Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2004 14:30:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [HAB:] re:  Naturalism


Thanks, Daniel, for your argumentation outline. I
recognize that your case is very credible, because I’m
familiar with what you’re referring to. The critical
issue is: How dependent on *Mead’s* understanding of
Mead’s own views is Habermas? Is Mead serving for
Habermas the role of precursor who is appropriated
reconstructively in terms of Habermas’s understanding
of his own formal-pragmatic theory? Or is Habermas
basing his own understanding on Mead’s understanding
of what Habermas employs from Mead? In other words, is
Mead---like Piaget---employed by Habermas in
reconstructive work or is Mead read as a basis for
Habermas’s own understanding of the issues that Mead
*exemplarily* raised?

I don’t think Habermas is altogether clear. So, your
argumentation sketch has credibility for me. But it IS
clear that Habermas doesn’t *intend* to be
functionalist. 

So, can Habermas’s reading of Mead be made
non-functionalist? In other words, can one read
Habermas reading Mead in a non-functionalist way?
Perhaps not. But it’s clear to me that, if Habermas’s
reading can be corrected, he would welcome that
*because* he does not intend to understand
communicative reason in a functionalist way. Indeed,
in his work that focuses on his self-understanding of
communicative reason, there is no functionalism! So,
it’s likely that either (1) he’s not reading Mead
functionalistically or (2) the functionalism of his
reading of Mead (who may be functionalist himself!) is
not important for his employment of Mead as exemplar
or precursor in Habermas’s reconstructive discourse. 

D> Habermas draws in _Nachmetaphysisches Denken_ [on]
a concept of self-consciousness that I like to call
naturalistic because of its reference to the
evolutionary theory of self-consciousness by Mead
_and_ his later concept of a "weak naturalism". 

G: In other words, JH’s concept of self-consciousness
is possibly “naturalistic” *because* he gives
“reference” to Mead and much later has a concept of
weak naturalism? Is it plausible that reference to an
other implies subscription to the other’s
presuppositions? “You find X useful, so you’re
basically just like him”?

D> I try to show that….the reference to Mead causes
the possibility of a re-interpretation of the concept
of communicative reason in a functional[istic] way. 

G: Again, my above point. Additionally, “possibility”
of a re-interpretation implies that a more sympathetic
reading is feasible. How would we adjust Habermas’s
reading in order to avoid possible reading of
functionalism? Is critical revision of his work
required (relative to his bad reading of Mead)? Or is
a critical revision of reading *Habermas* required
(relative to a functionalist Mead whose functionalism
isn’t pertinent to Habermas’s use of Mead)?

D> If you read carefully the transition from pure
interactions of organisms to the level of
communicatiion in the essay "Individuierung durch
Vergesellschaftung" (or in TkH) you can argue that
Habermas can not avoid the functional interpretation
Mead gives this phenomenon in _Mind, Self, and
Society_ for his (Habermas') own concept of reason. 


G: OK, that’s the crux of it: Careful reading leads to
seeing that JH cannot avoid a functionalistic reading
of Mead. But what if Mead IS functionalistic, but JH
isn’t dependent on that aspect of Mead?

D> If this is right it means that Habermas must show
why morality should not itself be reconstructed in an
functional way, because communcation is - ignoring all
the other aspects of the communicative reason now -
the source of some at least formally moral
presupposition. 

G: I agree---“if this is right”! But that’s the
question. My understanding is that Mead is not a part
of Habermas’s formulation of formal pragmatics. Mead’s
understanding of *socialization* is part of Habermas’s
reconstruction of available theory (through the lens
of his own!) for the sake of showing how individuation
is a socialization. Also, Mead’s theory of gesture is
part of Habermas’s reconstruction of the *historical*
(evolutionary) bases of language *anthropologically*
(and ontogenetically for individual development).

D> Habermas speaks often about the union of Darwin and
Kant. 

G: “Union”? In the passage from JH that I quoted last
week (in response to a passage in Matt’s thesis), JH
wasn’t speaking of a union. Rather, he spoke of siding
with Kant *only inasmuch as* Kant accords with Darwin.


D> You can even consider this as one of his main aims
in practical perspective (Detranszendentalisierung and
so on...).

G: Union is one of his main aims?

Anyway,

D>…... since Habermas uses the term 'naturalism'
himself, what does that mean for his _practical_
philosophy?

G: *That’s* a question I would like to pursue
further---along with concerns above. For a long time,
I’ve believed that Habermas’s reading of Mead is
problematic----but problematic for his sense of
individuation, not for his formal pragmatics. I’ve
wanted for a long time to dwell in writing with
Habermas’s use of Mead in his theory of communicative
action. I DO SEE how you, Daniel, would have the
problem with Habermas’s use of Mead that you outline.
But I think that a functionalist reading of Habermas’s
self-understanding is avoidable, while his sense of
Mead needs revision (and isn’t basic for the *formal
pragmatic* bases of his sense of communicative
action). 

D> Please don't mind my bad english,…

G: No problem.

Gary






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