Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 23:42:24 -0330 (NST)
From: Daniel James Arthur Tarte <h53djat-AT-morgan.ucs.mun.ca>
Subject: Heidegger on Husserl (It brings itself about)





heidegger-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU

St John's, 05 March 1998

Michael Eldred schrieb:

>Thank you for writing, Daniel. You put an interesting and thoughtful 
>slant on things, one with which I can agree, by and large.

>In coming to terms with the 'nothingness' of being (which is, in truth, a
>richness), it seems that the verbal-happening nature of the event-uation 
>of being's truth has to be radicalized. As in all matters of thinking, 
>there is always the danger of superficial slogans being generated by 
>fuzzy thinking, and the verbal-happening of being is perhaps particularly 
>susceptible to such flattening.

Hello Michael,

	About this 'flattening'. Perhaps I'm being too harsh and 
uncharitable, but my impression of much of the Heidegger (secondary) 
literature that is available is that it tends to merely rotate around and
ape Heidegger's speculations, rather than develop them or (more 
importantly) let it serve as an inspiration for striking off into new 
directions (ie. Nietzsche's 'dice roll': to posit a new idea is to take
a chance, for other than the history of thinking that has developed thus
far, there is no other standard or guide that can assist thinking; 
thinking can only rely upon its previous forms, and (again, more 
importantly) its own capacity to articulate new possibilities for itself, 
which spring from the questionability of existence. Perhaps a way of
expressing the (possible) meaning of being for Heidegger is to say not
that existence is questionable, but rather that there is, first and 
foremost, 'the questionable', and existence -on all of its levels and in 
all of its forms- arises and endeavors to take its stand (ie. phusis)
within the 'nullity' of questionability. But here, 'the questionable' 
does not refer to the reflectiveness of a subject but to the 
possibility of being (Sein/Seyn) granting, just as the 'verbal-happening' 
of 'the giving' only refers secondarily (at most) to the utterances of a 
subject. At the end of the day, there is nothing to be said by us about
be-ing given: it says itself, and it is simply up to us to to do with it
what we can. 

	The 'negation' of deconstruction is only (and always) necessary 
because 'the actual' is allowed to cover over the possible. Language, 
like any subject (such as art or humanism or technology), 'is': we 
therefore say that it has a materiality -a presentationalness- that may 
be formalized. Nearly all of philosophy, with all of its complex internal 
variations, may be comprehended as a series of arguments and 
counterarguments over what is the most adequate account of presentation 
and its formalization. To take the step back from all of this is, as you 
say, not a reaction but rather a radicalization, in that one 'merely' 
gives one's self over to death, over to the inarticulate and pure 
simplicity of be-ing alive; it is upon the surface of the depth of this 
'not' that the 'is' of material presentation floats; formal acts are of 
the surface as well, in that they are the attempt to bind together all of 
this debris. [Plato derives the ultimate fixity of the forms of the Good 
from this ontic surface; Nietzsche derives the ultimate fluidity of 
perspectival assertion from it.] All that 'is' is the external face of 
the 'not'; Heidegger tried to say this in his own way, and in his last 
public statement (the 'Spiegel' interview), he says that it is up to we 
of the present and future to discover this anew for ourselves, in our 
own ways (which points back to forty years earlier, in B&T, where the 
transcendental problem of authenticity is indicated; but it is up to 
'each' Dasein to discover the authenticity of its own (particular) 
situation). The 'Nihil' is not a line to be passed over, as Junger claims 
(and Nietzsche and Plato as well, in their own ways); the 'Nihil' is a 
'condition' that must be be thoughtfully appropriated into existence: 
we must learn to live in the line X. 
  
>Since Malcolm has quoted so much of GA24 and GA20 of late, for a change 
>I'd like to input some of the volume that deals at length with 
>transcendence (and intentionality) and temporality, GA26 (Metaphysical 
>Foundations [Principles] of Logic).

