In exploring their benefits and disadvantages, it would make sense to look to the experience of other legal systems. Robert Alexy, " The Nature of Legal Philosophy," Ratio Juris 17:2 (June 2004). Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call "law"? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content. "Lifeworld, discourse, and realism," Axel Seemann, Philosophy and Social Criticism 30:4 (June 2004): In this paper, I give a systematic account of the core features of Jürgen Habermas's revised approach to truth that comprises both realist and epistemic components. While agents in the lifeworld are pragmatic realists and work on the basic assumption that (most of) their beliefs about the world are true, beliefs that have become problematic can be scrutinized only in the form of validity-claims in rational discourses. Thus Habermas introduces a discursive truth predicate that involves a procedural idealization of the conditions of discourse in terms of 'justified acceptability under conditions that are currently ideal'. He argues that this truth predicate has to be understood in connection with agents' pragmatic realism to give a comprehensive account of truth. This paper is concerned with the tension between truth-in-the-lifeworld and discursive truth. I argue that Habermas's account is troubled by two problems: firstly an unclear conception of the role of the truth predicate; and secondly, the suggestion that agents in discourse temporarily abandon their lifeworldly realism. While the first problem can be remedied by exploring the distinction between a truth predicate and a truth criterion, the second difficulty requires a modification of Habermas's account. I show that the consistency of his approach depends on the acceptance of the principle of bivalence throughout (in both lifeworld and discourse), and hence on the subscription to a certain kind of realism that extends beyond the lifeworld. "Redeeming redemption," Maeve Cooke, Philosophy and Social Criticism 30:4 (June 2004): Critical social theory has an uneasy relationship with utopia. On the one hand, the idea of an alternative, better social order is necessary in order to make sense of its criticisms of a given social context. On the other hand, utopian thinking has to avoid 'bad utopianism', defined as lack of connection with the actual historical process, and 'finalism', defined as closure of the historical process. Contemporary approaches to critical social theory endeavour to avoid these dangers by way of a postmetaphysical strategy. However, they run up against the problem that utopian thinking has an unavoidable metaphysical moment. Rather than seeking to eliminate this moment, therefore, they should acknowledge its inevitability. The challenge is to maintain a productive tension between closure and contestability and between attainability and elusiveness. The paper outlines a strategy for meeting this challenge, a strategy that is based on a distinction between the metaphysical content of utopian projections and their fallible claims to validity. ____________________________________________________________________________ The information contained in this communication may be confidential, is intended only for the use of the recipient named above, and may be legally privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please re-send this communication to the sender and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. Thank you. For more information please visit us at http://www.piperrudnick.com ____________________________________________________________________________ --- StripMime Warning -- MIME attachments removed --- This message may have contained attachments which were removed. Sorry, we do not allow attachments on this list. --- StripMime Report -- processed MIME parts --- multipart/alternative text/plain (text body -- kept) text/html --- --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005