File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9804, message 86


From: "henry sholar" <H_SHOLAR-AT-marta.uncg.edu>
Date:          Tue, 21 Apr 1998 14:07:10 EST
Subject:       Re: Thinking Phenomenologically



>_from Michael Staples_:
>In the midst of the Husserl/Heidigger dialogue that has been going on,
>one question occured to me about the process of thinking
>phenomenologically. Husserl attempts to outline a method for thinking
>about being in the world phenomenologically. He goes through his
>routine...suspend the Natural mode of thinking, return to the thing
>itself, alow imaginative variation to collect perceptional
>impressions...and so on.
>
>Is Heidegger's approach to thinking the world phenomenologically (and
>I'm talking method here) different from Husserl's only in regard to the
>suspension of this Natural mode? 

no

In other words, where Husserl's method
>might suggest a step back, away from direct involvement in the world
>(and I realize this reading of the epoche might be controversial),
>Heidegger might suggest a step toward direct involvement. Is that the
>difference, not so much in their theoretical structue, but in the way
>these two men might suggest I go about thinking the world
>phenomenologically? 

still no

>Or is there more? 

yep

>Can anyone suggest a Heideggerian
>method for thinking about the world phenomenologically? 

i am still stuck with heideggerian thinking; yet to move to:
1) thinking "about"   or even 2) thinking "about the world"
much less 3) thinking "about the world phenomenologically?"

i think heidegger critiques husserl's phenomenology in his discussion
of phenomnology in the intros to B&T, or early there in the first division.


>Might the
>Husserlian "chalk" example (you know, walking around the piece of chalk,
>gathering perceptual evidence from different angles until all of a
>sudden you realize that its a piece of chalk) be a nice vehicle for an
>explanation here?
>

i can't see how.  the most radical difference has to do with the
theoretical stance; where husserl finds truth and the really real.

heidegger finds this {bracketing} theorizing, representational 
thematizing to be the most poverty-stricken understanding of
anything.  (you know this michael, or've heard me singit in 
various keys, complete with textual citations).

our premordial (best) understandings of things are
at their most radically pracitical and useful and, therefore,
transparent.  so the chalk-user knows the chalk, and knows
it best when she/he's not even thinking about it (when the
use of the chalk is completely transparent; when the use of
the chalk, the chalk-user and the event of chalk-using is all
the same.)



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