File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9803, message 44


Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 18:12:02 +0100
Subject: Re: Heidegger on Husserl
From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred)


Cologne, 05 March 1998

Daniel James Arthur Tarte schrieb:

Thank you for writing, Daniel. You put an interesting and thoughtful slant on 
things, one with which I can agree, by and large. 

In coming to terms with the ‘nothingness’ of being (which is, in truth, a 
richness), it seems that the verbal-happening nature of the event-uation of 
being’s truth has to be radicalized. As in all matters of thinking, there is 
always the danger of superficial slogans being generated by fuzzy thinking, and 
the verbal-happening of being is perhaps particularly susceptible to such 
flattening. 

Since Malcolm has quoted so much of GA24 and GA20 of late, for a change I’d like 
to input some of the volume that deals at length with transcendence (and 
intentionality) and temporality, GA26 (Metaphysical Foundations [Principles] of 
Logic). 

“Alles ontische Verhalten zu Seiendem, daseinsmaessigen oder nicht 
daseinsmaessigen, transzendiert so nicht erst, sofern es sich aufmacht, 
intentional sich zu Objekten in Beziehung zu setzen, sondern der intentionale 
Bezug ist nur die jeweilige faktische Weise der Zueignung dessen, was aufgrund 
der Transcendenz schon uebersprungen und d.h. enthuellt ist.” (GA26:253) 

“All ontic comportment/behaviour towards beings, whether they be in the way of 
Dasein or not, thus does not first transcend by it starting to put itself 
intentionally into relation with objects, but the intentional relation is only 
the particular factical way of appropriating what is already skipped, that is, 
uncovered, on the basis of transcendence.” 

One can see here that Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence is located on a 
deeper level than Husserl’s. The “uncovering” hints at the happening of 
truth/disclosure which characterizes the originary transcendence underlying any 
ontic transcendence. What follows on the next few pages can be read as a 
translation of Husserl’s transcendental temporality (in relation to 
intentionality) into the ex-static character of temporality. pp.263f comment 
explicitly on Husserl’s “achievement” of having seen the phenomena of “inner 
temporal consciousness” for the first time. “Nevertheless, with respect to the 
problem of time, everything remains basically unchanged...” (ibid.) Why? Because 
time remains “something inside the subject”, i.e. it is not ec-static. 

What is the ontological status of time? Can we say: time is? Does Husserl (or 
Bergson, who crops up on p.266) consider this question at all? Heidegger says 
no, time ‘is’ not; it “zeitigt sich”, i.e. it brings itself about. This is first 
movement in the ontological status of time since Aristotle. 

“Temporality is the unity of expecting, retaining and calling to presence 
originarily unifying itself in its bringing-itself-about [Zeitigung].” 
(GA26:264) 

Only within this on-going happening of time bringing itself about three 
dimensionally can beings _as such_ enter Dasein’s world. It is no wonder that we 
are now not far from ‘nothingness’. 

By the way, you can always catch up on the discussion by looking up the Spoon 
website. 

Regards,
Michael
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-  artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-
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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-_
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