Date: Sun, 17 May 1998 22:12:02 +0000
Subject: Re: Clarity


Robert wrote:

> about the hammer.  tony, in the default configuration we have our moments
> of authenticity.  clearly we do.  our lives are heavily and rigidly
> organized by "conceptualization" but sometimes, in certain contexts, we
> just let go of our "idea" of the world and just "hammer."

Actually, I would agree with Heidegger that "for the most part" (ie, 
the vast majority of the time), we are not "rigidly organized by 
conceptualization." That is precisely why, in Being and Time, 
Heidegger characterizes everydayness by readiness-to-hand (concernful 
absorbtion) instead of presence-at-hand. Everydayness by the very 
name suggests what is ordinarily and for the most part the case. With 
that move, Heidegger overturns the entire history of philosophy, 
which instead characterized everydayness as a deficient mode of 
presence ("unreflective perception" or something along those lines).

> about your kids.  of course they are your kids.  despite the obvious case
> of reflection you also mentally check with an "idea" of your child before
> (in real-time actually) interacting with him/her.  what i'm saying is that
> this mental checking isn't always on the level of "the little voice"
> talking in an psuedo-audible way.  it is that we be our "minds" as
> metaphysically grounded beings.  we are that the world is a certain way.

If I am understanding you (and Heidegger) correctly, I believe 
Heidegger would disagree with your equation between the world being a 
certain way and our being "metaphysically grounded beings." For 
Heidegger, the metaphysical world is only one way that the world is; 
nor is it the most primordial way that the world is. For Heidegger, 
the metaphysical world is founded upon the "practical" world, which 
is actually how the world is for the most part. In that "practical" 
world, we do not "mentally check with an idea" of something before 
interacting with it. Rather, the latter characterization presupposes 
a prior, more primordial interaction - one which is not metaphysical, 
and has nothing to do with "ideas."

> i mean that this is a good thing.  it adds "workable" structure to the
> world.  see it's not only for us as individuals that the world is a certain
> way.  it is for everyone a certain way in that many "things" exist as if
> they are "independent of language." (eg mountains. cars. chairs etc)

The characterization of "things" as "independent of language" is a 
conceptual one, and therefore (according to Heidegger) is founded 
upon a mode in which we encounter beings prior to such 
"independence." Even the "as if" which you add in your last sentence 
is a conceptual analysis of the pre-conceptual. For example, while I 
am absorbed in hammering, there is no hammer which appears "as if" it 
is independent of language. Rather, it is that way only upon 
conceptual reflection.

> so i'm sure that you have a great relationship with your kids.  however
> some folks have varying degrees of workability in relationships.  my
> experience in observing many folks work through to higher levels of
> workability was that inevitably, it was their interaction through a
> "filter" or adaptation mechanism that presented the limiting factor in such
> workability.  it appears that we (for the most part) interact with the
> world through an intermediary structure.  and we do this involuntarily.
> the psych people would say: "unconsciously")

The problem with making this the fundamental explanation is that it 
attempts to characterize the non-conceptual conceptually, thereby 
cutting of the possibility of encountering beings at all. If what is 
fundamentally going on is that we "interact with the world through an 
intermediary structure," then the problem immediately arises - how do 
we know that it's not all the "structure;" ie, how do we know that 
there is a world at all? The analysis of experience in terms of us 
experiencing a world through some intermediate filter is precisely 
that - an analysis, and is therefore a conceptual characterization of 
the non-conceptual. This does not mean that this explanation is not 
one way of encountering beings. It merely means that this explanation 
cannot be treated as if it is the most fundamental characterization 
of our encounter with beings.

Anthony Crifasi 


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