Subject: Re: [HAB:]  Naturalism
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2004 16:25:10 -0500


Hi,

I am sorry that I did not answer earlier.

I agree that the word "naturalism" has too many meanings as that one could 
use it in a sentence like "Habermas is a naturalist." That means almoust 
nothing.

My claim is nevertheless, that Habermas draws in Nachmetaphysisches Denken a 
concept of self-consciousness that I like to call naturalistic because of 
it's reference to the evolutionary theorie of self-consciousness by Mead 
_and_ his later concept of a "weak naturalism". I try to show that  there is 
a connection between the not obvously naturalistic arguments in 
Nachmetaphysisches Denken and the development of the concept of weak 
naturalism by Habermas himself. The argument - and I can only sum it up 
here - is that the reference to Mead causes the possibility of a 
re-interpretation of the concept of communicative reason in a functional 
way. If you read carefully the transition from pure interactions of 
organisms to the level of communicatiion in the essay "Individuierung durch 
Vergesellschaftung" (or in TkH) you can argue that Habermas can not avoid 
the functional interpretation Mead gives this phenomenon in Mind, Self, and 
Society for his (Habermas') own concept of reason. If this is right it means 
that Habermas must show why morality should not itself be reconstructed in 
an functional way, because communcation is - ignoring all the other aspects 
of the communicative reason now - the source of some at least formally moral 
presupposition. Habermas speaks often about the union of Darwin and Kant. 
You can even consider this as one of his main aims in practical perspective 
(Detranszendentalisierung and so on...).

I would like to write a lot more about that subject but I really do not have 
the time to do that.

Again: I don't care about the question if this is _really_ a naturalism. 
Habermas speaks about naturalism in an epistemological way and in my opinion 
there is a close connection to the practical questions. But if one says, 
this is not naturalism, then he has to show what exactly naturalism is. The 
important thing is, 1. there are special connections between Habermas and 
Mead which might cause the need of a reinterpretation of the moral concept 
and 2. since Habermas uses the term 'naturalism' himself, what does that 
mean for his _practical_ philosophy.

Please don't mind my bad english, but it isn't easy to write about that 
stuff in english for me. I hope you guys can at least understand what I am 
trying to say.

Daniel

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ralph Dumain" <rdumain-AT-igc.org>
To: <habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 12:37 PM
Subject: Re: [HAB:] Naturalism


>I still don't know what it meant by the term "naturalism" in all of this. 
>"Naturalism" has a number of meanings and has a history as a philosophical 
>weasel-word that covers a range of possible philosophical positions.  Are 
>we debating materialism here, emergent properties, or something else? 
>While all of human nature has a biological basis, that basis is far too 
>abstract, speaking philosophically, to account for human behavior in 
>historical and social context.  Part of our biological nature is 
>self-definition through sociocultural formation.  Our bare physical 
>architecture can only explain abstractly our behavioral proclivities.  This 
>has been a tenet of dialectical materialism for a century and a quarter. 
>Why are we debating this, again?
>
> At 08:52 AM 11/5/2004 -0800, Gary E. Davis wrote:
>>The more I recall the issue emphasized by Daniel
>>earlier this week, the more I want to focus on it in a
>>big way.
>>
>>But what's wrong with naturalism in the first place?
>>IS this just the same as quite properly objecting to
>>biologism in, say, understanding Habermas's assertion
>>of "anthropologically deep-seated" aspects of the
>>lifeworld? Is interpretive suspicion about
>>anthropological deep-seatedness basically to wonder
>>*how are we* to understand anthropological
>>deep-seatedness, if NOT biologistically? Is the
>>objection basically a call for a discursive How To?
>>
>>What, then, is biologism that makes it problematic to
>>say that human nature is biological?
>>
>>John Searle and others argue quite well that the mind
>>is what the brain does. On that basis (given proper
>>explication), a naturalization of phenomenology may
>>gain tenability. Habermas's sense of "weak naturalism"
>>accords with that, I would argue.
>>
>>Just to get clear on what the presumed (but
>>undiscussed) problem of naturalism is, what's wrong
>>with saying that human nature is "real", in some sense
>>of epistemological realism?
>>
>>Given the tenability of evolutionary
>>psychology---which quite a few investigators take
>>seriously---why *can't* such a discursive formation
>>validly understand the "and" of a weak naturalism and
>>epistemological realism? Is Habermas's work in
>>principle averse to some kind of evolutionary
>>psychology?
>>
>>What's wrong with claiming that our ontological
>>condition is biological?
>>
>>Gary
>
>
>
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