Subject: Re: [HAB:] re:  Naturalism
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 2004 12:39:43 -0500


Gary,

thank you very much for your answer. Your arguments are very good and I see 
that you really understand what I try to say. And your objections are very 
important, too. Let me try to answer very short (too short) because I have 
to leave the library very soon....

>G: In other words, is
> Mead---like Piaget---employed by Habermas in
> reconstructive work or is Mead read as a basis for
> Habermas's own understanding of the issues that Mead
> *exemplarily* raised?

That's a very important point. There might be a way, to reconstruct Mead 
without using his presuppositions but in my opinion Habermas develops a 
concept of self-consciousness that _depends_ on the presuppositions of Mead, 
because Habermas does not substitute this presuppositions with another 
concept.

>
> I don't think Habermas is altogether clear. So, your
> argumentation sketch has credibility for me. But it IS
> clear that Habermas doesn't *intend* to be
> functionalist.

not at all. au contrair: it is very important for Habermas that his concept 
of morals is not interpretable in a functional way. If needed I can quote 
some citations next time. Right now I have only my laptop with me - no books 
at all :)

>
G: > So, can Habermas's reading of Mead be made
> non-functionalist? In other words, can one read
> Habermas reading Mead in a non-functionalist way?
> Perhaps not. But it's clear to me that, if Habermas's
> reading can be corrected, he would welcome that
> *because* he does not intend to understand
> communicative reason in a functionalist way.

In a way that is exactly what I try to analyse at the moment. Or in other 
words: is there a possibility to keep the concept of Habermas' concept of 
morals without the Mead-stuff.


G: >Indeed,
> in his work that focuses on his self-understanding of
> communicative reason, there is no functionalism! So,
> it's likely that either (1) he's not reading Mead
> functionalistically or (2) the functionalism of his
> reading of Mead (who may be functionalist himself!) is
> not important for his employment of Mead as exemplar
> or precursor in Habermas's reconstructive discourse.

Totally right! I think Habermas uses Mead like he uses every other 
theoretician: for his own purposes and doesn't care much about "what did 
they really say". For me this is totally okay, and I could even say I like 
this proceeding. But he _has_ to be clear then in his own conepts, and if he 
not substitutes the presuppositions in his own way you could even say, that 
Habermas' concept of communicative reason might be inconsequent.


> D> Habermas speaks often about the union of Darwin and
> Kant.
>
> G: "Union"? In the passage from JH that I quoted last
> week (in response to a passage in Matt's thesis), JH
> wasn't speaking of a union. Rather, he spoke of siding
> with Kant *only inasmuch as* Kant accords with Darwin.

Maybe I used the wrong word. In german as far as I remeber he uses the word 
"Vereinigung". If needed I quote this next time, too.


Next week I will have no time to pursue the discussion. But I hope to join 
in again later on.

Daniel




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