File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9803, message 123


Date: Sat, 14 Mar 1998 17:57:58 +0800
From: Malcolm Riddoch <riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au>
Subject: Re:  Heidegger,  Husserl , perception...


>Cologne, 11 March 1998

>> >Thinking it this way
>> >encapsulates the Da inside, instead of showing it=92s ec-static nature.
>>
>> 'Inside' what exactly?
>In the world! Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Husserl thinks the ego=92s
>consciousness in its intentional relationship to objects in their
>objectivity.
>The world itself is not a question for him, nor for you [cheers mate]

Hmmm...from the context I had thought you were talking about encapsulating
the Da 'inside' consciousness, whatever that hackneyed reification might
mean. But apparently now we are talking about encapsulating the Da inside
the worldhood of the world...No? But if so, then I really don't know what
you're on about, cos the Da obviously isn't 'inside' anything. As for
Husserl, no, of course he doesn't theorize 'worldhood' or 'being-in' in the
sense Heidegger gives these existential structures. Then again, neither
does he simply think an ego's consciousness in relation to objects, rather,
he thinks the temporality of simple perceptions of the things themselves as
constitutive of both the unity of consciousness and the 'objectness' of
those things. The 'world' in Husserl's case is still given in the things
themselves as they show themselves, it's a receptive notion of perception
that also constitutes the ego as a unity in process. There is no separation
here between 'mere appearances' and a transcendental world outside of
these, cos we are already amongst the things themselves. In this sense
Husserl is much closer to the 'world' in Heidegger's sense than he is to
Descartes' empirically divided subject/object. Again, I think you are very
much oversimplifying the problematic here in favour of some rather glib
putdowns and the everpresent rhetorical recourse to 'openness'.

>> So what are the things themselves?
>> For Heidegger they are simple sensible perceptions of actual things,
>> schlichter sinnlicher Vernehmen, where we see coloured things and hear the
>> column on the march etc.
>
>This is terribly =93verkuerzt=94, i.e. abridged to unrecognizability. =93Schlichtes
>sinnliches Vernehmen=94 is only possible on the basis of being-in-the-world; it
>cannot be isolated for itself, as you do here. Perception is also a
>reduction of
>how things reveal themselves in their being. Things, i.e. Zeug, reveal
>themselves to Dasein _in their being_ i.e. in their being suitable for a
>possibility of Dasein=92s existence.

Bollocks mate. The introduction to the existential analytic sets out the
role that 'sheer sensory perception' plays with regards to phenomena and to
logos as representational judgements. All this to-ing and fro-ing about
straightforward perception is pointless because, and quite aside from the
question of Husserl, it remains a central tenet of the existential analytic
whether you can accept that or not. The simple noein of things, simply
seeing something as what it is, the phenomenon itself as it shows itself in
the light, is for Heidegger the whole question as regards the disclosedness
belonging to everydayness and the things themselves. The existential
structures of Dasein belong to that disclosedness and are nothing in
themselves...the Da must be thought as a whole and so:

>Here you articulate the core of the problem. There is much, much more than
>perception to the Da! It is not a matter of =93removing perceptions and
>their flow
>of consciousness=94, but, on the contrary, of recognizing that they are
>already a
>_reduction_ of being-in-the-world which overlooks the phenomena of
>being-in-the-world. The way in which the world opens up for Dasein, i.e. the
>Erschlossenheit des Da, is not a matter of perception but, in the first
>place,
>of attunedness and understanding. The comportment of Dasein towards Zeug has
>_ontological_ presuppositions which Heidegger clarifies, patiently, one after
>the other, in SuZ. The two modes of world-opening, attunedness (Sect.29
>SuZ) and
>understanding (Sect.31 SuZ), themselves present complex phenomena that are
>far
>removed from any problematic of the perception of an object in consciousness
>because they are far richer than the latter.

I think the core of our communicative problem is that you might be
confusing straightforward perceptions of the things themselves with
non-thematic perception of the temporally constituted 'objectness' of those
things (as in the phenomenology of time)...and then also with the reductive
seeing belonging to scientific regard that merely takes the thing
thematically as a physical object (as in _Ideen I_). So yes, the things
themselves give themselves in Dasein's 'attunedness', in whatever mood one
might find oneself in dealing with things. And yes, this is also an
existential critique of Husserl's presupposition that the things give
themselves primarily in the 'natural attitude' belonging to everyday
absorption. But nevertheless, 'attunedness' still belongs to the way in
which Dasein comports itself towards things given in straightforward
perceptions of the world. So the way in which the world opens up for the Da
is the way in which the things themselves give themselves, or the way in
which simple seeing of things gives itself. And this seeing is first and
foremost not a mere seeing of a physical object but rather an 'attuned'
seeing belonging to an absorption in the work at hand. Straightforward
perception isn't in this sense a reduction of being-in-the-world but more
the locus of the problem - how does the simple disclosedness of the things
themselves give itself? Not primarily in a theoretical 'seeing' of a
physical object but in a practical absorption in dealing with things...

