Date: Sat, 16 May 1998 16:11:13 -0700
From: Bob/Diane <guevara-AT-rain.org>
Subject: Re: What is being said


>Bob/Diane's clarification:


now that's philosophical.


>>i was referring to the implicit "range" of related-ness to chair, as an
>>example.  my point is that the chair, in the mode of everydayness is just a
>>"thing."  an object separate from me the subject.  my characterization was
>>meant to emphasize the apparent concrete-ness of the chair.  in the world
>>of everyday-ness, it exists independent of language as a separate thing,
>>however if i decided to "prove" it's existence, i could do so by reasoning
>>an "absolute validity" of such an existence.  and in the same sort of way,
>>i can come to an absolute validity of my wife being stubborn, as an
>>example.  i can mentally hold her that way.  she is that in my mind and
>>since i'm being my mind (default ground),  i am that she is stubborn.
>>that's who she is for me.  i can bring about tons of evidence that supports
>>she-is-stubborn.  as a default human being, we "do" this is my claim.  and
>>we do it habitually.
>>
>Bob/Diane, 
>if my reading/interpretation of SuZ is correct, then
>>the chair, in the mode of everydayness is
>NOT
>>an object separate from
>you, 
>>the subject.
>Indeed, it seems to me that the characterization/interpretation which you
>advance of ein Seiendes in 'the mode of everydayness' is of a piece with
>that which Heidegger sees Descartes as advancing. H sees D as
>characterizing an "entity" as "an object separate from" Dasein,
>"separate" in that special Traditional sense, an object with respect to
>whose 'existence' Dasein suffers such an epistemological problematic
>that the object's 'existence' genuinely seems to require proof. In other
>words, with respect to the chair, qua object 'separate' from Dasein, as
>you, Bob/Diane yourself insist,  had one
>>decided to "prove" it's existence
>one "could do so by reasoning," albeit, poor reasoning perhaps, such as
>invoking deus ex machinae.
>
>In short, your characterization/interpretation of everydayness simply
>carries an endorsement of the Tradition which H criticizes.



James.  James.  I was addressing the default configuration of being human.

[listen james.  i really appreciate your response and interaction however,
once again, i'm here as an "in the raw" heideggerian.  i'm not interested
in intellectual debates.  i'm interested in working knowledge.  if you
aren't able to accommodate that then i understand.  i am not a scholar (as
is plain) nor am i interested in being an academician even tho i have great
respect those that are.]


 .. thingification.  or being always already situated in ontic concerns.
SuZ sheds light on the matter that the traditionals did "explain" in the
context of an object/subject split.  this is without a doubt.  however SuZ
illuminates being human in it's default mode and not till later does H
address the end of philosophy and a new possibility of being human. 




>Similarly, your comments about your wife, interpolated with respect to
>the so-called problem of other minds, convey a
>characterization/interpretation of the Other which is also of a piece with
>D's interpretation of Dasein's mitdasein intimacy with the Other
>(paranthetically, your usage of the qualifier "in the same sort of way"
>puzzles me: shouldn't the analogy be between the existence of your wife,
>qua codasein, and the chair's vorhandensein, qua thing; and not
>between a character trait of your wife, given her existence qua
>codasein, and the chair).



problem of other minds?  no james.  simply an unfolding of what it is to be
human.

james.  i put forth that a reasoning mind conceptualizes.  whether this
activity leads to a technological manifestation or the habitual behavior
that identifies is irrelevant.  it is conceptualization that bewitches.




>If you intend to refer to "the chair" as a node, if you will, constituted by
>and individuated as the intersection of a variety of loosely coordinated
>and uncoordinated Dasein comportments ("its related-ness"?), qua
>Zeug, if you will,  there is no question of "proving" its 'existence'. This
>"no-question" status, moreover, does not refer to the Kantian "scandal
>of philosophy," but the scandalousness of that scandal as H saw it (in his
>Geshicte des Zeitsbegriffe): that the scandal is that we even confer
>meaningfulness upon and accord legitimate urgency to the so-called
>question of "proof of an external world," "proof of the existence of
>Other minds," or in this case, to a chair or a codasein. 



you built this whole display on misunderstanding.  i was addressing
default-ness as i explained above.



