Date: Sat, 4 Apr 1998 00:43:03 +0200
Subject: Re: Heidegger, Husserl,  perception
From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred)


Cologne, 03 April 1998

Malcolm Riddoch schrieb:
> No, it is quite obviously aesthesis that "is 'true' in the greek
> sense...this perception is always true...Das besagt...das reine noein, das
> schlicht hinsehende Vernehmen" (B&T, p. 57/33). I don't think you're being
> playful now, just bloody minded. 

Your reading of this passage, Malcolm, depends on _aesthaesis_ and “pure 
_noein_” being synonymous. If there were, that would certainly overthrow my 
understanding of these Greek concepts. 

In the passage in question (SuZ:33), there is a descent from the truth of 
_logos_ through the “more originary” truth of _aesthaesis_ to the “purest and 
most originary sense” of true (“wahr”) as “pure _noein_”. Your reading conflates 
the latter two levels. But the reference is explicitly to a “more originary” and 
a “purest and most originary sense” of “wahr” (truth). Thus we have true 
(_logos_), truer (_aesthaesis_), truest (_noein_). And _noein_ is the taking-in 
or apprehension of the “simplest determinations of the being of beings as such”. 

> As Heidegger states in 'Basic Problems'
> the greek mode of access to the things themselves is by way of an
> "intuitive finding present, a beholding perception, noein...aesthesis" (p.
> 109-110).

Could you provide a German page reference, Malcolm, so that I can look it up?

The distinction between _aesthaesis_ and _noein_ goes back to Aristotle, of 
course (cf. de anima 414b). _nous_, the substantive from _noein_ is the power 
(faculty, _dynamis_) that distinguishes humankind from other living things. All 
plants and animals have _aesthaesis_, whereas only humankind has the power “to 
think things through, i.e. reason” (_to dianoaetikon te kai nous_: 414b18). 

> But if your distinction between these modes of perception is untenable then
> your insistence on denying the rightful place of phenomenological method in
> Heidegger's thinking is also questionable.

Yes, if this distinction collapses, then I am in hot water, for I am trying to 
save the ontological difference, the difference between the physical and the 
meta-physical (i.e the transcendent). 

> There is no mention here [in 'My way to phenomenology']
> of a merely negative critique of phenomenology, in fact Heidegger is trying
> to explain how Husserl in part first guided him to his great discoveries by
> way of especially the sixth logical investigation (which deals with the
> distinction between categorial and sensible intuition in the
> straightforward perception of the things themselves). In fact he's saying
> something positive about Husserl for once.

I have no quarrel with you here. Nevertheless, “consciousness” remains the 
obstacle in getting to the “things themselves”. 

> Yet sensible perception in Husserl's ITC is already a unity of retentional
> anticipation in making present, these three belong to the originary moment
> as a unity of Zeitlichkeit...

These three moments of Zeitlichkeit are not equivalent to the ek-static 
temporality of Dasein, nicht wahr? 

> Sort of, but it is also (in BP) the temporal horizon of presence, praesens,
> Anwesenheit, that first opens up the three temporal ecstases...presence is
> now thought temporally as a unity of past, present and future ecstases. And
> what is presence in this temporal sense open to?

At this point it is vitally important not to confuse praesens, Anwesenheit with 
presence, Gegenwart, since the latter is one of the temporal ecstases of the 
former. In English this gets very confusing since we don’t have separate words. 
Anwesenheit is not restricted to sensual presence in the present (Gegenwart), of 
course. And what is Anwesenheit itself open to? This is where Heidegger starts 
to flounder, as far as I can make out. Anwesenheit is only open to itself (if it 
is to be the sense of being) or it is open to the openness of truth 
(unconcealedness). But then, the framework of SuZ has already been sprung.

> You said that you sit there on the roof and plan about the job
> tomorrow...you thoughtfully relate yourself to the future possibilities
> grounded as they are in what has been, and these two modes of relatedness
> come together in 'making present' what you are actually doing
> there...thinking about things, on the roof. But this sounds like you're not
> getting down and doing the work itself but just bringing it to mind.

Sure, and this collecting of myself allows me then to go get the hammer I need. 
My getting the hammer is only possible under the guidance of my projecting the 
other hammer into my own future. The point is that the other hammer I need, 
which is not sensually, or ‘physically’ present (i.e. _aesthetically_ present in 
the Greek sense) is nevertheless open to me in the truth of its being (as the 
hammer that is good for hammering nails into brick), and _must_ be open to me if 
I am ever going to be able get it for the job I am engaged in. 

If the future were cut off from me as an openness of being, I would only be able 
to wander around aimlessly (in the present) and, with luck, strike on something 
(a stone, perhaps) suitable for the job. If the past were cut off from me, I 
would then forget what I had been engaged in, anyway. 

> And what do you make of Heidegger's contention that, in spite of Husserl's
> supposed metaphysical limitations, what "Husserl still calls time
> consciousness, ie, consciousness of time [which is in no sense whatsoever
> merely an ego's being conscious of time] is precisely time, itself, in the
> primodial sense" (p. 204/264)? That is, temporality [Zeitlichkeit] as the
> "primordially self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention, and making
> present" (p. 204/264).

This, in my opinion, is the point where Heidegger and Husserl touch tangentially 
in their thinking. 

> >Malcolm, my experience over the years with reading Heidegger is that it is
> >the
> >simplicity that is hardest to imbibe for it to become embodied thought. At
> >first, one overlooks so much because it seems obvious, or one learns a
> >complex
> >structure of concepts (as in SuZ).
>
> This latter is called scholarship Michael, most probably not a sufficient
> condition for thinking but certainly a necessary one as far as making
> assertions about the matter at hand is concerned, that is, if what we are
> talking about here is Heidegger's question concerning being, or the
> Seinsfrage.

I agree: necessary but insufficient (nicht hin-reichend). Thinking is out of 
scholarship's reach (reicht nicht hin).
To put it another way: Scholarship is the craft of thinking. Just as a skilful 
craftsman cannot be called an artist in the fullest sense of the word, nor can a 
scholar make claim to being a thinker in the fullest sense of the word. 
Scholarship is situated in the antechamber to thinking. 

Regards,
Michael
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