>"All ontic comportment/behaviour towards beings, whether they be in the 
>way of Dasein or not, thus does not first transcend by it starting to put 
>itself intentionally into relation with objects, but the intentional 
>relation is only the particular factical way of appropriating what is 
>already skipped, that is, uncovered, on the basis of transcendence."
>(GA26:253)

>One can see here that Heidegger's understanding of transcendence is 
>located on a deeper level than Husserl's. The 'uncovering' hints at the 
>happening of truth/disclosure which characterizes the originary 
>transcendence underlying any ontic transcendence. What follows on the 
>next few pages can be read as a translation of Husserl's transcendental 
>temporality (in relation to intentionality) into the ex-static character 
>of temporality. pp.263f comment explicitly on Husserl's 'achievement' 
>of having seen the phenomena of 'inner temporal consciousness' for the 
>first time. "Nevertheless, with respect to with respect to the problem 
>of time, everything remains basically unchanged..." (ibid.) Why? Because 
>time remains "something inside the subject", i.e. it is not ec-static. 
>What is the ontological status of time? Can we say: time is? Does 
>Husserl (or Bergson, who crops up on p.266) consider this question at 
>all? Heidegger says no, time "is" not; it "zeitigt sich", i.e. it brings 
>itself about. This is the first movement in the ontological status of 
>time since Aristotle.

	I would also say that it is on this point that Husserl and 
Heidegger become incommensurable. One can say that for Dasein there is an 
ontical transcendence in the 'action' of going beyond (ie. transcending) 
entities, to the being of entities: Being by way of beings. But the 
"first movement in the ontological status of time since Aristotle" is 
Heidegger's attempt to render as explicit as possible the way in which 
the ontic sphere, along with its ontological, theological and metaphysical 
derivations, is itself derivative of 'time in itself', this latter of 
which which would be the most adequate way of saying transcendence. Ontic 
transcendence places itself at a remove from Seyn (a removal that, 
according to Heidegger, Seyn Itself allows as a possibility of our 
existence; this would be one example of the 'richness' -to use your 
adjective- of the not: losing sight of Seyn in the opened up possibility 
of metaphysics is a result of the playing out of this possibility, of 
letting ourselves be fixated by the ontical; existing and developing 
within this historical event, devoting ourselves to its accomplishment 
and fulfillment, the memory of Seyn's giving gets buried (or better yet,
built over: the Hole is boarded over, so that we may begin to build our 
metaphysical 'mode' of life; the Hole (the not) throws up the boards 
Itself, so that we may have a way of existing).

	Husserl: time/transcendence is expressed by the functioning of 
the structural activity of the ego. Heidegger: time is itself, and brings 
itself about, which is already implied in B&T, therefore eventually 
making any reconciliation with Husserl destructive to his own calling. 
"Zeitigt sich": that is a really fine phrase, and I shall have to look
more carefully again at the passages of MFL that you are citing from.  

	Bergson, of course, is a whole other kettle of fish; still, I 
believe that prior to Husserl he is developing a method of enquiry 
similar in spirit to Phenomenology (in "Time and Free Will" [1889], 
he is insisting upon an empirical study of conscious life that is 
adequate to the depth and complexity of its subject matter, instead
of reductive of it), and to some of the claims that shall be made by
Heidegger in B&T: for example, that there is a qualitatively unique
experience of duration enjoyed by consciousness, which gets distorted
into quantitative terms by the mind (re. Dasein distorting its 
understanding of its authentic temporality by identifying itself with
the ontic sphere); the mind does this because it identifies itself with 
the extensive nature of the perceived world. Like Kant (and Schopenhauer), 
Bergson sees space at this stage as as a concept of extension in general, 
which the mind posits from the instances of particular, material entity 
available to it in perception (thus unlike Kant, Bergson argues for a 
genetic as opposed to apriori account of spatiality). Inasmuch as inner 
duration is positive and self-sufficient, it seems to me that it is 
Bergson (and not Husserl) who is the first to develop the significance of 
time-consciousness.

