Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1997 17:11:54 -0500 (EST)
From: henry sholar <H_SHOLAR-AT-marta.uncg.edu>
Subject: RE: "I"



>> Anthony (and anyone else who is interested),
>> what is your take on the "in each case" portion of the passage though? each
>> case of what?

hen's 2c: 
 I think Heidegger compares the "in each case mine" to the activity of 
zuhandenheit (& not vorhandenheit)-this suggests that "in each case" the 
existence of Dasein is personal, i.e, "mine" = henry sholar's (literally), and not 
a theoretical subject (psyche, cogito, ego, etc.)

There is a view that Charles Taylor traces concerning authenticity which I 
suspect he also associates with Heidegger but has proceeded to embellish with    
Rousseau and Herder.   The view that (Taylor: "...each of us has an original 
way of being human.")  (Herder: "Jeder Mensch haat ein eigenes Mass, 
gleichsam eine eigne Stimmung aller seiner sinnlichen Gefuhle zu 
einander.")  see Taylor's "Ethics of Authenticity" (Harvard Press:1992)


>I'm not entirely sure what to do with the "in each case", but I'd guess 
>you'd have to come up with some view of the finitude of Dasein's 
>horizon.  "Dasein is mine to be in some way or another. Dasein has always 
>made some sort of decision about how to be." (BT p.42)  Looking at Dasein 
>always means looking at some phenomenon of it. But if this phenomenon is 
>the 
>phenomenon of the Self and we take that to be the starting point (as did 
>Descartes), we'll get led astray.
>
>The natural tendency is to look at some phenomenon of being-in-the-world 
>as primary and say "look! here is the being of Dasein". But in fact 
>"when being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and 
>concealments are rejected becuase this phenomenon itself is always 'seen' 
>in a certain way in every Dasein". (BT p.85) So in fact if we want to
>understand Dasein, we have to work through the disguises and 
>concealments 
>that are inevitably there.
>
>If Heidegger were to suggest a way of getting access to one's OWN Dasein, 
>I think he would have to say that any way of claiming "I'm BEING" would 
>be misguided. In fact an examination of conscience that says "I have not 
>BEEN" or rather "I have been deficiently; I have been GUILTY" seems to me 
>to be the only kind of existential introspection allowed in Being and Time.

hen again:
 I think Heidegger offers two modes of being for an *individual* Dasein 
(*distinct from a *group* Dasein, like a nation or a company or an institution):

1)  inauthentic:  falling-in-with Das Man ("the anyone"  "the everyone")
where not only do we share the historical-cultural skills and practices, and 
take on cultural roles, but we don't recognize that there is anything beyond the 
roles.  for inauthentic Dasein, the cultural roles are all there is...we stay fallen.

2)  authentic Dasein recognizes the cultural roles Dasein is called upon to 
perform in "falling-in-with" Das Man, but recognizes that these are roles, that 
they are mere interpretations of being, and to be authentic is to wrestle with 
the *mineness* beyond the roles, that "nothingness" that is our recognizable 
"self."  

of course the real meat of authenticity comes in the second division, where we 
really deal with the mineness of Dasein in guilt and, especially in death 
("my-ownmost-potentiality-for-Being").  Pretty grim stuff.  I still maintain 
Heidegger gave up the lugubrious "authenticity" of the second division as an 
impossibility.  

kindest regards,
hen



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