Unfortunately Husserl complicates the matter here cos his emphasis on
physical objects and scientific regard as a fundamental way in which the
things themselves are given (his scientific neo-Cartesian bias) is grounded
in that temporal problematic we have been talking about. And here we have
to distinguish between theoretical seeing that reduces the being of things
down to that of a mere physical object, and the temporal constitution of a
thing such that it endures as what it is over time. This latter notion is a
non-thematic 'seeing' (hearing, feeling) such that any straightforward
perception implicitly remains what it is, and within the lived context of
one's dealing with things. This temporal 'seeing' is an intentional
relation belonging to 'consciousness' and I am presuming that you remain
conscious when you deal with things Michael, even if that dealing is an
unthinking practical absorption. Don't go to sleep now, cos the temporal
problem in Husserl gets a bit difficult here. And I am relieved that you
are:

>not concerned with trying to reify Husserlian consciousness; that is a
>complete red herring. What you [cheers again mate] and Husserl do not see
>is the openness of the
>world itself -- that it is a _problem_. Moreover, what you are continually
>missing in your emphasis on perception is that what is opened up in dealing
>practically with things is beings _in their being_.

I would beg to differ, for the emphasis on perception is Heidegger's, and
the question is the way in which the things themselves first give
themselves...ie what is the 'simplicity' of simple 'seeing' as a
straightforward perceiving in which phenomena are constantly given? The
simplicity is the existential structure of Dasein; being-in, attunedness,
being-with, practical comportment towards things and so on. And the
existential structures that constantly set up our 'seeing' are of course
not the whole of the beings _in their being_...there's that damn temporal
problem as well, but Husserl's also there (in a restricted non-practical
sense of course) at the moment when Zeitlichkeit is opening up the way in
which the things are constantly given. So in this overall sense I can in
part agree with you that:

>perception, as
>derivative of practical comportment, is also an opening up of beings _in
>their
>being_.

In part that is, because I can in no way see how perception is 'derived'
from practical comportments. Unless you mean perception as mere theoretical
seeing of a thing as a physical object which itself is derived from simply
seeing the thing itself in its practical context. But then you should be
clearer I think as to which mode of perception you're talking about here,
otherwize we'll just end up going around in confused circles. It seems
obvious that the intentionality of perception as given by Husserl belongs
within practical intentionality, obvious that is if you've read Heidegger's
HCT, but we've been through this already. But don't then confuse this
intentionality, which is grounded in Zeitlichkeit, with merely representing
a thing as a physical object.

>> Husserl opted for the
>> self-representing ego while Heidegger went for practical comportments.
>
>This is a formulation you keep repeating, while totally missing the
>openness of
>the world (in the twofold way of moodedness and understanding), the
>self-disclosure of being, the openness of beings in their being without which
>there could be no =93practical comportments=94, nor any =93historicity=94.

And your formulaic recourse to 'openness' gets us nowhere either, unless
that is you should like to explain the relation of openness to the way in
which the things themselves constantly show themselves...but I thought that
is precisely what we have been talking about, and that is also something of
the 'task of thinking'.

>Without seeing the ontological difference, which is the gateway to
>understanding
>SuZ, it is also impossible to see the openness of the truth of being and the
>movement from one to the other.

Yes, but in what sense does one 'see' openness? Does openness give itself
to you in some sort of epiphany? If so, then good luck to you Master
Eldred, but remember that the divine light also needs the open clearing to
play across...so just how does openness give itself? It gives presencing?
Which is to say, it gives being and time? Perhaps openness only gives
itself in what it gives...in the phenomena as they constantly show
themselves? But then that's my phenomenological bias again, and apparently
this:

>phenomenological bias amounts to adhering to a phenomenology of
>perception, as if the things themselves show themselves of themselves
>originarily to consciousness.

Huh? I presume that you are conscious when you 'see' openness...or do you
go into some sort of quasi-mystical unconscious fugue state? My perceptual
bias here merely follows what Heidegger lays out as regards the phenomena
themselves in the intro to the existential analytic. So I seem to have a
Heideggerean bias as far as the analytic goes, phew! Thanks for pointing it
out mate...The Husserlian interest has come from working back from B&T to
the LI and ITC and being amazed at the way in which so much of B&T is
prefigured in Husserl's phenomenology...from straightforward perception to
the temporality of everyday inauthenticity and on to the temporal
constitution of self-'nullity'. And as for all the crappy anti-Cartesian
critiques of Husserl going around...well even you Michael must acknowledge
that the issue here is far more complex than the general misreadings
suggest...no? And now on to the matter at hand...

>The being of the hammer, for example, lies hidden in the way being
>opens itself in it with the possibility of hammering (for Dasein). For all
>your
>frequent references to so-called =93practical comportments=94, it appears that
>you
>have yet to see the being of the hammer, which no amount of =91intentional
>analysis=92 can uncover, because the opening up of the hammer in its beings
>takes
>place from the =91side=92 of the world, not from the =91side=92 of Dasein (which is
>(only) open _to_ the world in its worldliness).
>
>Regards,
>Michael

Yep, but of course the 'side' of the world gives itself nowhere else than
to Dasein...in that sense we can't have the world 'in itself' can we? Such
is the finitude of human being. So we have the hammer, and I am assuming
here that you, like myself, are at least conscious when you use that
hammer. And let's not fall back into simple cartesianism here, by conscious
I don't mean that you represent it to your ego as 'this objective thing has
a use value called hammering...'. No, we both merely come across it in the
context of our work, and simply see it for what it is...the
hammer...without even having to think about it as such. I also assume here
that you can see and feel the hammer for what it is, otherwise how could
you use it? In this sense the thing itself, the hammer, gives itself in a
flux of straightforward perceptions, and in the context of whatever work is
at hand. Do you have any trouble with this existential analysis so far?

