From: "Chris Morrissey" <morrissey-AT-moreC.com>
Subject: Re: Aristotle: "I'm a Soul Man" ?
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 01:00:26 -0800


> > > Ok, if epagoge is where I think it is in Post. An. II.19, then 
> > > epagoge is the immediate grasping of a first principle of 
> > > demonstration, as opposed to scientific demonstration through 
> > > prior premises.  So what "nous" sees in epagoge, according to Post. 
> > > An. II.19, is the step from "This is a rational animal" and "This one

> > > is another rational animal" to "Man IS a rational animal" - the step 
> > > from particulars to the universal and common nature.  Are you asking 
> > > something more?
> > 
> > Yes, I am asking something more because I read Aristotle not as saying
just
> > that we can "intuit" some "first principles" that cannot be "deduced,"
from
> > which we "demonstrate" all "knowledge," but as saying something more.
> > 
> > Are you saying that "nous" *sees* the step or *makes* the step? (Makes
the
> > leap into the ground?)
> 
> For Aristotle, "nous" *sees* the step.  Are you asking what 
> specifically is "seen"?  Like the "nature" or something like that?

No, I'm just asking you to explain what you said: 
"What "nous" sees in epagoge, according to Post. An. II.19, is the step."

Do you say nous sees the nature? Or that nous sees a step? (Which one of
these two?)
(If you mean nous sees the step, does this mean it makes the step and makes
the nature?)


> > > > 1. What is the mode of being of the active intellect? Is it present
at
> > > > hand?
> > > 
> > > I think so.  It is supposed to be something *within the world*, even 
> > > though it is supposed to be immaterial.  Under Averroes' 
> > > interpretation, it would be a self-subsisting form, and therefore 
> > > would be a being as opposed to other beings.  It would thus be a 
> > > being-within-the-world, along with other beings-within-the-world.  
> > > Under Aquinas' interpretation, it would be a power in a substantial 
> > > form, which is also something within-the-world.
> > 
> > No way. This doesn't do justice to Aquinas' thought. He doesn't say the
> > active intellect is "present at hand". Check out the _Summa Theologica_
> > Pt.1 Q.79. For example, in Article 4 "Whether the Active Intellect is
> > Something in the Soul" (in Reply Obj. 3), Aquinas says "the active
> > intellect is not an object, rather it is that whereby the objects are
made
> > to be in act." 
> 
> I'm looking at the article right now.  That has nothing to do with 
> whether the active intellect is something present-at-hand.  For 
> something to be present-at-hand, it must be something 
> inside-the-world.  It does not matter whether it is a material 
> object, an immaterial substance, or a self-subsisting substantial 
> form - it is still something inside-the-world, no less than a tree is 
> something inside-the-world.  The only being which you 
> *might* argue is not inside-the-world for Aquinas is God, and even 
> there, I think this would lead to problems.  But as 
> for the active intellect, it is a power in the soul, and the soul is 
> definitely something inside-the-world.  

Hmmm. Your concept of inside-the-world seems to be meaningless to me. I am
puzzled: Is there anything that is not inside-the-world? Please name
something.

You see, I don't know how you can say an immaterial substance is
inside-the-world. "The soul is definitely something inside the world"? Huh?
For example, the soul of St. Thomas? Well, sorry, but I don't see it
present at hand anywhere around us! And I have difficulty even finding my
soul present at hand inside-the-world. Don't you?

Maybe we have two different concepts of world. In my concept, there can be
otherworldly substances. But in your concept, everything is in the world.
Therefore you can arbitrarily demarcate something, say, Being, that is not
inside-the-world and thereby accuse me of forgetting it, because, like a
general with a map, you have draw your own arbitrary boundaries of what
belongs to your country?

> Proof of this is that the 
> intellect does NOT start off, for Aquinas, as what Heidegger calls 
> Being-alongside.  At first, the passive intellect is supposed to be a 
> tabula rasa, and then it begins to grasp the world with the aid of the 
> agent intellect.  The intellect does NOT start off as Being-alongside, 
> but as Being-inside which must reach outside to things.

