Date: Thu, 12 Feb 98 07:36:15 UT From: "j md" <jmdnmnm-AT-classic.msn.com> Subject: ?? Although I can't recall with precision, but a few messages ago someon e raised the question whether it was 'logically possible' to speak wi th oneself, or something to that effect. It was responded that such t alk as 'logical possibility' wasn't worth dealing with, or something to that effect. That question, though misleadingly stated, seems quite relevant to an y discussion of Dasein (early, BT). Does anyone agree that if Dasein is to be thought of as, at least, an alternative to a Cartesian accou nt of the kind of creature that we are, then we should look at the qu estion whether Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument can be constr ued as a kind of Transcendental Argument against Solipsism and any ph ilosophical picture which renders so-called Problematic Idealism a vi able or coherent account of what we are, or, perhaps, a kind of Trans cendental Argument for the existence of Voice/language? If Solipsism were the correct account of what a (one) creature, S, li ke ourselves is, then for language to exist for S, S would have to se cure through its own devices the necessary conditions for the existen ce of language. Securing such conditions would require that S 'fix' t he referent of terms which, at least allegedly, refer to certain psyc hological or mental states -- indeed, for S, any terms which do refer , must ultimately refer to some psychological or mental state of S (t hat's Solipsism, by hypothesis). Fixing the referent of such terms wo uld require that S establish some 'reference' relation -- whatever re lation it is, is in virtue of which a term does refer -- between the term and its referent, which, again, must be a psychological state. I n order to establish such a relation, at least according to Wittgenst ein, would require that S enjoy command of the distinction between 'r ight' and 'seems right'. However, for S, "whatever seems right is rig ht." Consequently, S couldn't secure the conditions for language, so Solipsism couldn't be the correct account. The last three steps in the argument are directly related to the Beet le-in-the-box parable: just like the players' communications concerni ng the Beetle, it is wrong to construe our talk about feelings and su ch on the model of our 'referring to' or 'talking about' some item or other. Of course, from here, its a big leap to argue that Dasein is it, or t hat we are Dasein. However, that conclusion seems compelling once we start looking at the necessary conditions for securing Voice: everyon e has an accent, but no one can genuinely hear their own. So from her e does the accent originate? --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005