File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9803, message 38


Date: Thu, 05 Mar 1998 06:50:10 -0800
From: Mike Staples <mstaples-AT-argusqa.com>
Subject: [Fwd: Archetypes]


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Message-ID: <34FEB8EA.AB39D295-AT-argusqa.com>
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 1998 06:38:35 -0800
From: Mike Staples <mstaples-AT-argusqa.com>
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To: heidegger-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: Re: Archetypes
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References: <34867050F00-AT-marta.uncg.edu>

henry sholar wrote:

> do we see conceptual categories?  how is it that we can see conceptual
>
> categories and not ding-an-sich (s) ?  no, i think 'conceptual
> categories'
> are just boxes to hold ding-an-sich(s) or other paraphenalia, ie, the
> conceptual category (whether it is Kant's, Quine's, or anybody else's
> is still just another metaphysical topic lying atop the
> onto-theo-logical
> foundation of platonic beginnings...
>
> conceptual categories just neatly places the metaphysical contraption
> within our haids; for example, Kant's first critique makes the mind
> into a sort of '53 Buick V-8 engine...

MS: Yes, I see this. It seems again that we are talking about the
difference between a conceptual category, or a patterning, or an
archetype as a thing-in-itself, and the presumption (jump to)
considering the same as the bedrock of an onto-theology. Right?

In Michael E's response in which he lashes out against science (I liked
it!) he ends with a line about Jung's version of archetypes being
essentially ontic. I passed over this at first, but in fact it seems as
though it is important. Putting asside the arguable conclusion that
Jung's thinking was not metaphysical, it seems that Michael is saying,
as you are saying, that, as with the science of sticking electrodes in
the brain to produce laughter, it is only when we make the jump to an
onto-explanation about the brain that we get into trouble. Certainly,
there are patterns in the world. There are causes and effects. There are
relationships such that when we stick an electrode in the brain, someone
laughs. These phenomena are just as much phenomena as any other
(wouldn't you say?). We only have a problem when, as Plato did with his
"Ideas", we jump to the conclusion that these phenomena are the really
real, and other phenomena are not. Sound close?

Michael Staples





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