Date: Fri, 3 Apr 1998 15:16:32 -0330 (NST) Subject: Re: Heidegger, Husserl and perception Hello Henk, At the end of your recent post to Anthony, you cite a passage from SZ, where Heidegger refers to "a making-present belonging to the unity of that temporality in which... etc". Inasmuch as the factical structure of the world, exemplified by the phenomena of presence-to-hand and readiness-to-hand, is grounded in the nullity of temporalizing; and inasmuch as the possibilities for comporting myself (as well as the possibilities that I have carried out and that I am carrying out) are 'in' this nullity as well, how do you see the meaning of this "making-present"? It belongs to the span of the past and the present and the future, a span with a factical surface and a temporal depth; but what does this mean? It seems that the factical is 'made present' via not only comportment, but even more importantly (as a condition for comportment) the movement of time (not Dasein, but the abyss). Do you think, then, that making-present refers specifically to the middle term of the span (ie. the present), or does it mean something stronger? Perhaps the way in which time, as temporalizing, is an exposing of my being to facticity? If so, what does this mean? Heidegger seems clear that such a movement does not involve a materializing or an actualizing. Would it be apt to say that on this level of analysis, we are no longer interested in conceptual accounts (metaphysical or otherwise) of entities, but are instead concerned with the 'pulsation' of time itself, and how this pulse renews my acquaintance with the possibilities of my situation? Is it not rather fantastic and strange that in Heidegger's philosophy there does not seem to be any interest in 'actuality' as an inherently informative principle of being? Just some thoughts, which I hope have at least some degree of intelligibility to them. Yours, Daniel Tarte --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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