	Bergson is also Heidegger's unknown ally in the task of 
recognizing the underlying dynamics of a temporality IN ITSELF. He admits 
that his conclusions at the end of TFW are too Cartesian; for although I 
can intuit my own 'inner life' or temporality, I can only externally 
perceive change in others. How to give a properly universal account of 
time? He begins to do this in "Matter & Memory" [1896] (again, the 
resonances between his account of the nature of body-consciousness, along 
with its relationality WITH the world, are remarkably akin to the 
Dasein-analysis), but what is interesting for the discussion at hand is 
the way that the status of memory becomes increasingly important to 
Bergson; memory, he concludes in the early 1900s -after writing "Creative
Evolution"- PRESERVES ITSELF IN ITSELF. Furthermore, with the help of his
reflection upon the possibility of conceiving of a profound kind of 
'durational intuitionism', he finally sees memory as a World-Memory (or 
in Deleuze's phrase, a 'Memory-Being'), as an absolute 'substance' that 
irrupts into forms of life distinguished from each other by the 
qualitative differences in their 'consciousness' (here, consciousness is 
nowise limited to egoity, but is a term used to express the complex depth
and structure of entities). Most significantly, Bergson speculates upon 
an intuition that would have for its guideline the movement of 
Life/Memory/Time in its presubjective and preobjective 'momentum', so 
that man -who is SELF-conscious- could tap into such a momentum, and bring 
about a new form of life, a form of life for the future that comes out of
Memory into the present. The emphasis here is upon our responsiveness
to a deeper, seemingly inarticulate activity that we are nevertheless
bound up with and grow out of.

>"Temporality is the unity of expecting, retaining and calling to presence
>originarily unifying itself in its bringing-itself-about [Zeitigung]."
>(GA26:264)

>Only within this on-going happening of time bringing itself about three
>dimensionally can beings 'as such' enter Dasein's world. It is no wonder 
>that we are now not far from 'nothingness'.

	A difficult quotation, and a difficult supplement; yet your 
'supplement' gets to the heart of the Husserl-Heidegger difference: 
time itself happening, or simply: time. Does your 'as such' have 
anything to do with why nothingness is closer here? Our we speaking
here of the same sort of activity Heidegger characterizes as the 
'making present' of beings in B&T? That is: ontically, beings 'are'; 
but the 'mistake' of thinking has been to derive time and/or being from 
the givenness of this 'are'('is'). Yet is time, as the most profound way
of saying and understanding the transcendent, an 'is'?: "Temporality...
temporalizes itself. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid saying, 'Temporality   	
"is" the meaning of care', 'Temporality "is"... defined in such and 
such a way';... Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes
possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of 
Dasein's modes of be-ing" (B&T, H328 [R&M]) Beings are, as such, 
because there is time (itself). Also, The possible ways of time are 
the condition of Dasein and its possibilities ('as such' as well?);
another instance of the genuine issue breaking through in the 
Dasein-analysis (which is what Heidegger wanted, but no doubt he had
no idea that it would come about the way that it did).

	Time dispenses the 'as such': out of nothing comes everything.
Or: nothingness gives light. But nothingness is not chaos or void or
darkness, just as light is not brightness or the medium for clarity
or perfect transparency. In 'Time & Being' Heidegger refers them both
to the atmosphere of the forest clearing:

	"The forest clearing (opening) is experienced in 
         contrast to dense forest, called 'density'...
	 the clearing, the opening, is not only free for
	 brightness and darkness, but also for resonance
	 and echo... the clearing is the open for every-
	 thing that is present and absent..."

****************************

amidst green mists
                    of light and pine
and creaking doors
	            opening and closing
beneath watery slate applauding
the setting sun
is a breathing
that is a rioting- of inviting
	           sheltering
                   returning



					Yours,

                                           Daniel Tarte

 
PS: I wonder if you or anyone else would be interested in looking
closely at the discussion of Bergson in MFL; we could shift the ground 
from 'Heidegger on Husserl' to 'Heidegger on Bergson'. The danger of
sympathetic comparision is that there is always the temptation to 
translate the one into the other, so that the uniqueness of one 
thinker's thought suffers. I would suggest then, that the passages in 
question be looked at not for comparing Heidegger and Bergson (and that
also means distinguishing them from each other), but toward the task
of trying to bring to light the meaning of time in itself. This would
serve as the posited 'higher' category, set up to remind us of what the
real issue at stake is.      







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