Date: Sat, 16 May 1998 14:46:41 +0100
From: jmd <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: What is being said


To Bob/Diane:

In message <3.0.32.19980515204957.0069fdc0-AT-rain.org>, 
Bob/Diane <guevara-AT-rain.org> writes
>>i say that a "thing" is very rigidly "defined."
>>i can bring about evidence to support it.
>>i can validate it.
>>it is self-consistent.
>>it is calculated.
>>
>
Bob/Diane's clarification:
>i was referring to the implicit "range" of related-ness to chair, as an
>example.  my point is that the chair, in the mode of everydayness is just a
>"thing."  an object separate from me the subject.  my characterization was
>meant to emphasize the apparent concrete-ness of the chair.  in the world
>of everyday-ness, it exists independent of language as a separate thing,
>however if i decided to "prove" it's existence, i could do so by reasoning
>an "absolute validity" of such an existence.  and in the same sort of way,
>i can come to an absolute validity of my wife being stubborn, as an
>example.  i can mentally hold her that way.  she is that in my mind and
>since i'm being my mind (default ground),  i am that she is stubborn.
>that's who she is for me.  i can bring about tons of evidence that supports
>she-is-stubborn.  as a default human being, we "do" this is my claim.  and
>we do it habitually.
>
Bob/Diane, 
if my reading/interpretation of SuZ is correct, then
>the chair, in the mode of everydayness is
NOT
>an object separate from
you, 
>the subject.
Indeed, it seems to me that the characterization/interpretation which you
advance of ein Seiendes in 'the mode of everydayness' is of a piece with
that which Heidegger sees Descartes as advancing. H sees D as
characterizing an "entity" as "an object separate from" Dasein,
"separate" in that special Traditional sense, an object with respect to
whose 'existence' Dasein suffers such an epistemological problematic
that the object's 'existence' genuinely seems to require proof. In other
words, with respect to the chair, qua object 'separate' from Dasein, as
you, Bob/Diane yourself insist,  had one
>decided to "prove" it's existence
one "could do so by reasoning," albeit, poor reasoning perhaps, such as
invoking deus ex machinae.

In short, your characterization/interpretation of everydayness simply
carries an endorsement of the Tradition which H criticizes.

Similarly, your comments about your wife, interpolated with respect to
the so-called problem of other minds, convey a
characterization/interpretation of the Other which is also of a piece with
D's interpretation of Dasein's mitdasein intimacy with the Other
(paranthetically, your usage of the qualifier "in the same sort of way"
puzzles me: shouldn't the analogy be between the existence of your wife,
qua codasein, and the chair's vorhandensein, qua thing; and not
between a character trait of your wife, given her existence qua
codasein, and the chair).

If you intend to refer to "the chair" as a node, if you will, constituted by
and individuated as the intersection of a variety of loosely coordinated
and uncoordinated Dasein comportments ("its related-ness"?), qua
Zeug, if you will,  there is no question of "proving" its 'existence'. This
"no-question" status, moreover, does not refer to the Kantian "scandal
of philosophy," but the scandalousness of that scandal as H saw it (in his
Geshicte des Zeitsbegriffe): that the scandal is that we even confer
meaningfulness upon and accord legitimate urgency to the so-called
question of "proof of an external world," "proof of the existence of
Other minds," or in this case, to a chair or a codasein. 

Is my reading of your comments incorrect? If so, then the delicacy and
subtlety of the philosophical points you are making demand clearer and
more careful formulation. Heideggerian ATTIRE concealing a Cartesian
physique does not render the physique of Heideggerian stock. I.e., you
seem to neglect the significance of or simply to conflate the distinctions
of Presence/Praxis, Vorhandensein/Zuhandensein.

>
>james.  please consider carefully the distinction between "contemplative"
>thought and "praxis."  when calculating change, you are indeed using
>"mental" calculation.  a perfectly appropriate use of such thought.  simple
>and useful.  then informed by this activity, you give change in an actual
>encounter with the customer.

Question, Bob/Diane:
is "'mental' calculation" to be categorized as "'contemplative' thought or
"praxis," qua intrinsic component of or "ground of"
>an actual
>encounter with
codasein?

>From what you write in the following, it seems that you would
categorize this species of calculation as "contemplative" (because
"technological"?) and therefore metaphysically based:
>as i indicated, my
>assertion is that calculative thinking is technological as well as the
>ground of default relationship or "being with" 

This suggests to me that not only do you see all thinking, not just
calculative/contemplative as metaphysically based, but also that YOU
ASSUME not only that thought grounds, in some sense, mitdasein, and,
thus, codasein encounters, but also that it is METAPHYSICAL thought
which does so.

If this reading of your position is correct, then to characterize thought as
metaphysically based would be as informative as characterizing all
bachelors as unmarried: true, in some sense, but trivial. In any case,
being "metaphysically based" is not a characteristic on which you can
pivot a taxonomy of thought. What's more, in a very loose and broad
characterization of H's thought, mitdasein is precisely NOT so
grounded. 
 
Still later, you make such claims as that

> the "mind" is indeed bewitching.

In light of your earlier comments, I read your usage of the term "mind"
here as designating an item which enjoys a species of 'existence' which
is 'separate from' the "things" in their mode of everydayness. Such an
item was precisely Descartes' res cogitans.

I am, thus, again seeing merely Heideggerian plate on Cartesian metal.
Such veneer does not secure Heideggerian alloy; it is not the sterling
view for which H was seeking emancipation from the tradition.  

As for some of your other questions:

>are you arguing for the status quo?

I don't understand what "the staus quo" is. Is it the traditional Cartesian
view which you endorse, at least, as I interpret your comments
throughout? If that is "the status quo," then clearly not. What is "the
status quo"?

>are you proposing something new in the way of workability?

Am I proposing something new? I hope so. Whether it is "in the way of
workability" or not, I cannot say because I don't understand what that
means. 

>by the way jim.  why don't you address me directly?

I didn't address you directly for the simple reason that I was NOT
addressing YOU directly. Whether the views which I quoted were
yours or another's, was not relevant. As a matter of fact, when I quoted
them, I didn't know from whose 'post' I was quoting.

My closing point was that the usage of language -- for whatever
purposes -- should be guided by the same love of and care for language
which typifies the poet and novelist, although obviously not confined to
them; that not heeding the example of such artists, especially in dialogue
with H or the Tradition, we stand the risk of "taking language on
holiday." 
Cheers,

jim


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