Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 16:24:40 +0800
From: malcolm riddoch <riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au>
Subject: RE: "I", proper names, etc.


>MR:
>> Dreyfus is apparently one
>>of the most influential but he almost completely ignores the question of
>>time, then there's Okrent's version of pragmatic temporality :( are there
>>any other contenders?
>
>In his B-in-the-World, Dreyfus says that he is intentionally bracketing
>time (remember that it is, for the most part, a commentary on Division I),
>and that he (Dreyfus) is waiting for William Blattner's treatment of
>temporality, which Dreyfus says he will consider the sequel to or
>fulfillment of his own book (I forget the exact language).  (Dreyfus's book
>is the product of 25 years of reworked lecture notes--Blattner was a
>student of Dreyfus.)
>        Blattner's work on time appears in Dreyfus and Hall, eds.,
>_Heidegger"  A Critical Reader_ (though this is mostly on "existential
>temporality" and I believe there is a more thorough treatment elsewhere--a
>lit search under Blattner would certainly turn some interesting things
>up--on time, death, etc.).
>Iain
>
>
>
>
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Yes, he's a nice bloke and he readily admitted to not really understanding
what the whole thing about temporality was about and told me to go and read
Blattner's work when he visited my campus last year. I've been
contemplating sending off for the PhD thesis but haven't got around to it
yet since the essay on why H's not a pragmatist suits my purposes just
fine, for the moment at least.

What do you make of Dreyfus' critique of Kant and Husserl? As far as the
latter is concerned I think Drefus' reading runs into a bit of trouble as
soon as he reduces noetic content down to the noemata. And this seems to be
related to his elision of temporality in that noesis is where Husserl's
notion of time comes into play, it's the process of sense making which
supposedly founds the atemporal categories. Then Dreyfus tries to exclude
noema as noetic content from absorbed coping altogether, which seems like a
drastic reduction of Husserlian phenomenology. I agree with his critique of
noema, which is part of Husserl's strange mathematical transcendentalism,
but perhaps the problem of noesis is much more subtle than Dreyfus allows.

I'm just now working my way through some of these problems and would
welcome any suggestions, criticisms etc.

MR














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