Date: Sat, 04 Apr 1998 16:23:24 +0200 From: Henk van Tuijl <Henk.van.Tuijl-AT-net.HCC.nl> Subject: Re: Heidegger, Husserl and perception Daniel, You write: At the end of your recent post to Anthony, you cite a passage from SZ, where Heidegger refers to "a making-present belonging to the unity of that temporality in which... etc". Inasmuch as the factical structure of the world, exemplified by the phenomena of presence-to-hand and readiness-to-hand, is grounded in the nullity of temporalizing; and inasmuch as the possibilities for comporting myself (as well as the possibilities that I have carried out and that I am carrying out) are 'in' this nullity as well, how do you see the meaning of this "making-present"? It belongs to the span of the past and the present and the future, a span with a factical surface and a temporal depth; but what does this mean? It seems that the factical is 'made present' via not only comportment, but even more importantly (as a condition for comportment) the movement of time (not Dasein, but the abyss). Do you think, then, that making-present refers specifically to the middle term of the span (ie. the present), or does it mean something stronger? Perhaps the way in which time, as temporalizing, is an exposing of my being to facticity? If so, what does this mean? Heidegger seems clear that such a movement does not involve a materializing or an actualizing. Would it be apt to say that on this level of analysis, we are no longer interested in conceptual accounts (metaphysical or otherwise) of entities, but are instead concerned with the 'pulsation' of time itself, and how this pulse renews my acquaintance with the possibilities of my situation? Is it not rather fantastic and strange that in Heidegger's philosophy there does not seem to be any interest in 'actuality' as an inherently informative principle of being? ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Some thoughts: Making present .... Making-present is something we always live in. It is the way we encounter something that has presence (Anwesendes) in the present (Gegenwart). This encountering is a process of construction. We construct a specific something out of what is no longer and what is not yet there. Therefore, making-present can be seen as the foundation of intentional comportment - or of comportment (Verhalten) as such. Intentional and transcendental ... The relation between time and the intentional and transcendental is unclear to me. In relation to the intentional, time seems to be only the precondition for the construction by Dasein of what has presence (Anwesendes) - even if it is absent (Abwesendes) - since Heidegger does not seem to accept the possibility of the absolute absent (as far as I know), In relation to the transcendental, time seems to be only the precondition for the construction of the transcendental (e.g. _Verstehen_) by Dasein - at least after SZ... More or less ... Making-present, as the intentional, is something we _always_ live in. And it is seems - somehow - _always_ imbedded in the transcendental. Because of this "imbeddedness" it is more than it seems to be at first sight. There is always some kind of back-up (_im Ruecken_). Time's doings ... Time itself does not _do_ anything but temporalize itself and only in relation to Dasein and its intentional or transcendental constructions. Perhaps if the absolute absent had been possible, the functioning of time could have been different ... Actuality ... Dasein seems to be essentially in a fallen mode. However, it may bring itself back from falling and be more authentically "there" in the "moment of _vision_" (Augenblick). The _Augenblick_ is not a simple "now". In the _Augenblick_ Dasein "takes place" and is truly "there" in its particular situation, owned and whole. It is not fascinated, curious or absorbed, forgetting itself, but fully being itself. Kindest regards, Henk --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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