Date: Fri, 1 May 1998 12:27:13 -0500
Subject: Re: Heidegger & Kuhn


> focus).  When you say that Kuhn stays within conceptual philosophy and 
> therefore leads to relativism with his paradigm-revolution theses, I
> think I understand what you mean.  But what, more specifically, is 
> conceptual philosophy, and how does Heidegger overcome it?  

The following is a rather crude explanation, but it gets the point across.

The relativism which results from the Kuhnian theory of paradigm shifts was 
clearly drawn out by Feyerabend in "Against Method." The primary basis of this 
inevitable result is the relativization of *facts.* Traditionally, the truth and falsity 
of theories was ultimately decided by objective facts, so if it turns out that there 
are no objective facts (as both Kuhn and Feyerabend argue), then the truth and 
falsity of theories themselves become relativized. So the whole theory of 
paradigm shifts is ultimately assumes that if there were any ground of real truth 
and falsity, it must be objective facts, so since facts fail in this regard, the 
result must be total relativism. 

Heidegger proposes that the essence of truth is not the thing as *objective 
fact,* and in a radically new way. The best way to begin seeing what he is 
saying is to see what it traditionally meant to be an objective fact. To be 
objective meant to exclude any personal subjective element, which is the entire 
point of a precise scientific experiment. Objectivity requires that one distances 
oneself from the thing, so that it appears only as it itself is, without any 
"subjective coloring." Kuhn and Feyerabend argue that there can never be a 
situation in which such "subjective coloring" is removed, so that one can never 
really get to things themselves. Now, note that this follows only if "getting to 
things themselves" means removing attachments we have with the thing.

Heidegger turns this on its head. He proposes that "getting to things 
themselves" means precisely our dealings with things in which we are 
absorbed with it, interest in it, and not seeing it "objectively." He gives the 
example of a person using something without thinking about it, such as 
someone hammering without thinking about the hammer. Traditionally, such 
"unthinking" activity would be the farthest thing from "getting to things 
themselves," since we would be "merely" using it without thinking about and 
studying it. This view goes all the way back to Plato. Heidegger, however, says 
that when we think about something, we are merely thinking about it without 
using it. *Thinking* and *analyzing* turns out to be the deficient mode. I can go 
into the latter further if you wish, but that is the basic divide between Heidegger 
and Kuhn, in my opinion. Kuhn is still assuming that the ground of truth must 
be objective facts, so since the latter are impossible, the result is total 
relativism. Heidegger questions the very point that the ground of truth must be 
objective facts.

Anthony Crifasi


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