Wow, that's a real caricature of Aquinas. I don't know where you get such
sloppy exegesis from. Have you ever read anything beyond these cartoons?
How about, e.g., Karl Rahner's _Spirit in the World_?

Well, I'm suggesting that there is nothing to stop us from reading the
active intellect as Being-alongside. After all, Aquinas says that the
intellectual light (i.e. active intellect) of the soul comes from God. Is
He not Being-alongside? 

Therefore, I'm suggesting that the imago Dei is that "in" us which is
already Being-alongside. 

(I place "in" in quotes, because I wish to highlight that there is more
than one meaning of "in", i.e. it doesn't mean "inside-the-world" or
"existing in something present at hand". In other words, when Aquinas says
the active intellect is "in" the soul, he doesn't mean it is present at
hand. He means there is a light already Being-alongside. The texts I quoted
support this view; but you seem to have made up your mind in advance that
they cannot be read this way?)


> > Translate this as "the active intellect is not present at hand, rather
it
> > is that whereby the present at hand is made to be in Being."
> 
> That is absolutely not Aquinas' position.  For Aquinas, beings have 
> Being independently of whether the intellect grasps them.  For 
> Heidegger, however, if there is no Dasein, then there will be beings, 
> but not Being.

I am unaware of St. Thomas having appointed you as his authoritative
spokesman. "Absolutely not" ? :-)

It seems to me that Aquinas would not say beings have Being independently
of whether the intellect grasps them. 

In the first place, your contention is an anachronism, projecting awareness
(better: forgetfulness) of the ontological difference back in time into
Aquinas' mind. There's nothing wrong with such thought experiments, but you
should be charitable to your opponents and look for what is open to the
truth in their writings. If you simply want to cast them into the oblivion
(of Being), then you are only casting straw men. 
(Note that Jean-Luc Marion has reversed his position on this; in _God
Without Being_ he consigned Aquinas to the oblivion of Being; in recent
years he has studied Aquinas more carefully and concluded otherwise; cf.
_The Thomist_, Oct 1996)

In the second place,  I don't think Aquinas would say beings have Being
"independently", but rather "dependently", i.e. ultimately they depend on
God. 
(And this does not mean that God is ultimately ipsum esse or causa sui;
these are creaturely similes as much as the grey beard! Even when you
acknowledge the ontological difference, there is still a God who can
transgress it and who is not bound by any sending of beings in their Being.
This is what the revealed doctrine of "creation" is: not a crude
metaphysics, but a cancellation of any metaphysical conception of
"independence" or "dependence" within the ontological difference, and,
moreover, an abrogation of the ontological difference itself. [vide Marion]
)

Therefore, for Aquinas, because man ultimately "depends" on God and on His
light in the active intellect, the knowledge of "independent" being is
first made possible (i.e. via this luminous ekstasis or excessus in the
soul, akin to "Being-alongside"). 

I fail to see how this corresponds to the "correspondence theory of truth"!
;-)


> > Heidegger's critique of the tradition doesn't do it justice. When
Aquinas
> > says in Pt.1 Q.79 Art.5 that "the human soul derives its intellectual
light
> > from Him," this is not a deus ex machina to magically solve the problem
of
> > how the soul can correspond to beings; it has more in common with
> > Heidegger's clearing of Being than he ever suspected.
> 
> For Heidegger, the clearing of Being is what allows things to come 
> into their Being in the first place.  For Aquinas, however, things 
> have Being independently of whether the intellect grasps them.  This 
> is a fundamental conflict.

I think now you can see how and where I disagree. Can you?

To me the fundamental conflict is between Heidegger's acceptance of the
fate of beings in their Being, and St. Thomas' openness to He Who outwits
this fold of Being/beings.

Pax Christi,
Chris
Chris Morrissey [More C Communications Inc., a Microsoft Solution Provider]
{ http://www.moreC.com } < (604) 877-7731 >
"A question remains a question, even if it does not come to us from Being.
For faith, far from annihilating questions through the idiotic prolepsis of
a blunt certitude (as many people, and not the least among them, imagine),
can open certain abysses that all the meditation *of the world* would not
be able even to glimpse." - Jean-Luc Marion, _God Without Being_, p.71



     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---