Date: Thu, 05 Mar 1998 06:50:10 -0800 From: Mike Staples <mstaples-AT-argusqa.com> Subject: [Fwd: Archetypes] This is a multi-part message in MIME format. Message-ID: <34FEB8EA.AB39D295-AT-argusqa.com> Date: Thu, 05 Mar 1998 06:38:35 -0800 From: Mike Staples <mstaples-AT-argusqa.com> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.01 [en] (Win95; I) To: heidegger-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU Subject: Re: Archetypes X-Priority: 3 (Normal) References: <34867050F00-AT-marta.uncg.edu> henry sholar wrote: > do we see conceptual categories? how is it that we can see conceptual > > categories and not ding-an-sich (s) ? no, i think 'conceptual > categories' > are just boxes to hold ding-an-sich(s) or other paraphenalia, ie, the > conceptual category (whether it is Kant's, Quine's, or anybody else's > is still just another metaphysical topic lying atop the > onto-theo-logical > foundation of platonic beginnings... > > conceptual categories just neatly places the metaphysical contraption > within our haids; for example, Kant's first critique makes the mind > into a sort of '53 Buick V-8 engine... MS: Yes, I see this. It seems again that we are talking about the difference between a conceptual category, or a patterning, or an archetype as a thing-in-itself, and the presumption (jump to) considering the same as the bedrock of an onto-theology. Right? In Michael E's response in which he lashes out against science (I liked it!) he ends with a line about Jung's version of archetypes being essentially ontic. I passed over this at first, but in fact it seems as though it is important. Putting asside the arguable conclusion that Jung's thinking was not metaphysical, it seems that Michael is saying, as you are saying, that, as with the science of sticking electrodes in the brain to produce laughter, it is only when we make the jump to an onto-explanation about the brain that we get into trouble. Certainly, there are patterns in the world. There are causes and effects. There are relationships such that when we stick an electrode in the brain, someone laughs. These phenomena are just as much phenomena as any other (wouldn't you say?). We only have a problem when, as Plato did with his "Ideas", we jump to the conclusion that these phenomena are the really real, and other phenomena are not. Sound close? Michael Staples --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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