File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9804, message 24


Date: Fri, 3 Apr 1998 16:40:27 -0330 (NST)
Subject: X: It Brings Itself About (History & Finitude?)



Rafael wrote:

Dear Michael and Daniel Tarte!

I agree with you both, that Heideggerian literatur is much either on
the Scylla of merely repeting Heideggerian slang  or on the Charybdis
of merely using Heidegger for own purpuses... The question of 'Nihil'
is, indeed, a fundamental one. Probably is Heidegger not once for
all clear either there should be a pass over (berwindung) beyond the
line or not. This is also a crucial question in Nietzsche. The
standard interpretation I know is that Heidegger thought Nietzsche
was strieving for new values, thus trying to pass over, but not in
the sense of eternal ideas, of of the idea of the eternal 'play
back'... Heidegger would question this new kind of metaphysics by
trying to _danse in the abyss_ (Nietzsche). How far was Nietzsche
still thinking in natural categories? How far was Heidegger himself
afraid (?) of remaining in the line X? Probably there was a
development in Heidegger (and in Nietzsche) in this question.
Heideggers "Der Satz vom Grund" (with the two meanings of this title:
the literal one and the one of springing from the ground into the
Ab-Grund) is a clear option for remaining in the line X. This should
be discussed taking Heidegger "ber die Linie" (in dialogue with
Ernst Jnger, I think). The importance of silence (in this particular
context!) is the the kind of co-respondence to the abyss, as a kind
of saying that should point to (cf. Wittgenstein) 'the thing'
without making a thing of it. Silence in this sense is basically a
dialogical phenomenon, it is in between ('dia') the 'logoi'.
Concerning the openness to possibilities, I think it is worthwhile to
recall Derrida's idea of the im-possible in the sense of that which
is not just 'impossible' but (as I think Derrida is thinking about)
what seems (!) impossible in a given situation, but it should be
possible (for instance concerning intolerable situations in the
world). So the im-possible is something we should look about.
(Derrida talks about this in an interview published by the German
newspaper Die Zeit). But in order to be able to think beyond  prima
facie 'given' possibilities we have to be aware of the givenness as
such (well this sound pretty abstract, but it can be very ontic...)
cheers
rafael


Hello Rafael,

	'Concerning the Line' (ie. "The Question of Being") is indeed
a response to Junger's essay 'Over the Line'. Heidegger seems to 
respectfully disagree with the latter over the issue of how the line of 
nihilism is to treated with; Junger says that we need to cross over it, 
while Heidegger insists that we must concern ourselves with it: 
"overcoming is only attained when... the essence of nothingness... can 
arrive and be accepted by us mortals." (QB 79) The line of the 'Nihil'
[nihiline] is, according to Heidegger, an X, one that crosses out Seyn, 
or more precisely, one that is drawn with Seyn: Seyn and the nihiline say
the same thing. As seems to be the case consistently with Heidegger's 
speculations, the negative is folded back into a positive, so that the
nihilating essence(ing) of metaphysics -consumated in the frame-up/
set-up of beings- is traced back to the openness of Seyn, out of which 
has sprung ('springing from the ground') the metaphysical-historical 
orientation of Dasein. So Dasein as well has been 'set-up' by Seyn: 
nihilism, that is to say metaphysics, is a distancing of ourselves from
Seyn that Seyn itself has granted us, as a possibility of metaphysics.

	Heidegger's X evokes 'the thing' of the lecture series 'Insight 
into that Which Is' (Heidegger refers explicitly to "The Thing" near the
end of QB). The thing is the 'togethering' expressed in MORTALS building
on the EARTH beneath the SKY for the GODS, the four intersecting terms 
constituting an X. Not only is technology another 'leap' of metaphysics'
possibility; as the last leap, it is the definitive one as well, for it
comes about by the gathering together of all of its prior developments
into a 'finished essence', one that thinking seems to find itself locked 
within, unable to get out of ('the impossible'?): "The rule of the frame
threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied him to enter 
into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a 
more primal truth." (QCT 309) All 'forward looking' thinking remains 
within the frame, articulating its practically infinite possibilities
for expansion and increasing (internal) sophistication (ie. 'chaos'
mathematics, for the ultimate purpose of developing applied techniques
such as weather control). Heidegger's meditation upon our technological 
contemporaneity leads him to the 'conclusion' that the frame is a 
challenge to the continuance of the relationship that human thinking has
to Seyn's open-ness, a challenge to be stood up to via a return to its 
source, which is the open itself.   

	I suppose that Heidegger's analysis of Nietzsche leads him to
the understanding that the latter still remains to engrossed in the 
given-ness of the factical; this would be why Nietzsche sees the creation
of new values as an adequate response to the overcoming of nihilism. 
Heidegger seems to see Junger's desire to 'cross over' as operating 
within the same region of the will to power-as-epochal. With regard to 
Derrida's possible impossibility/impossible possibility, can one say
that from Heidegger's point of view, this means preparation for the
coming to be of a condition that thinking could 'possibilize' as an 
epoch beyond metaphysics, but still within the same movement of history 
that provided the condition for metaphysics (ie. the thought of the
ontological difference)? This would be a possible way of 'formulating'
the eternal return in terms of the history of being? What is silence
here? Waiting and preparing? What does 'preparing' involve? 

	I must admit that recent work I have been doing, involving 
Deleuze's metaphysics, is making me reconsider Heidegger's interpretation
of Nietzsche, especially as it necessarily unfolds the thought that our
age is the age of the utter exhaustion of thinking as we have known it
since the Greeks. Why is it that 'what is at stake' needs to be posed 
so dramatically? Isn't thinking also doing something dramatic when say,
two strangers meet and become friends?

  					    Yours,

						Daniel Tarte




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