>Is my reading of your comments incorrect?



yes.  see above.



>If so, then the delicacy and
>subtlety of the philosophical points you are making demand clearer and
>more careful formulation. Heideggerian ATTIRE concealing a Cartesian
>physique does not render the physique of Heideggerian stock. I.e., you
>seem to neglect the significance of or simply to conflate the distinctions
>of Presence/Praxis, Vorhandensein/Zuhandensein.



wow james.  you're off to the races eh?  once again.  this is all based on
a misunderstanding.

i'm not a scholar.  as is obvious to you.  i said so clearly at the off
set.  if that wasn't agreeable to you then why interact with me?




>>james.  please consider carefully the distinction between "contemplative"
>>thought and "praxis."  when calculating change, you are indeed using
>>"mental" calculation.  a perfectly appropriate use of such thought.  simple
>>and useful.  then informed by this activity, you give change in an actual
>>encounter with the customer.
>
>Question, Bob/Diane:
>is "'mental' calculation" to be categorized as "'contemplative' thought or
>"praxis," qua intrinsic component of or "ground of"
>>an actual
>>encounter with
>codasein?
>
>>From what you write in the following, it seems that you would
>categorize this species of calculation as "contemplative" (because
>"technological"?) and therefore metaphysically based:
>>as i indicated, my
>>assertion is that calculative thinking is technological as well as the
>>ground of default relationship or "being with" 
>
>This suggests to me that not only do you see all thinking, not just
>calculative/contemplative as metaphysically based, but also that YOU
>ASSUME not only that thought grounds, in some sense, mitdasein, and,
>thus, codasein encounters, but also that it is METAPHYSICAL thought
>which does so.
>
>If this reading of your position is correct, then to characterize thought as
>metaphysically based would be as informative as characterizing all
>bachelors as unmarried: true, in some sense, but trivial. In any case,
>being "metaphysically based" is not a characteristic on which you can
>pivot a taxonomy of thought. What's more, in a very loose and broad
>characterization of H's thought, mitdasein is precisely NOT so
>grounded. 
> 
>Still later, you make such claims as that
>
>> the "mind" is indeed bewitching.
>
>In light of your earlier comments, I read your usage of the term "mind"
>here as designating an item which enjoys a species of 'existence' which
>is 'separate from' the "things" in their mode of everydayness. Such an
>item was precisely Descartes' res cogitans.




exactly.  and THAT IS MY POINT!  always already being human is to "act"
based on what is "made-up" and not what is so.  that is precisely the point.




>I am, thus, again seeing merely Heideggerian plate on Cartesian metal.
>Such veneer does not secure Heideggerian alloy; it is not the sterling
>view for which H was seeking emancipation from the tradition.  
>
>As for some of your other questions:
>
>>are you arguing for the status quo?
>
>I don't understand what "the staus quo" is. Is it the traditional Cartesian
>view which you endorse, at least, as I interpret your comments
>throughout? If that is "the status quo," then clearly not. What is "the
>status quo"?
>
>>are you proposing something new in the way of workability?
>
>Am I proposing something new? I hope so. Whether it is "in the way of
>workability" or not, I cannot say because I don't understand what that
>means. 
>
>>by the way jim.  why don't you address me directly?
>
>I didn't address you directly for the simple reason that I was NOT
>addressing YOU directly. Whether the views which I quoted were
>yours or another's, was not relevant. As a matter of fact, when I quoted
>them, I didn't know from whose 'post' I was quoting.


i got it james.


>My closing point was that the usage of language -- for whatever
>purposes -- should be guided by the same love of and care for language
>which typifies the poet and novelist, although obviously not confined to
>them; that not heeding the example of such artists, especially in dialogue
>with H or the Tradition, we stand the risk of "taking language on
>holiday." 
>Cheers,


i really doubt that.  i say that endless philosophizing is language on
holiday.  as H himself says.  have you even read later H james?

later....


Robert T. Guevara   | guevara-AT-rain.org
Electrical Engineer | guevarb-AT-mugu.navy.mil
Camarillo CA, USA   | http://www.rain.org/~guevara


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