It's the context that matters here I think. The context is a practical one
for Heidegger, and as such it has its own 'moodedness' rather than an
attitude. For Husserl (the neo-cartesian) what directs the momentary flux
of simple 'seeing' (understanding) is the self-grounding ego and its
projects, whereas Heidegger shows that even this representing ego first
finds itself thrown into a with-world that constrains its actions. So then,
the flux of simple 'seeing' makes its way through a world already set up by
way of 'shared background practices' (ala Dreyfus). In our simple 'seeing'
of the hammer we see its perceptible aspects in terms of its relation to a
totality of the 'in-order-to'. Practical holism sets up our 'seeing', and
so the flux of perceptions in which the hammer gives itself as what it is
(in its non-thematized 'objectness' or bodily presence over time) is only
meaningful within the wider context of the work at hand. It's in this sense
that I understand Heidegger's assertion in HCT that perceptual
intentionality/comportment is only one instance of comportments in general.
And this notion of perception, in which the hammer gives itself as a
perceptual unity over any number of sensible aspects, is not merely a
representation of the thing as a physical object. It is the
temporal/perceptual basis for subsequently asserting the objectivity of a
thing...Heidegger shows however that this subsequent theoretical 'seeing'
and its self-representing ego cogito are also constituted within the
practical context of the ready-to-hand...

And so we get the Cartesian critique of B&T in which the ego cogito is
thrown open to its world, and so the ego cannot be the controlling centre
of sensibility anymore but rather finds its provenance 'outside' itself.
That seems to be the general drift of division one...but as we have already
worked out here Dasein's openness to the equipmental setup isn't the basic
question of B&T, is it? There's this difficult matter to do with time...or
the way in which Dasein is constantly thrown open to the world, and it's
this matter that leads to an authentic disclosure of 'something like being'.

So where does temporality show itself? In the _BEING_ of beings? Which in
our case means in the 'being of the hammer'...But what does this mean? Or
is it in the constant change inherent to simple 'seeing' (as existential
understanding) of the phenomena given in straightforward perceptions of the
things themselves? Such is the ecstatic being of Dasein...and so while
Husserl's later neo-Cartesian emphasis on the controlling ego (and his
assumption that theoretical seeing is somehow fundamental to a foundational
philosophy of science) can be shown to be a 'metaphysical' error, there
still remains this analytic of the temporality of straightforward
perception. It is the foundation of his neo-cartesianism but in it there is
as yet no controlling ego, the problem of what directs the flux of simple
seeing isn't an issue yet. In this sense I find that the ITC is still
'internal' to the existential analytic of Dasein...and here I'm assuming
that, while conscious and not sleepwalking, when you simply see and feel
that hammer within the wider context of whatever work is at hand, it
remains what it is throughout your practical dealings with it....no? Such
is the non-thematic 'bodily presence' of the thing itself which gives
itself over a constant flux of sensible perceptions...the unity of the
perception of the hammer and the unity of the consciousness that follows
along with this hammer are both constituted in the originary flux belonging
to straightforward perception, ie Zeitlichkeit. This is also assuming that
your continuity of dealing with the hammer (which is still given within its
practical context) is a continuity that is in this case 'Michael's'. That
unity is the temporalizing ground of the self, of cogito, and for both
Husserl and Heidegger, although in different yet seemingly related senses,
it is a 'pre-egological' unity that is constituted in temporality. So in
this sense Husserl is 'open' to Zeitlichkeit as a constitutive ground...yet
he is not open to the practical/historical realm of the with-world and so
goes on to develop his own unique brand of 'subjectivism'.

Is this precis of the problem any clearer Michael? I have not anywhere in
my posts on this thread tried to suggest that Husserl is thinking in terms
of the openness of being...and yet his early problematic (ie LI and ITC)
far exceeds any of the criticisms levelled at him by the likes of Dreyfus,
Derrida or even Heidegger. From _Ideen I_ onwards however, Husserl does
seem to remain firmly within the metaphysics of subjectness although in a
radically different sense to simple Cartesianism. But even here his
problematic is founded on the phenomenology of time and originary
temporality that continues to develop through the 20's taking into account
many of Heidegger's initial criticisms. The relationship between these two
phenomenologists is a complex one don't you agree?

Regards,

Malcolm Riddoch

=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83=83

Pure noein is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being
which beings as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at
them. This noein is what is 'true' in the purest and most primordial sense;
that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it
can never cover up. This noein can never cover up; it can never be false;
it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, not sufficing for straightforward
(schlichten) and appropriate access (B&T, p. 57/33).














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